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 Much is made of the ethical duty to protect attorney-client privi-
lege.  Both the ethical duty of confidentiality1 and the ethical duty of 
zealous representation2 require attorneys to vigorously defend privi-
leged information from attempts to compel its disclosure.  The no-
tion that there might be ethical limits to such a duty is hardly ever 
considered and certainly not emphasized.  For most lawyers, this em-
phasis on the importance of protecting privilege and lack of attention 
to the ethical limits of such claims has produced a sense that there is 
an unlimited ethical duty to protect privileged information from 
compulsory disclosure.  Indeed, many lawyers seem to think that they 
are ethically obligated to give privilege the same level of protection 
given to criminal defendants.  Just as criminal defendants are pre-
sumed innocent until the government has proven their guilt, lawyers 
often treat confidential information as privileged until the party seek-
ing compulsory disclosure proves that it is not. 
From this perspective, a claim of privilege cannot be any more 
frivolous than a plea of “not guilty,” even if the documents in ques-
tion have never been examined nor the relevant law of privilege re-
searched.  “Knee-jerk” claims of attorney-client privilege to any in-
formation requested are seen not as merely strategic, but as ethically 
required.  Such conduct is buttressed by assumptions that the adver-
sary system provides opponents a fair opportunity to challenge claims 
of privilege.  Taken together, these assumptions produce “an impor-
 1 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2004) (“A lawyer shall not reveal 
information relating to the representation of a client . . . .”). 
 2 Id. M.R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (“A lawyer must . . . act . . . with zeal in advocacy upon the 
client’s behalf.”). 
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tant and recurring problem in civil discovery—the improper assertion 
of a claim of privilege.”3
In fact, neither the law of privilege nor the systemic realities of 
privilege litigation support application of the ultra-zealous posture of 
criminal defense lawyers to claims of privilege.  In criminal cases, the 
legal presumption of innocence provides a firm foundation for the 
ethics of presumptively pleading a client not guilty.4  In contrast, the 
legal burdens for proving privilege are in direct opposition to a prac-
tice of presumptively claiming privilege.  In matters of evidence, the 
presumption is in favor of the compulsion to reveal relevant evi-
dence,5 and the burden initially falls on the party claiming privilege 
to show that the information in question meets the multi-factor legal 
test for privilege.6  Thus, as a matter of law, it is quite possible to 
make a frivolous claim of privilege.7  Furthermore, courts that en-
counter such claims are more than willing to impose a wide range of 
sanctions on attorneys and/or their clients,8 as such frivolous claims 
of privilege, even when successfully unmasked, impose unnecessary 
litigation costs on both clients and opposing parties,9 and use up 
scarce judicial resources.10
 3 Eureka Fin. Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 136 F.R.D. 179, 181 
(E.D. Cal. 1991) (“blanket” privilege objections that delayed production by five years 
sanctioned by waiver of privilege and compelling production). 
 4 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 & cmt. 3 (prohibiting frivolous 
claims and contentions but allowing “[a] lawyer for the defendant in a criminal pro-
ceeding . . . [to] so defend the proceedings as to require that every element of the 
case be established”). 
 5 See United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d 1369, 1389 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating that 
the attorney-client privilege is not “favored” because it “interferes with the ‘truth 
seeking mission of the legal process’”) (citation omitted). 
 6 See, e.g., Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 146 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[A] per-
son claiming the attorney-client privilege has the burden of establishing all the essen-
tial elements thereof.”); United States v. Jones, 696 F.2d 1069, 1072 (4th Cir. 1982) 
(“The burden is on the proponent of the attorney-client privilege to demonstrate its 
applicability.”); United States v. Lawless, 709 F.2d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 1983); Bouschor 
v. United States, 316 F.2d 451, 456 (8th Cir. 1963) (“[O]ne claiming the privilege has 
the burden of establishing it.”);  United States v. Bump, 605 F.2d 548, 551 (10th Cir. 
1979); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834, 843 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1997) (“When a party asserts the attorney-client privilege it is incumbent 
upon that party to prove the preliminary fact that a privilege exists.”).  But see EDNA 
SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 38 
(4th ed. 2001) (citing California statute shifting burden to opponent of privilege). 
 7 See cases cited infra Part III.A–C. 
 8 See cases cited infra Part III.B–C. 
 9 See, e.g., Starlight Int’l Inc. v. Herlihy, 186 F.R.D. 626, 648 (D. Kan. 1999) (“De-
lay and mounting attorney’s fees can equate to prejudice.”); United States v. W. Elec. 
Co., 132 F.R.D. 1, 1–2 (D.D.C. 1990) (detailing the three-year delay produced by 
privilege objections to hundreds of documents that were “entirely without legal 
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The systemic problem with an ultra-zealous approach to attor-
ney-client privilege is the fact that the adversary system does not work 
to fully test all claims of privilege, with the result that some, perhaps 
many, frivolous claims of privilege may never be successfully un-
masked.11  Opposing parties do not always have the resources to liti-
gate privilege claims document by document or communication by 
communication.12  Courts do not always have the time or patience to 
review all such claims.13  Indeed, opposing parties may never become 
privy to the facts that would allow them to successfully challenge the 
frivolous claims.14  The ultimate effect of this loss of evidence on the 
results of litigation may range from inconsequential to devastating. 
foundation, factual basis, or both”); Ost-West-Handel Bruno Bischoff GmbH v. M/V 
Pride of Donegal, No. M8-85, 1997 WL 231126, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 1997) (de-
scribing the unnecessary costs incurred by opponent when three-quarters of docu-
ments withheld as privileged “were clearly not covered by the privilege”). 
 10 See, e.g., Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburg, No. CIV.A. 
98-1788, 1999 WL 970341 (E.D. La. Oct. 22, 1999) (a document-by-document review 
of approximately 2800 allegedly privileged documents revealed that a large percent-
age of the documents were easily recognizable as not privileged, including blank 
pages and copies of reported cases); Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 
398 (1990) (“Baseless filing puts the machinery of justice in motion, burdening 
courts and individuals alike with needless expense and delay.”); see also Deborah L. 
Rhode, Symposium, The Future of the Legal Profession: Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 665, 670–71 (1994) (noting that partisan practices such as unfounded 
claims of privilege both cause litigants to incur unnecessary expense and cause the 
general public to bear the costs “in the form of higher prices, tax deductions for le-
gal expenses, and governmental subsidies for adjudicative and administrative pro-
ceedings”). 
 11 See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting in Freedom of 
Information Act case that the “lack of knowledge by the party seeking disclosure se-
riously distorts the traditional adversary nature of our legal system’s form of dispute 
resolution”). 
 12 See Rhode, supra note 10, at 669–70 (noting that “[i]mbalances in representa-
tion, information, and resources” can be “exploited” by partisan practices to “ob-
struct the search for truth”). 
 13 Ronald L. Motley & Tucker S. Player, Issues in “Crime-Fraud” Practice and Proce-
dure: The Tobacco Litigation Experience, 49 S.C. L. REV. 187, 189 n.10 (1998) (noting 
that courts were reluctant to engage in the review of vast numbers of documents 
claimed to be privileged by the tobacco company, forcing plaintiffs to choose small 
subsets for review with little information to determine which documents to choose); 
see also Jones v. Boeing Co., No. 94-1245-MLB, 1995 WL 827992 (D. Kan. Aug. 30, 
1995) (stating that “[i]n camera procedures should be a rare procedure in discovery 
disputes” because “such a procedure requires a great deal of a court’s time and en-
ergy”); accord Vaughn, 484 F.2d at 826 (noting that the government’s failure to meet 
its burden of proof when claiming Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemption 
for hundreds of pages of documents shifts burden to court system ill-equipped to 
handle it and creates likelihood that non-exempt material will be improperly found 
exempt). 
 14 See Eureka Fin. Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 136 F.R.D. 179, 183 
(E.D. Cal. 1991) (noting that when documents are withheld as privileged, but spe-
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The early failures of the tobacco litigation are an example of the 
devastating effect of overly broad claims of privilege.  While the to-
bacco companies were successfully resisting discovery of their internal 
documents as privileged, plaintiffs were unable to prevail.15  However, 
once the privilege claims were examined in detail, at great expense 
all around, it became obvious that many of the documents claimed to 
be privileged failed to meet even the basic elements of privilege.16  
Other documents met the basic elements of privilege, but were ulti-
mately released under the crime-fraud exception to privilege.  Plain-
tiffs were unable to make the crime-fraud argument in the early cases 
because the fraud was only revealed in the very documents that the 
privilege claim prevented them from examining.  Indeed, it is by no 
means clear that these lawsuits would ever have succeeded if the 
“privileged” documents showing the tobacco lawyers’ involvement in 
the cover-up of the addictive and cancer-causing effects of cigarette 
smoking had not been stolen by a disgruntled employee and pro-
vided to plaintiffs’ counsel.17
If the adversary system cannot be counted upon to effectively 
and consistently unmask frivolous claims of privilege, an unlimited 
ethical duty to assert privilege without regard to the potential legiti-
macy of the claim will have the effect of distorting the justice pro-
vided by our courts.18  The punitive nature of sanctions imposed by 
courts on some egregiously frivolous claims of privilege may not be 
sufficient to offset the strategic value of successful, yet unwarranted, 
nondisclosure in the vast majority of cases.  Indeed, to the extent that 
cific information is not provided to justify the claim, the opposing party cannot know 
whether “the documents withheld under a blanket privilege objection were withheld 
correctly, incorrectly, or maliciously”); Delaney, Migdail & Young, Chartered v. IRS, 
826 F.2d 124, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that the party seeking information 
claimed to be privileged has a “natural handicap—an inability to argue intelligibly 
over the applicability of exemptions when he or she lacks access to the documents”). 
 15 See Motley & Player, supra note 13, at 189 & n.10 (“For more than forty years, 
the tobacco industry avoided the discovery of its nefarious activities by hiding behind 
discovery abuse practices and ill-founded claims of privilege.”). 
 16 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565, 1998 WL 257214, at 
*6 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 1998) (“Defendants and each of them claimed privilege for 
documents which are clearly and inarguably not entitled to protections of privi-
lege.”); see generally Motley & Player, supra note 13, at 189 n.10 (listing the “ever-
increasing string of judicial decisions finding sets of tobacco industry documents 
simply not privileged in the first instance”). 
 17 Motley & Player, supra note 13, at 190 (describing how a “whistle-blowing para-
legal at one of the tobacco industry’s law firms” finally made discovery of crucial 
documents previously protected by attorney-client privilege possible). 
 18 See Rhode, supra note 10, at 669–70 (arguing that “partisan practices” such as 
“adopting strained interpretations of the attorney-client privilege” can prevent a “fair 
adversarial contest”). 
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ethical duties of confidentiality and zealous representation seem to 
validate strategic, but frivolous claims of privilege, one can expect 
that sanctions will simply be viewed as the cost of litigation that is 
both effective and ethical.  Such abuse has, in turn, led some to attack 
the scope of legal protection provided to attorney-client privilege.19  
However, if the ethics of privilege includes a limiting principle that 
makes it clear under what circumstances claiming privilege is ethical 
and under what circumstances claiming privilege is unethical, ethics 
can resume and maintain its familiar role as a counterweight to stra-
tegic concerns.20  This Article will explore this limiting principle and 
consider whether it can be incorporated into the ethical rules to pro-
vide more balanced guidance to lawyers in their use of attorney-client 
privilege to resist compulsory disclosure. 
This is a difficult undertaking for three rather different reasons.  
First, attorney-client privilege is central to the American system of jus-
tice.21  Our protection of confidential client communications through 
privilege is premised on the assumption that this is essential to vigor-
ous representation of clients. 22  Changes to the ethical rules that un-
dermine attorney-client privilege would, therefore, undermine the 
very role that legal ethics seeks to define and defend.  Thus, any ethi-
cal limitation on assertions of attorney-client privilege must have a 
negligible effect on legitimately protected communications.  This Ar-
ticle will show both that ethical limitations on the assertion of attor-
ney-client privilege will not undermine the ethical duty of protecting 
privileged information and that useful guidance about impermissible 
claims of privilege can be provided to attorneys. 
The attempt to provide specific guidance regarding frivolous 
claims of privilege reveals the second difficulty in this undertaking.  If 
what is unethical is only the frivolous claim of privilege, is the law of 
 19 See ABA, TASK FORCE REPORT ON ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 2, 11 (2005),  
available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/materials/hod/report.pdf 
(noting the “policies, practices, and procedures of governmental agencies that have 
the effect of eroding the attorney-client privilege” and arguing that abuse of the 
privilege “as a tactic to delay and hinder the discovery of otherwise discoverable ma-
terial . . . do[es] not justify encroaching upon the protections afforded by the privi-
lege”). 
 20 See id. at 11 (arguing that control of privilege abuse should occur through ethi-
cal rules and sanctions under procedural rules, rather than by limiting the legal pro-
tection provided to privilege, and suggesting that existing rules are sufficient). 
 21 See id. at 7–11 (“[T]he privilege is an important and necessary part of our judi-
cial system.”). 
 22 See id. at 7 ( “The privilege has an important role in (i) fostering the attorney-
client relationship, (ii) encouraging client candor, (iii) enhancing voluntary legal 
compliance, (v) [sic] increasing the efficiency of the justice system and (v) en-
hancement of constitutional rights.”). 
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privilege clear about what claims of privilege are frivolous?  The very 
description of a claim as frivolous presumes a clear and unmistakable 
lack of legal merit.  We must consider what, if any, claims of privilege 
so clearly lack legal merit that they should be declared to be ethically 
frivolous.  Where the law of attorney-client privilege is too unsettled, 
inconsistent, or convoluted, it may be impossible to declare claims of 
privilege frivolous and, therefore, unethical.23  At the same time, 
there may be particular areas of privilege law that are more settled 
than others in which identification of ethically frivolous claims of 
privilege is possible. 
Finally, even where the law of privilege is clear and settled, de-
terminations of privilege are highly fact dependent.24  Is it possible to 
make lawyers ethically responsible for evaluations of facts under the 
law?  This will depend on how predictable such evaluations are.  An 
ethical limit on privilege claims cannot be merely theoretical; rather, 
it must provide meaningful specific limits on when privilege must be 
asserted under the ethical duties to protect client confidentiality and 
to zealously represent a client’s interests.  This could take the form of 
specific practical guidance to identify the kind of factual support 
needed for a non-frivolous claim of privilege. 
This Article takes the position that lawyers are sufficiently capa-
ble of identifying frivolous claims of privilege that they may reasona-
bly be held ethically responsible for failing to avoid such claims.  It 
proposes the addition of a comment to the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct which will both alert lawyers to the ethical stakes on 
both sides of the attorney-client privilege and provide some specific 
guidance on what makes a claim of privilege frivolous and, therefore, 
unethical.25  At the same time, a comment to the Model Rules cannot 
substitute for legal expertise about attorney-client privilege.  What is 
needed is for lawyers to both develop and use judgment about claims 
of attorney-client privilege.  The development of such judgment can 
only be provided by training and education.  Thus, it is also the case 
 23 See Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 578 (E.D.N.Y. 
1986) (imposing minimum sanctions because “the very complexity of the law on anti-
trust standing makes it difficult to say with assurance that any plaintiff’s claim to have 
standing is obviously frivolous”). 
 24 See, e.g., Glade v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. Rptr. 119, 123 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) 
(waiver of privilege is a question of fact). 
 25 Such a comment might serve more as a guide than as a basis for discipline, as 
frivolous claims in general rarely receive disciplinary treatment.  See Peter A. Joy, The 
Relationship Between Civil Rule 11 and Lawyer Discipline: An Empirical Analysis Suggesting 
Institutional Choices in the Regulation of Lawyers, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765, 806–07, 814 
(2004) (arguing that regulation of frivolous litigation claims has and should remain 
primarily the province of judges rather than state disciplinary agencies). 
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that attention to the legal and factual analysis of claims of attorney-
client privilege must be given greater emphasis in the ethical training 
of lawyers in law schools and in continuing legal ethics education. 
I. THE ETHICAL STATUS OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
Legal protection of clients’ communications to their attorneys 
began in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as an accommoda-
tion to the honor of gentlemen attorneys who would otherwise have 
been forced to violate their oath of secrecy by being compelled to tes-
tify against their clients.26  The justification for the privilege, however, 
eventually shifted away from protecting the honor of the attorney to 
protecting the client’s ability to obtain effective representation and 
thereby gain the full protection of the law.27  In the absence of such a 
privilege, clients could only get legal advice by taking the chance that 
their attorney might be forced to disclose secrets that would other-
wise never come to light; thus legal advantage could only be obtained 
by incurring legal disadvantage.28  As such a trade-off would discour-
age legal consultation, by the eighteenth century, courts recognized 
that privileging client communications from compulsory disclosure 
was essential to the rule of law itself.29  This same justification contin-
ues to guide the contemporary American jurisprudence of attorney-
client privilege.30
The legal privileging of attorney-client communications provides 
attorneys and clients with the ability to avoid both disclosure of such 
 26 PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES 12–13 & n.24 
(2d ed. 1999) (describing the emergence of attorney-client privilege in sixteenth- 
and seventeenth-century England). 
 27 Id. at 12–13 (describing how a client-centered theory arose to justify the privi-
lege in the eighteenth century). 
 28 See id. at 23 n.55 (quoting Story v. Lord George Lennox, (1836) 48 Eng. Rep. 
338 (Rolls) (“It has been considered so important that a man should take legal ad-
vice, and communicate with his legal advisors freely and without apprehension of 
consequences hurtful to himself.”)); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) 
(The attorney-client privilege “is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and ad-
ministration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled 
in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free 
from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure.”). 
 29 Greenough v. Gaskell, (1883) 39 Eng. Rep. 618, 620–21, 1 (Ch.) (stating that 
“the interests of justice” require lawyers, and that, without the privilege, “every one 
would be thrown upon his own legal resources”). 
 30 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (“Its purpose is to en-
courage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and 
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administra-
tion of justice.  The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves 
public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully 
informed by the client.”). 
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communications and sanctions for failing to disclose in compulsory 
testimonial setting such as trials, civil discovery, and grand jury hear-
ings.  In such settings, the possible applicability of attorney-client 
privilege to an attorney-client communication sought to be disclosed 
will trigger the general ethical duty of lawyers to “act with commit-
ment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in ad-
vocacy upon the client’s behalf.”31  Yet for purposes of this particular 
ethical duty, attorney-client privilege is just one of many legal rights 
or entitlements available to a client that a lawyer must protect and 
advance.  As such, attorney-client privilege requires no more or less 
zeal than any other legal right or interest and has no special ethical 
status. 
The special ethical status of attorney-client privilege arises under 
the ethical duty of lawyers “not [to] reveal information relating to the 
representation.”32  The purpose of this ethical duty is the same as the 
purpose of the evidentiary attorney-client privilege: to encourage cli-
ents “to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer even as to em-
barrassing or legally damaging subject matter.”33  As some, although 
not all, of the information relating to the representation will typically 
be attorney-client privileged, the ethical duty of confidentiality re-
quires that attorneys assert the privilege wherever necessary to pre-
vent the compulsory disclosure of attorney-client communications.34  
Because this ethical duty implicates the ability of lawyers to fulfill 
their roles as client advisors and representatives, it is not merely a 
duty to advance the interests of a particular client, but a meta-ethical 
duty to protect the role of lawyers and the system of justice that is 
made possible by this role.35  As a meta-ethical duty, confidentiality 
requires extra vigilance because it is understood that the conse-
quences of failure to protect confidentiality will be to undermine the 
profession and its achievements as a whole. 
 31 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2004); see also MODEL CODE OF 
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1983). 
 32 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2004). 
 33 Id. cmt. 2. 
 34 Id. cmt. 3 (noting that the duty of confidentiality encompasses attorney-client 
privileged information) & cmt. 13 (A “lawyer should assert on behalf of the client all 
nonfrivolous claims that . . . the information sought is protected against disclosure by 
the attorney-client privilege.”). 
 35 See Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 863 (8th Cir. 1956) (“[T]he at-
torney has the duty . . .  to make assertion of the privilege, not merely for the benefit 
of the client, but also as a matter of professional responsibility in preventing the pol-
icy of the law from being violated.”). 
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II. THE ETHICAL BASIS OF LIMITING CLAIMS OF PRIVILEGE 
Given that the ethical duty of protecting attorney-client confi-
dences is located in the foundational ethical duty of confidentiality, 
and is additionally buttressed by the general duty to protect the legal 
interests of each particular client, it is easy to see how placing any 
kind of limit on claims of attorney-client privilege might be viewed as 
outside the ethical pale.  There are at least two well-established ethi-
cal duties, however, that provide a foundation for an ethical limit on 
claims of attorney-client privilege: the duty to provide competent rep-
resentation to a client36 and the duty not to make a frivolous de-
fense.37
A. Abuse of Privilege as a Violation of the Duty to Provide Competent 
Representation 
In considering whether the duty to provide competent represen-
tation might implicitly make some claims of attorney-client privilege 
unethical, it is important to recognize that this duty is primarily cli-
ent-oriented.  Lack of competence is only a problem, and an ethical 
failing, insofar as it results in bad results for a client.  In the rare case 
where a good result occurs fortuitously despite incompetence, disci-
pline is also appropriate under this rule,38 but it would seem to be 
based on an assumption that such incompetence will inevitably pro-
duce a loss of rights for future clients even if it has not done so for 
the present client.  Thus, in order for this rule to provide significant 
support for limits on claims of attorney-client privilege, it would have 
to be the case that frivolous assertions of attorney-client privilege due 
to a lack of competence would regularly turn out to be prejudicial to 
the clients on whose behalf the objection is raised. 
Because assertions of attorney-client privilege are actions rather 
than omissions, even frivolous assertions rarely have the kind of di-
rect negative impact upon client results that a failure to file a claim 
within the statute of limitations or failure to read a contract would 
 36 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (“A lawyer shall provide competent 
representation to a client.”); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 6-1 
(1983). 
 37 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a 
proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and 
fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an 
extension, modification or reversal of existing law.”); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-4. 
 38 ABA, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3 (3d ed. 1996) (cit-
ing In re Gastineau, 857 P.2d 136 (Or. 1993) (good results do not excuse the poor 
job of lawyer)). 
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have.  Furthermore, inasmuch as frivolous assertions of privilege of-
ten effectively serve to block possibly damaging information from ei-
ther disclosure or use as evidence, they will have either a beneficial 
effect or no harmful effect on the results achieved for the client.  In 
cases where the frivolous nature of the privilege claim is neither con-
tested nor revealed, it is difficult to see any prejudice to the current 
client or to future clients. 
If, however, the claim of privilege is successfully contested by the 
other side, the client will, at a minimum, incur the costs of respond-
ing to motions to compel disclosure and, if counsel digs in their 
heels, may incur further costs to respond to motions for sanctions 
and to appeal both the privilege ruling and the sanctions.  While the 
potential benefits of preventing admission of damaging evidence 
might be worth incurring the litigation costs of a non-frivolous but 
controversial claim of privilege, this could hardly be true when frivo-
lous privilege claims are successfully contested.  In such successful 
contests, the most serious prejudice to clients of frivolous claims of 
privilege will likely arise out of sanctions the courts may impose. 
Sanctions for frivolous privilege claims can be imposed under a 
number of different procedural rules and substantive laws, as well as 
under the inherent power of the court.  The purposes of such sanc-
tions include: “(1) deterring future litigation abuse, (2) punishing 
present litigation abuse, (3) compensating victims of litigation abuse, 
and (4) streamlining court dockets and facilitating case manage-
ment.”39  Monetary damages are the most typical form of sanctions.  
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4)(A) requires a court to 
award the moving party the expenses, including attorney’s fees, in-
curred in making a successful motion40 to compel discovery.  The rule 
permits the court to compel such payment either from the client on 
whose behalf the frivolous claim was made, 41 or from the attorney ad-
vising this course of action.42  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
37(b)(2) allows a court to award such attorney’s fees in addition to 
 39 Resolution Trust Corp. v. Williams, 162 F.R.D. 654, 660 (D. Kan. 1995). 
 40 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(4)(A).  Success under this rule includes both the “volun-
tary” provision of discovery after the filing of the motion as well as a grant of the mo-
tion by the court.  Id. 
 41 See, e.g., Prousi v. Cruisers Div. of KCS Int’l, Inc., No. 95-6652, 1997 WL 135692 
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 1997) (ordering plaintiff to pay reasonable counsel fees and cost 
in bringing the motion to compel production of a redacted fee agreement between 
plaintiff and its counsel). 
 42 See, e.g., Jones v. Boeing Co., No. 94-1245-MLB, 1995 WL 827992 (D. Kan. Aug. 
30, 1995) (ordering resisting counsel to pay opposing counsel $500 for the costs of a 
successful motion to compel, where resisting counsel failed to even begin to meet his 
burden of showing privilege). 
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other sanctions upon a party’s failure to comply with an order to pro-
vide or permit discovery, so long as “the failure was [not] substantially 
justified.”43  Rule 37(b)(2) also provides the court the power to re-
quire the resisting party to compensate the court for the added ex-
pense of frivolous claims of privilege.44  Monetary sanctions in the 
form of a per diem fine are additionally available under both the 
court’s civil and criminal contempt powers45 against non-party wit-
nesses who fail to obey court orders, including orders resisted on 
frivolous claims of privilege. 
Should clients be required to pay these expenses as well as their 
legal expenses in resisting discovery, the clients will certainly suffer 
monetary prejudice as a result of their attorneys’ frivolous claim.  
However, if the court requires the attorney to pay these expenses, the 
only negative monetary consequence to the client will be their own 
expenses for resisting discovery,46 unless the attorney later passes to 
the client expenses the court has assessed to counsel.47
 43 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2). 
 44 Gov’t Guar. Fund of the Republic of Finland v. Hyatt Corp., 182 F.R.D. 182, 
186 (D.V.I. 1998) (relying on the court’s inherent powers to impose a fine designed 
to compensate the court for discovery abuse). 
 45 18 U.S.C.A. § 401 (2002) (“A court of the United States shall have power to 
punish by fine or imprisonment, or both, at its discretion, such contempt of its au-
thority.”); see, e.g., Better Gov’t Bureau v. McGraw, 924 F. Supp. 729, 735 (S.D. W.Va. 
1996) (imposing a $250 per day fine on an attorney witness who continued to resist 
disclosure on grounds of attorney-client privilege after the court ordered disclosure), 
rev’d in part sub nom. In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding resisted discov-
ery was privileged). 
 46 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g); 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2000) (allowing 
courts to make attorneys personally liable for the costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees 
incurred as a result of unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of proceedings).  
The inherent power of the court to impose sanctions for bad faith behavior also al-
lows for monetary sanctions in the form of costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees under 
circumstances that could include frivolous claims of attorney-client privilege.  See, 
e.g., SEC v. Kimmes, No. M18-304, 1996 WL 734892, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 1996) 
(holding that Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and 
the inherent power of the court to punish bad faith conduct could permit a court to 
impose attorney’s fees on a non-party deponent who had failed to produce non-
privileged documents sought under a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 subpoena 
duces tecum; court subsequently ordered documents to be produced, but found such 
sanctions inappropriate in this case); McCormick-Morgan, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus., 
134 F.R.D. 275, 286 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (sanctioning an attorney under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 26(g) and Rule 37 for claiming privilege at a deposition after waiving 
such privilege; sanctions to consist of  reconvening depositions at opposing party’s 
counsel’s office and requiring a $500 payment by the attorney to opposing party). 
 47 Courts can, and sometimes do, forbid counsel to seek reimbursement from 
their client for monetary sanctions imposed against counsel personally.  See Chilcutt 
v. United States, 4 F.3d 1313, 1325–27, (5th Cir. 1993) (forbidding a U.S. govern-
ment attorney from seeking reimbursement from the government for sanctions im-
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Non-monetary sanctions for failure to obey a motion to compel 
may be imposed by the courts in civil cases under Rule 37(b)(2) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  These sanctions can reduce the 
potential strategic value of asserting frivolous claims of privilege by 
providing strategic advantages to the party properly seeking disclo-
sure.  These punitive advantages include: establishing facts relevant to 
the non-disclosed information against the resisting party;48 estopping 
the resisting party from claiming privilege as to specified categories of 
documents;49 denying the resisting party’s discovery-related motions;50 
precluding the resisting party from supporting or opposing specified 
claims or defenses or introducing specific facts into evidence;51 strik-
ing out portions of the pleadings of the resisting party; staying the 
proceeding; dismissing all or part of the action; entering a default 
judgment against the resisting party;52 and treating the failure to obey 
the motion to compel as contempt.53
While some of the lesser non-monetary sanctions do not neces-
sarily lead to a loss for the sanctioned client,54 such non-monetary 
sanctions will ordinarily be prejudicial to the client.  Similarly, when 
posed against the attorney for groundlessly asserting attorney-client privilege to block 
deposition answers, and also stating that private attorneys may be treated similarly). 
 48 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A).  See, e.g., Amway Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 
No. 1:98-CV-726, 2001 WL 1818698 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 2001) (magistrate recom-
mendation of an order designating as established facts sought to be proven by 
documents wrongfully withheld as privileged). 
 49 See Minnesota v. Philip Morris, Inc., No. C1-94-8565, 1998 WL 257214, at *7 (D. 
Minn. Mar. 7, 1998) (when a random review of categorized documents claimed to be 
privileged revealed some documents “clearly and inarguably not entitled to protec-
tions of privilege,” such abuse of privilege warranted loss of privilege for all docu-
ments within that category). 
 50 SEC v. Levy, 706 F. Supp. 61, 67 (D.D.C. 1989) (denying resisting party’s mo-
tion to produce certain documents and motion to extend the time permitted for dis-
covery). 
 51 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(B). 
 52 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(C); see generally Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey 
Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639 (1976) (upholding a dismissal of the action due to failure to 
timely answer interrogatories both as a penalty to the sanctioned party and as a de-
terrent to others who might be tempted not to comply with discovery orders in the 
future). 
 53 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(D).  Civil contempt provides the court with a broad 
range of discretionary remedies, including imprisonment and punitive monetary 
fines.  See Better Gov’t Bureau, Inc. v. McGraw, 924 F. Supp. 729, 734–35 (S.D. W.Va. 
1996), rev’d in part sub nom. In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582 (4th Cir. 1997) (choosing a per 
diem fine rather than imprisonment as a contempt sanction for a non-party’s failure 
to obey a court order finding no attorney-client privilege). 
 54 For example, defendant, Procter & Gamble, sanctioned by establishing certain 
facts claimed by plaintiff as proved in Amway Corp. v. Procter & Gamble, No. C1-94-
8565, 2001 WL 1818698 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 2001), later prevailed in the case.  Am-
way Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 346 F.3d 180, 181 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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monetary sanctions are awarded, the extra expense will ordinarily be 
borne by the client with no offsetting benefit.  Even where no sanc-
tions occur, the client bears the extra expense of their own attorney’s 
fees and costs to resist the disclosure.  Therefore, in those cases in 
which frivolous claims of attorney-client privilege are unsuccessful, 
there will almost always be sufficient prejudice to the client to find a 
breach of the ethical duty of competence. 
It may well be the case, however, that frivolous assertions of privi-
lege are a successful tactic on the whole, helping more clients than it 
hurts.  If this is the case, it is difficult to place the ethical failing in 
question as one of competence.  Only if the tactic tends to be unsuc-
cessful, and is more harmful than helpful to clients, might it make 
sense to view frivolous assertions of attorney-client privilege as in-
competence.  Therefore, the ethical duty of competence may not 
provide clear support for the proposition that frivolous claims of 
privilege involve a breach of legal ethics. 
B. Abuse of Privilege as a Violation of the Ethical Duties Not to Make 
Frivolous Claims or Defenses and Fairness to the Opposing Party 
Unlike the duty to provide competent representation, the duties 
not to make frivolous claims and to be fair to the opposing parties are 
designed to limit the advancement of client’s interests.  While the 
comment to Model Rule 3.1 states that an “advocate has a duty to use 
legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client’s cause,”55 the rule 
itself places the emphasis on the limits of such representation: “A 
lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert 
an issue therein, unless there is a basis . . . for doing so that is not 
frivolous . . . .”56  Model Rule 3.4 explains that the adversary system’s 
focus on evidentiary competition presumes that both sides have ap-
propriate and fair access to evidence.57
One clear goal of the limit on frivolous claims imposed by Model 
Rule 3.1 is the protection of non-clients from the negative legal, fi-
nancial, or emotional consequences that such conduct can produce.  
Taking legal actions for the primary purpose of creating these nega-
tive consequences is viewed as an abuse of legal procedure.58  Fur-
thermore, since “what goes around, comes around,” clients who 
might have benefited from frivolous claims made by their own attor-
 55 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 1 (2004). 
 56 Id. M.R. 3.1. 
 57 Id. M.R. 3.4 cmts. 1 & 2. 
 58 See id. M.R. 3.1 cmt. 1 (stating that advocates have a “duty not to abuse legal 
procedure”). 
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ney can at other times suffer the negative consequences of having 
such frivolous claims made against them. 
It is also possible to understand the limit placed on representa-
tion by Model Rule 3.1 as a way to protect the judicial system itself, 
although this goal is not clearly referenced in either Model Rule 3.1 
or its comments.59  This goal tends to be most clearly articulated by 
the courts themselves as one of the important justifications for impos-
ing sanctions on both parties and lawyers who have abused the proc-
ess in this way.60  The use of scarce judicial resources by frivolous 
claims and defenses slows the judicial process.  This, in turn, hurts 
the quality of justice for both civil and criminal litigants, as justice 
merely delayed for some is justice lost for others. 
Delay, congestion, and gridlock in the judicial system also tar-
nish the reputation of this system as capable of producing just results 
both in the view of the public and in the view of those who work 
within the system.  This can lead the public to avoid utilizing the sys-
tem to assert their rights and lead attorneys to avoid utilizing the sys-
tem to vindicate the rights of their clients.61  The negative effects of 
frivolous claims and defenses can even discourage qualified candi-
dates from seeking judicial office, as both the frustration of wasting 
time on frivolous matters and the resulting increased backlog of cases 
simply makes the job less attractive.  Finally, frivolous claims can lead 
to legislative hostility to lawyers, legal rights, and the courts, as legisla-
tures seek to reduce the waste of taxpayer money by immunizing 
various sectors of society from suit,62 placing caps on damages,63 and 
under-funding the courts. 
 59 If Model Rule 3.1 cannot be found to have the protection of the judicial system 
as a goal, it might be possible to find this goal in Model Rule 8.4(d): “It is profes-
sional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the ad-
ministration of justice.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d).  Although the 
comment to the rule only specifically targets the distorting effects of prejudice or 
bias on the results of legal proceedings, the negative effects of frivolous claims and 
defenses on the system itself would seem to be another kind of prejudice to the sys-
tem that lawyers should avoid. 
 60 See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Williams, 162 F.R.D. 654, 660 (D. Kan. 1995) 
(noting that one purpose to be kept in mind in determining the appropriate sanc-
tion is “streamlining court dockets and facilitating case management”). 
 61 Lawyers may choose mediation or arbitration to resolve client disputes. 
 62 See, e.g., CNN.com, ‘Cheesburger Bill’ Puts Bite on Lawsuits, Oct. 20, 2005,  
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/10/20/cheeseburger.bill/ (noting that a bill 
passed the House of Representative in 2005 banning lawsuits by obese customers 
against fast food restaurants). 
 63 Twenty-five states now have medical malpractice non-economic damage caps, 
and similar federal legislation has passed the House several times.  Insurance Infor-
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The primary target of this ethical duty is the initiation of a law-
suit that has no legal basis, no factual basis, or both.  Clearly, this is 
the most harmful kind of frivolous action a lawyer can take, as it re-
quires the defendant to undergo the entirely unnecessary expense, 
effort, and stress of defense, and produces the most impact on the 
operation, finances, and reputation of the judicial system.  Frivolous 
defenses to legitimate claims have a lesser, although quite significant, 
effect on both litigants and the court.  At best, frivolous defenses can 
simply slow down and make more expensive the vindication of rights 
by plaintiffs.  At worst, the increased cost of litigating may require the 
suit to be dropped, may produce a less favorable ruling due to lack of 
resources for vigorous litigation of legitimately controversial aspects 
of the case, or may simply cause a lesser settlement to be accepted.  
Such increases in expense and diminishment of results for the plain-
tiff is paralleled in the judicial system by increased use of scarce judi-
cial and administrative resources and a sense that the results of the 
process are less “just’ than they could have been. 
What is of concern in this Article, however, is not frivolous 
claims and defenses, but rather frivolous objections to, or resistances 
to, compulsory evidentiary processes such as civil or criminal discov-
ery, grand jury subpoenas, and trial testimony and evidence.  These 
are covered both by Model Rule 3.1, as discussed above, and Model 
Rule 3.4, which states: 
A lawyer shall not: (a) unlawfully obstruct another party’s access 
to evidence . . . .  A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another per-
son to . . . (d) in pretrial procedure, . . . fail to make a reasonably 
diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by 
an opposing party.64  
As is the case with many frivolous claims and defenses, some 
frivolous evidentiary objections are revealed as frivolous and, there-
fore, have no legal impact.  I would suggest, however, that frivolous 
attorney-client privilege objections are, on the whole, much more 
likely to prevail than are frivolous claims and defenses. 
The possibility of a default judgment if one fails to defend 
against even a frivolous action is sufficient to galvanize most defen-
dants into enough of a response to reveal the frivolous nature of the 
claim.  Furthermore, even in the absence of such a defense, a claim 
that is legally, rather than factually, frivolous may be so obvious to the 
court that it will dismiss the action on its own motion rather than en-
mation Institute, http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/medicalmal (last 
visited Dec. 12, 2006). 
 64 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4. 
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ter a default.  In the case of a frivolous defense, the plaintiff is already 
geared up to litigate, having initiated the action in the first place.  
Since the direct consequence of failing to attack the frivolous defense 
would be the loss of potential positive results, and the plaintiff al-
ready has retained counsel and invested in these potential results, the 
plaintiff will, except in extreme circumstances, both have sufficient 
resources to reveal the frivolous nature of the defense and choose to 
use their resources to accomplish this end. 
In contrast, when a frivolous objection of attorney-client privi-
lege is made in a compulsory legal procedure seeking evidence, it is 
not clear to the party seeking the evidence how important or useful 
the evidence not disclosed would be to their case.  Even assuming 
that the party making the frivolous objection files a fully detailed 
privilege log65 with affidavits66 or otherwise provides the required 
level of detail about the withheld evidence,67 only the party making 
the objection knows the actual content of the non-disclosed material.  
A privilege log will not reveal whether the evidence withheld is the 
missing smoking gun, duplicative of other useful evidence already ob-
tained, or entirely unhelpful.  As a result, the value of vigorously con-
testing the objection cannot be predicted.  Thus, even an objection 
that strikes counsel as obviously frivolous may not seem worth the ef-
fort required to challenge it. 
Additionally, even though a privilege log with affidavits, or an 
equivalent, is meant to provide the requesting party with enough in-
formation to allow a challenge to be made to the objection, practi-
cally speaking, it is often not so easy to clearly determine, based on 
the information provided, that a particular claim of privilege is or 
might be frivolous.68  This is why courts prefer in most cases to under-
 65 To satisfy the requirements of Rule 26(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, specified information is required to be included in the log.  In re Cmty. Psy-
chiatric Ctr. Sec. Litig., No. SA CV91-533AHS(RWRX), 1993 WL 497253,  at *4 (C.D. 
Cal. Sept. 15, 1993) (A privilege log should at least contain: “(a) the attorney and cli-
ent involved, (b) the nature of the document, (c) all persons or entities shown on 
the document to have received or sent the document, (d) all persons or entities 
known to have been furnished the document or informed of its substance, and (e) 
the date the document was generated, prepared, or dated.”). 
 66 See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 02-0164 MHP (JL), 2003 WL 
21212614, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2003) (“In addition to a privilege log, the party 
claiming privilege should produce affidavits describing the confidential nature of the 
documents.”). 
 67 A regular feature of many, although not all, frivolous attorney-client privilege 
objections is a failure to produce any privilege log, or a sufficiently detailed privilege 
log.  See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 68 Mark Stein has described a similar phenomenon under Rule 11, which he calls 
a “hidden fact-violation.”  Mark Stein, Of Impure Hearts and Empty Heads: A Hierarchy of 
STRASSBERGFINAL 1/15/2007  11:57:13 AM 
430 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:413 
 
take in camera evaluation of withheld evidence prior to ruling against 
a claim of attorney-client privilege.69  In the absence of an ability to 
judge either the likelihood of success when challenging a claim of 
privilege or the value of the information that might be obtained, 
counsel may simply choose not to make such a challenge.   
Finally, another disincentive to challenging claims of attorney-
client privilege is the fact that, in many cases, there is not just one 
challenge to make.  Depending on the volume of information re-
quested and available, objections on the basis of privilege could cover 
tens, hundreds, or thousands of documents, each of which must be 
separately challenged as “not privileged.”  Even where a detailed 
privilege log makes it facially apparent that no privilege can legiti-
mately be asserted, the time and expense of evaluating and respond-
ing to each of many individual privilege claims, any and all of which 
may be of little ultimate value, can and does lead requesting parties 
to leave claims of attorney-client privilege unchallenged.  Thus, when 
considering the consequences to non-client parties and the judicial 
system of frivolous objections of privilege, the consequences that oc-
cur both when such frivolous objections are successfully stricken and 
when no challenge is made at all, must be included. 
The obvious consequence of successful challenges on both non-
clients and the judicial system is the waste of legal and judicial re-
sources required to judge the objection frivolous.  The proliferation 
of magistrates as essential adjudicators of discovery disputes, some 
portion of which revolve around objections based on attorney-client 
privilege, and the sometimes staggering quantity of objections which 
Rule 11 Violations, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 393, 395 (1991).  This is where a claim vio-
lates Rule 11, under language since changed by the 1993 amendments, because it is 
not well-grounded in fact and the contrary facts are either hidden from, or not acces-
sible to, the other party.  Id.  Those claims of attorney-client privilege that require 
access to the privileged material to reveal the lack of actual privilege would seem to 
be a kind of hidden fact-violation.  Stein has argued that such hidden fact-violations 
“pose[] a far greater threat to the non-violator—and to justice—than the obvious 
fact-violation,” for which the opposing party has access to the contradictory facts and 
therefore has the ability to challenge.  Id. at 397. 
 69 See, e.g., Lane v. Sharp Packaging Sys., Inc., 640 N.W.2d 788, (Wis. 2002) (hold-
ing erroneous a release of documents claimed to be privileged without in camera re-
view, but based only upon a prima facie showing of the crime-fraud exception); Mar-
tin Marietta Corp. v. Fuller Co., No. 86-0151, 1986 WL 12424, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 
1986) (“Where, however, the parties have been unable to solve their dispute over 
claims of privilege, and especially where public policy requires protection of docu-
ments or portions of documents, court inspection is unavoidable.”); Avery Dennison 
Corp. v. Four Pillars, 190 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1999) (conducting an in camera review 
despite the lack of a privilege log, but noting that failure to produce such a log can 
be treated as a waiver of privilege). 
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must be reviewed item by item both by the requesting litigators and 
by the court in camera, along with the immediate appealability of or-
ders compelling disclosure,70 suggest that the financial cost to non-
client parties and the judicial system may well be considerable.  While 
it is impossible to quantify the extent to which the early diversion of 
legal resources affects the results ultimately obtained by diminishing 
the legal resources later available to devote to winning the case or 
maximizing the award, it seems likely that, for some requesting par-
ties, even successfully unmasked frivolous claims of privilege will 
negatively impact the quality of justice received.  For courts, the 
amount of judicial time that may be expended in disputes about 
frivolous privilege claims, including conferences, hearings, in camera 
review, and written orders, might be almost as much as that used by 
frivolous suits or defenses.  Even if less time is involved, resolving 
frivolous claims of privilege must be seen as adding to those delays 
and backlogs that diminish the quality of justice produced and tar-
nish the system’s reputation for producing just results. 
So far, this Article has considered the possible negative conse-
quences that occur even when frivolous claims of privilege are suc-
cessfully challenged.  What are the consequences to non-client parties 
and the judicial system of the considerable number of frivolous 
claims of privilege that are never challenged or are never successfully 
challenged?71  Certainly no time, money, or scarce judicial resources 
are wasted by such claims because the issue never receives legal or ju-
dicial attention.  In these cases, the frivolous claim of privilege has 
successfully prevented relevant evidence from being discovered and 
offered into evidence; thus the negative impact is entirely on the re-
sults achieved.  The law itself is clear about the importance of admis-
sion of relevant evidence to the truth-seeking goal of the judicial 
process: “[b]ecause of the privilege’s adverse effect on the full disclo-
sure of the truth, it must be narrowly construed.”72  If a liberal inter-
pretation of attorney-client privilege cannot be permitted because it 
has too great an impact on full disclosure of the truth, frivolous asser-
 70 See Avery Dennison Corp., 190 F.R.D. at 4 n.5 (“Courts have been reluctant . . . to 
conduct in camera inspection,” especially “[w]here the examination of the requested 
documents requires herculean labors because of their volume.”). 
 71 The reluctance of courts to do in camera review, particularly when the number 
of items to be reviewed is large, may lead courts to discourage full bore litigation of 
privilege objections, even when the parties involved may be willing to expend the 
time and resources.  Thus, even frivolous claims of privilege may survive attempts to 
challenge by the requesting party. 
 72 In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672, 675 (D.C. Cir. 
1979) (citation omitted). 
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tions of privilege that successfully prevent disclosure must have an in-
tolerable impact on the truth that emerges from the judicial process.  
This in turn produces injustice for the individuals involved and di-
minishes the social value of the judicial system in general. 
It appears, therefore, that frivolous assertions of attorney-client 
privilege, whether successfully unmasked or never challenged, unac-
ceptably harm opposing parties, the judicial system itself, and all 
those who will seek or need to seek vindication of their rights in the 
future.  Since the goal of these ethical duties is to prevent negative 
impacts on non-clients and the judicial system in the name of client 
service, Model Rule 3.1 and Model Rule 3.4 must include a duty to 
avoid frivolous assertions of attorney-client privilege, should it be pos-
sible to describe some claims of attorney-client privilege as frivolous.  
It remains to be seen, however, whether there are claims of attorney-
client privilege that can be reasonably recognized as frivolous without 
the benefit of the adversary process.  The possibility of early recogni-
tion is essential if the ethical rule is to be understood as prohibiting 
the unlimited interposition of attorney-client privilege as an objection 
to an otherwise legally compelled disclosure obligation. 
III. ETHICALLY IMPERMISSIBLE CLAIMS OF 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
As a general matter, it is possible to identify three kinds of con-
duct that we might be willing to view as producing ethically imper-
missible claims of attorney-client privilege, each of which may be 
viewed as frivolous in a different way.  First, we should consider 
whether claims of attorney-client privilege made for improper pur-
poses should be viewed as ethically impermissible.  Such claims may 
be described as frivolously motivated because they are motivated by 
interests other than the assertion or defense of legal rights. 
A second kind of impermissible conduct might be best described 
as “lazy” claims of privilege.  This would include claims of privilege 
made without reasonable factual investigation, such as failure to actu-
ally review a document before claiming it as privileged.  It would also 
include claims of privilege made without reasonable legal research or 
analysis, as well as claims of privilege made without complying with 
the procedural requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(b)(5), such as a general objection of privilege without submission 
of a privilege log.73  Claims made in these three ways might be de-
 73 See FED. R. CIV.  P. 26(b)(5). 
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scribed as made in a frivolous manner without regard for the need 
for substantive support. 
The final kind of impermissible conduct would involve substan-
tively frivolous claims of privilege.  Claims that are simply factually in-
sufficient under settled law and claims that are inconsistent with exist-
ing law when no good faith argument is made to change the law 
would be included here, even if such claims were not made in a frivo-
lous manner. 
In considering whether any of these kinds of privilege claims 
should be ethically impermissible, a few sources of guidance are 
available.  First, Model Rule 3.1 and its comments provide some defi-
nitional assistance.  Second, we can examine the disciplinary cases 
applying Model Rule 3.1 and its predecessors.  An additional resource 
would be the considerable body of case law applying those statutes 
that authorize the imposition of legal sanctions for litigation conduct 
that could include frivolous claims of attorney-client privilege.  It is 
important to recognize, however, that although the language of the 
law may sometimes be identical or nearly identical to the language of 
the ethical rules, it is not necessarily the case that the legal meaning 
of frivolous and the ethical meaning of frivolous should be the same 
in the context of privilege.  The law may require attorney-client privi-
lege to be narrowly construed to minimize its distorting effect on the 
truth-seeking function of the judicial process;74 however, our willing-
ness to view a claim of attorney-client privilege as ethically impermis-
sible is likely to be tempered by the countervailing ethical value of 
confidentiality.  Therefore, we may choose to define sanctionable 
conduct more narrowly in the context of ethical limits on claims of 
attorney-client privilege than we might in other contexts. 
A. Claims of Privileges Made for Frivolous Purposes 
Most claims made for frivolous purposes are at the same time 
substantively frivolous.75  The opposite is surely true as well; most sub-
stantively non-frivolous claims are made for legitimate purposes.  Yet 
some substantively non-frivolous claims are made for improper or 
frivolous purposes.  Although it is difficult to imagine how typical im-
proper collateral benefits or detriments, such as beneficial delay in 
another matter76 or reputational or financial injury to the opponent, 
 75 Stein, supra note 68, at 402. 
 76 E.g., In re Perez, 43 B.R. 530 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1984) (attorney three times filed 
and dismissed Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings to obtain multiple automatic stays 
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might attach to frivolous claims of attorney-client privilege, let us 
suppose that this can and does occur.  Would we be willing to view as 
ethically impermissible claims of privilege that are not entirely 
groundless from a legal perspective, but which are made for such im-
proper purposes? 
From at least 1908 through 2002, American Bar Association 
(“ABA”) ethical canons, codes, or rules have stated that claims or de-
fenses made for improper purposes are ethically impermissible.  The 
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, propounded by the ABA from 
1908 through 1969, required a lawyer to “decline to conduct a civil 
cause or to make a defense when convinced that it is intended merely 
to harass or to injure the opposite party or to work oppression or 
wrong.”77  In 1969, the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity replaced the Canons and stated that “a lawyer shall not: [f]ile a 
suit, [or] assert a position . . . on behalf of his client when he knows 
or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or 
maliciously injure another.”78  In 1983, the ABA replaced the Model 
Code with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  Before the 2002 
amendments to the Model Rules, comment 2 to Model Rule 3.1 
stated that an action would be frivolous, and therefore prohibited 
under Model Rule 3.1, “if the client desires to have the action taken 
primarily for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring a per-
son.”79  As variously drafted, these ethical rules seem to suggest that 
improper purpose alone could be sufficient to make a litigation posi-
tion ethically impermissible. 
Not surprisingly, the issue of improper purpose as an independ-
ent ground has hardly ever arisen in most jurisdictions that have 
adopted the language of either Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(1) or 
Model Rule 3.1 because improper purpose and lack of merit are usu-
ally both present.80  At least one jurisdiction, however, has expressly 
of foreclosure proceedings despite the fact that the debtors had no income and no 
ability to make payments as required by Chapter 13). 
 77 CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 30 (as amended through 1969) 
 78 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A) (as amended through 
1983). 
 79 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 2 (2001). 
 80 See, e.g., In re Edmonds, No. 00-022-1227, 2002 WL 32396986 (Va. State Bar Dis-
ciplinary Bd. May 15, 2002) (suspending the license of a former judge who filed a 
federal case seeking $50 million in damages from former judicial colleagues and 
court staff who had participated in a judicial ethics inquiry on the ground that the 
suit was legally baseless and intended to harass); see generally ANNOTATED MODEL 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (3d ed. 1996), supra note 38, at 299–300 (listing 
cases from many jurisdictions in which either improper motives or substantively frivo-
lous claims could be found). 
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interpreted this language as making improper purpose an independ-
ent ground for discipline.81  In a few other jurisdictions, no express 
position has been taken on the independence of improper purpose 
as a ground for ethical sanction, but disciplinary sanctions have been 
imposed even in the absence of findings of lack of merit.82
Some jurisdictions, however, have modified their ethical codes 
or rules to make clear that lack of merit is also necessary before an 
improper purpose would make an action ethically impermissible.  
The 2002 amendments to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
follow this trend and have eliminated the improper purpose lan-
guage altogether from the comments following Model Rule 3.1.83  
This reflects yet another step in the “objectification” of Model Rule 
3.1 by elimination of subjective elements such as motive or knowl-
edge.84  This Model Rules deletion must be understood to limit the 
ethical prohibition solely to claims lacking any merit from an objec-
tive perspective, with no regard to proper or improper purposes.  
Under the kind of ethical regime proposed by this latest version of 
Model Rule 3.1, therefore, a non-frivolous assertion of attorney-client 
privilege made for an improper purpose would clearly be ethically 
 81 See, e.g., In re Levine, 847 P.2d 1093, 1100 (Ariz. 1993) (interpreting the lan-
guage of Model Rule 3.1 to mean that “if an improper motive or a bad faith argu-
ment exists, respondent will not escape ethical responsibility for bringing a legal 
claim that may otherwise meet the objective test of a nonfrivolous claim”). 
 82 See, e.g., In re Spallina, No. BD-99-001, 1999 WL 33721626, at *13 (Mass. State 
Bar. Disciplinary Bd. Jan. 11, 1999) (imposing discipline based on, among other un-
ethical conduct, filing a suit to attach and collect legitimate attorney’s fees for repre-
sentation of husband in a divorce case from a certificate of deposit, thereby know-
ingly trying to frustrate the award of the certificate of deposit to wife in the divorce 
action); Columbus Bar Ass’n v. Finneran, 687 N.E.2d 405 (Ohio 1997) (sanctioning 
lawyer for, in a number of separate matters, filing cases, failing to provide discovery, 
dismissing the cases, and then re-filing the cases, up to as many as five times, in order 
to get a favorable settlement offer in the case, and describing this as a violation of 
OHIO CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1), but not citing OHIO CODE OF 
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(2) (lack of merit) or describing the cases as 
groundless or unsubstantiated). 
 83 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 2 (as amended through 2002). 
 84 See ABA REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES No. 401 (Aug. 2001); ABA Center 
for Professional Responsibility, Model Rule 3.1 Reporter’s Explanation of Changes, 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/e2k-rule31rem.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2006) 
(explaining the deletion as justified because “the client’s purpose is not relevant to 
the objective merits of the client’s claim”); ABA, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 316 (5th ed. 2003) (explaining the change from Model Code 
7-102(A)(2) to Model Rule 3.1 as a move from a subjective standard which prohib-
ited only “knowingly advanc[ing]” unwarranted claims or defenses to an “objective 
‘reasonable lawyer’ standard”). 
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permissible.85  Thus, there is disagreement among ethical authorities 
and jurisdictions concerning the general issue of whether improper 
purposes are sufficient to make a claim ethically impermissible. 
A similar disagreement can be found in the interpretation of 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11 and 26, which are the federal 
procedural counterparts to Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(1) and Model 
Rule 3.1.  The federal rules and the case law generated by them have 
had an important influence on the Model Rules,86 state procedural 
law,87 and state ethical standards regarding frivolous litigation con-
duct.88  As the issue of attorney-client privilege mostly arises in the 
context of discovery, the most relevant rule to the issue of claims of 
attorney-client privilege would be Rule 26(g); however, most of the 
case law on the independence of improper purpose as a ground for 
sanctions has arisen in the context of Rule 11.  Since most courts 
treat Rule 11 and Rule 26(g) as parallel provisions,89 the Rule 11 case 
law should be instructive as to Rule 26(g) sanctions as well.90
Rule 26 states that the required signature of attorneys to discov-
ery requests, responses, and objections: 
 85 See e.g., D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 2 (2006) (deleting the pur-
pose language found in comment 2 to the Model Rule altogether), available at 
http://www2.law.cornell.edu/cgi-bin/foliocgi.exe/dc-
narr/query=[jump!3A!273!2E1!3A100!27]/doc/{@1860}? (last visited Dec. 12, 2006).  
California has not eliminated improper purpose as ethically impermissible, but has 
required a lack of merit as well.  CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3-200 (1989) 
(precluding California lawyers from accepting or continuing employment if he 
“knows or should know” that the object of employment is either “to bring an action, 
conduct a defense, assert a position . . . or take an appeal without probable cause and 
for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any person”), available at 
http://www2.law.cornell.edu/cgi-bin/foliocgi.exe/ca-
narr/query=[jump!3A!273!2E1!3A100!27]/doc/{@2258}? (last visited Dec. 12, 2006). 
 86 ABA, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT, 1982–1998 164 (1999) [hereinafter “LEGISLATIVE HISTORY”] (noting 
that the objective standard of Model Rule 3.1 “was adopted rather than one based on 
the concepts ‘harass’ or ‘maliciously injure’ to track the standard generally used and 
defined in the law of procedure”).. 
 87 GEORGENE M. VAIRO, RULE ELEVEN SANCTIONS: CASE LAW PERSPECTIVES AND 
PREVENTATIVE MEASURES 40 (3d ed. 2004) (“Most states have adopted a sanctions tool 
like Rule 11.”). 
 88 See, e.g., In re Levine, 847 P.2d 1093, 1100 (Ariz. 1993) (analyzing the treatment 
of motive in the context of civil sanctions as relevant to the interpretation of ethical 
frivolous standards and concluding that there was “a common theme in both our 
procedural and ethical rules”). 
 89 See e.g., In re Byrd, Inc., 927 F.2d 1135, 1137 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting the inten-
tionally parallel structures of Rule 11 and 26(g)). 
 90 See generally VAIRO, supra note 87, at 744–45 (suggesting that much of the Rule 
11 analysis is relevant to Rule 26(g), with certain exceptions not relevant to this 
analysis, such as mandatory or discretionary sanctions, who may be sanctioned, and 
the nature of sanctions). 
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Constitutes a certification that . . . the request, response, or objec-
tion is: 
(A) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law 
or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law; and 
(B) not interposed for any improper purpose . . . ; and 
(C) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome  or expen-
sive.91
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g)(3) allows sanctions when such 
certifying signatures are made “without substantial justification . . . in 
violation of the rule.”92  As drafted, it would seem that an improper 
certification as to either Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g)(2)(A), 
(B), or (C) would be sufficient to violate Rule 26(g)(2).   
Similarly, Rule 11 states that presentation to the court93 of “a 
pleading, written motion or other paper”94 is at the same time certifi-
cation that, among other things, “to the best of the person’s knowl-
edge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable 
under the circumstances . . . it is not being presented for any im-
proper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or 
needless increase in the cost of litigation.”95  Improper purpose is 
found under Rule 11(b) when a party takes an action “not in order to 
prevail on the paper filed, but in order to obtain some other, unjusti-
fied benefit.”96  Usually, it is clear that the party does not seek to pre-
vail because the claim is also obviously frivolous and the party knows 
that it will not benefit directly from this legal action.97
Despite clear language in both rules that an improper purpose 
makes even substantively non-frivolous claims impermissible, the is-
sue of whether courts may in fact impose sanctions for improper 
purpose alone has been particularly difficult for courts to accept in 
the context of Rule 11.  Many circuits have refused to find sanctions 
appropriate under Rule 11 for colorable complaints in which both 
proper purposes of vindicating legal rights and improper purposes 
may be combined.98  At the same time, most circuits have approved 
 91 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(2) (emphasis added). 
 92 Id. 26(g)(3). 
 93 Presenting includes “signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating.”  FED. R. 
CIV. P. 11(b). 
 95 Id. 
 96 Stein, supra note 68, at 404. 
 97 Id. at 402. 
 98 See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Employees v. Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Employees, 844 
F.2d 216, 223 (5th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he Rule 11 injunction against harassment does 
not exact of those who file pleadings an undiluted desire for just deserts.”); Sussman 
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sanctions for even well-grounded motions or other non-complaint filings 
that are abusive or seen as serving an improper purpose.99  Since al-
most all claims of attorney-client privilege are defensive, it would be 
rare that such claims would be part of a complaint.  As a result, claims 
of attorney-client privilege would seem to fall within the scope of 
those litigation actions that many courts would view as sanctionable 
under Rules 11 or 26(g).  There is, however, a dearth of case law con-
sidering the actual application of sanctions under either of these 
rules to colorable claims of attorney-client privilege made for im-
proper purposes. 
Although there is legal support, and ninety-four years of ethical 
support, for generally imposing disciplinary sanctions on even non-
frivolous motions, filings, and discovery actions, we must now con-
sider whether it would make ethical sense to specifically impose dis-
ciplinary sanctions on non-frivolous claims of attorney-client privilege 
for improper purposes.  Once the issue is limited to claims of attor-
ney-client privilege, it quickly becomes apparent that colorable claims 
of privilege cannot be sufficiently tainted by improper purposes to 
justify the chilling effect disciplinary sanctions would provide. 
v. Bank of Israel, 56 F.3d 450 (2d Cir. 1995) (sanctions could not be imposed under 
Rule 11 for the filing of a complaint that was not substantively frivolous but was dis-
missed on forum non conveniens grounds and won for the plaintiff an assurance of 
safe passage in Israel to testify in a parallel action filed against him there); Zaldivar v. 
City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 832 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that the vindication 
of rights at issue in a complaint that is well grounded in fact and law cannot be 
tainted by any additional improper purposes).  But see Senese v. Chicago Area I.B. of 
T. Pension Fund, 237 F.3d 819, 826 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating that “Rule 11 may be vio-
lated when, even if the claims are well based in fact and law, parties or their attorneys 
bring the action for an improper purpose” but deferring to the trial court’s finding 
that an improper purpose was not present in this case); In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 
518 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that a complaint filed to vindicate rights in court, and 
also for some improper purpose, should not be sanctioned so long as the added pur-
pose is not undertaken in bad faith and is not so excessive as to eliminate a proper 
purpose). 
 99 See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Alla Med., 855 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that 
non-frivolous motions filed to harass or delay as a part of abusive litigation tactics 
could be sanctioned under the improper purpose clause of Rule 11 alone, even 
though a non-frivolous complaint filed for an improper purpose could not be sanc-
tioned under  Rule 11); Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 518 (stating that filing well-grounded 
motions can be sanctioned as harassment if excessive or filed without a sincere intent 
to pursue); Whitehead v. Food Max, Inc,  332 F.3d 796, 805 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding 
an objectively ascertainable improper purpose sufficient to justify Rule 11 sanctions 
even when an action is “well grounded in fact and law”); Pathe Computer Control 
Sys. Corp. v. Kinmont Indus., 955 F.2d 94, 97 (1st. Cir. 1992) (affirming sanctions for 
removal motion that could not be said to be legally unwarranted, but which was filed 
for the improper purpose of delay). 
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To begin with, attorney-client privilege claims are purely defen-
sive in nature, unlike maliciously made, but legally grounded, offen-
sive acts such as filing a lawsuit or making a discovery request.  As a 
result, the possible improper purposes that might be associated with a 
claim of privilege are likely to be considerably tamer than those that 
might be associated with the initiation of a lawsuit or even a request 
for discovery.  Imagine an attorney served with a request for docu-
ments that clearly targets some that are unquestionably privileged, 
but that contain nothing that would help the requesting party.  It is 
difficult to see how an objection of attorney-client privilege alone 
could serve the usual malicious improper purposes such as ruining a 
personal or financial reputation,100 tying up the sale of property,101 or 
causing deep emotional distress.102  At most, we might have a situation 
where blocking the discovery of the documents might be made with 
the purpose or intent of annoying and frustrating the other side or 
triggering an expensive fight about the documents that will drain the 
opponent’s resources and resolve.  These purposes clearly fall short 
of the more malicious purposes that have been seen as sufficient to 
overcome the non-frivolous nature of the claims. 
In addition to the fact that the improper purposes that might 
motivate non-frivolous claims of privilege are more strategic than ma-
licious, it is also important to realize that in many cases, there is a very 
important legal reason why non-frivolous claims of privilege should 
be asserted regardless of the lack of harm to the client if the re-
quested communication was provided.  Failure to assert privilege can 
create a waiver of privilege for other communications on the same 
subject that could be disadvantageous to the client.103  In cases where 
such a waiver would harm the client, the proper purpose makes any 
improper purpose collateral at most. 
Perhaps there are cases where a waiver is either not possible or 
not harmful to a client.  Is there still a proper purpose sufficient to 
 100 E.g., Whitehead, 332 F.3d at 801 (sanctioning an attorney’s staged for-television 
execution of a writ of judgment at a local Kmart for a $3.4 million judgment as un-
dertaken both to embarrass Kmart and create free publicity for the lawyer); In re 
Edmonds, No. 00-022-1227, 2002 WL 32396986 (Va. State Bar Disciplinary Bd. May 
15, 2002) (finding an improper purpose where a former judge instituted a federal 
racial discrimination suit against a sitting judge who had ruled against his client in a 
commercial matter). 
 101 In re Perez, 43 B.R. 530 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1984) (filing repeated Chapter 13 
bankruptcy petitions to obtain repeated stays of foreclosure). 
 102 E.g., Argentieri v. Fisher Landscapes, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 55, 62 n.9 (D. Mass. 
1998) (party claimed a motion for attachment was filed solely to give plaintiff’s wife 
“apoplexy”). 
 103 EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 299, 378. 
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outweigh the concerns we have about these strategic but improper 
purposes?  Legally successful claims of privilege defend the attorney-
client relationship and the adversarial system of justice that depends 
on this relationship.  It seems obvious that the ethical duty of confi-
dentiality requires protection of the attorney-client relationship by 
non-disclosure whenever and wherever the relationship is actually 
targeted.  This defense is so important from an ethical perspective 
that it is unimaginable that an improper purpose for making this de-
fense would change our valuation of the defense.  When it comes to 
legally supportable assertions of attorney-client privilege asserted for 
improper purposes, it may be fair to say that they do resemble not-
guilty pleas in criminal defense cases.  Just as we cannot imagine a 
collateral reason for pleading not guilty that would undermine the 
defense of liberty embodied in all such pleas, we cannot also imagine 
a collateral reason for denying access to possibly attorney-client privi-
leged materials that would undermine the defense of the adversary 
system provided by protecting attorney-client privilege.  Conse-
quently, any ethical limitation on assertions of attorney-client privi-
lege should not extend to legitimate assertions made for improper 
purposes.  Therefore, in the context of claims of attorney-client privi-
lege, the move made by the 2002 amendments to Model Rule 3.1 to 
eliminate improper purpose as a species of frivolousness can be seen 
as consistent with the underlying principles of legal ethics.  There-
fore, this Article would not define a frivolous claim of attorney-client 
privilege as including a claim made for an improper purpose. 
B. Claims of Privilege Made in a Frivolous Manner 
The introduction to this section described three kinds of “lazy” 
claims of privilege: claims made without reasonable factual investiga-
tion, claims made without reasonable legal research or analysis, and 
claims made without complying with the procedural requirements of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5).  When such laziness pro-
duces substantively frivolous claims of privilege, the lack of merit 
alone may well suffice to make such claims ethically impermissible.104  
At issue in this section is whether making claims of privilege in a 
frivolous manner should be an ethical violation even when the claim 
turns out to be either colorable or meritorious. 
 104 See infra section III.C. 
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1. Lack of Factual Inquiry 
The most extreme example of a claim made in a factually frivo-
lous manner would arise if a lawyer claimed attorney-client privilege 
for documents that the lawyer had no prior factual knowledge of 
without ever reviewing the documents for the presence or absence of 
facts that would support a claim of privilege.105
The ethical duty of competence under Model Rule 1.1 requires 
that “[a] lawyer. . . provide . . . [the] preparation reasonably neces-
sary for the representation.”106  Such preparation includes “inquiry 
into and analysis of the factual . . . elements of the problem.”107  Thus, 
lawyers have been disciplined for failing to obtain and review bank 
records that would have prevented a conservatorship from being un-
necessarily imposed on an elderly client,108 for failing to obtain and 
review medical reports in a murder case,109 for failing to read a cli-
 105 See, e.g., Am. Med. Sys. v. Nat’l Union Fire Insur. Co., No. CIV.A 98-1788, 1999 
WL 970341, at *10 (E.D. La. Oct. 22, 1999) (awarding attorney’s fees for a “com-
pletely inappropriate” claim of privilege, including for copies of folder labels, blank 
pieces of paper, and copies of reported cases); see also Eureka Fin. Corp. v. Hartford 
Accident & Indem. Co., 136 F.R.D. 179, 183 n.9 (E.D. Cal. 1991) (suggesting that 
improper “blanket” claims of privilege are most often made by counsel “who have 
not carefully reviewed the pertinent documents for privilege”). 
 106 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2004).  This language is quite similar 
to Disciplinary Rule 6-101(A)(2) of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, 
which requires a lawyer not to “[h]andle a legal matter without preparation adequate 
in the circumstances.”  MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101 (1983). 
 107 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 5.  It is worth noting that the 
Model Code fails to mention factual inquiry in either the Disciplinary Rules or the 
Ethical Considerations that precede the rule.  An increasing emphasis on factual in-
vestigation can be most clearly seen in the movement from Disciplinary Rule 7-
102(A) to Model Rule 3.1 and in the most recent amendments to Model Rule 3.1.  
See infra text accompanying notes 119–30.  Further support for a general duty to un-
dertake a factual review of documents prior to claiming privilege can also be found 
in Model Rule 3.4, which prohibits a lawyer from “fail[ing] to make a reasonably dili-
gent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party.”  
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4.  Clearly, the first step in a reasonably dili-
gent effort to comply would be a factual review of documents that might be within 
the scope of the request. 
 108 In re Brantley, 920 P.2d 433, 441–42 (Kan. 1996) (before filing for conservator-
ship for elderly client, lawyer failed to verify that client did not know of bank trans-
fers to son reported by bank official by checking bank records and showing client 
these records). 
 109 In re Chambers, 642 P.2d 286, 291 (Or. 1982) (lawyer suspended for, among 
other things, not reviewing state-held medical records in a murder case); Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Mooney, 753 A.2d 17, 37 (Md. 1999) (lawyer suspended 
for, among other things, failing to obtain medical records or subpoena witnesses in 
an assault case). 
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ent’s statement or contact potential witnesses,110 and for failing to 
read grand jury transcripts or examine physical evidence.111  Under-
standably, these disciplinary cases under Model Rule 1.1 have tended 
to involve failures to investigate facts central to the success and failure 
of the claims and defenses of clients.  Indeed, Model Rule 1.1 would 
seem to be aimed at failures to factually investigate that are likely to 
directly lead to loss of client rights.  Thus, in such cases, courts are 
willing to say that good results, should they occur, do not excuse the 
lack of preparation on the part of the lawyer because the good results 
are not really produced by the representation itself, but by some in-
dependent factor.112
On the other hand, it is difficult to say that incompetence is pre-
sent when the acts or omissions may and do directly produce good 
results, and can therefore be seen as strategic acts or omissions.113  
Clearly, if a lawyer fails to examine documents to be produced, pro-
duces them all without claiming privilege for any of them, and 
thereby produces some privileged documents, we would have a 
Model Rule 1.1 failure to factually investigate that directly led to a 
loss of client rights.  Indeed, there would probably be a greater de-
gree of competence at work if the same lawyer were to blindly claim 
privilege for all the documents in this situation, rather than failing to 
make any effort at all to protect the client’s privilege.  In this situa-
tion, if privileged documents are thereby protected, the lawyer has 
directly produced this result.  If detrimental information has been 
withheld from the opposing party, the lawyer has directly produced 
this result as well.  There is a level of legal and strategic competence 
operating in such a practice that makes it difficult to bring it cleanly 
within the scope of cases decided under Model Rule 1.1. 
 110 Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Ficker, 706 A.2d 1045, 1057–58 (Md. 
1998) (lawyer appeared not to have read statement given by client to assistant and 
did not contact any witnesses named in statement). 
 111 In re Wolfram, 847 P.2d 94, 100 (Ariz. 1993) (lawyer suspended for failing to 
read grand jury transcript, examine physical evidence, or interview witnesses in fel-
ony child abuse case). 
 112 See, e.g., id. at 104 (Corcoran, J., concurring) (noting that, although lawyer’s 
incompetent representation ultimately resulted in an improved plea bargain after 
issue of ineffective assistance of counsel was raised, and a lesser sentence, and that 
this may actually have been intended by counsel, it was still unethical); In re Gasti-
neau, 857 P.2d 136, 142 (Or. 1993) (“If a lawyer does a poor job, but the client for-
tuitously or through the efforts of others obtains a good result, that does not excuse 
the lawyer from providing competent representation or justify neglecting the case.”). 
 113 Gastineau, 857 P.2d at 142 (no incompetence when “the accused identified the 
most desirable disposition for his client and deliberately was using the tactic of not 
getting in the way of a good result”). 
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Of course, a failure to actually review documents would make it 
impossible to comply with the procedural obligations of providing 
specific factual information about each document objected to.114  At 
most, a general privilege objection could be made as to all docu-
ments.  Thus, the lack of factual investigation would necessarily lead 
to procedural violations and a violation of Model Rule 3.4, which is 
discussed in more detail below.115
Additional support for the proposition that failing to review 
documents prior to claiming privilege is ethically impermissible may 
be found in the 2004 version of Model Rule 3.1, which specifies that 
“[a] lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or con-
trovert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact . . . that 
is not frivolous.”116  The comments add that while an action is not 
frivolous “merely because the facts have not first been fully substanti-
ated or because the lawyer expects to develop vital evidence only by 
discovery . . . [w]hat is required of lawyers, however, is that they in-
form themselves about the facts of their clients’ cases.”117
It should be noted that both the reference to a basis “in fact” in 
the body of Model Rule 3.1, and the requirement in the comment 
that lawyers inform themselves about the facts, were 2002 additions to 
Model Rule 3.1.118  Neither the previous version of Model Rule 3.1,119 
nor its predecessor, Model Code provisions 7-102(A)(1),(2),120 made 
any specific reference to factual investigation or grounding for litiga-
tion actions.  Indeed, the overwhelmingly subjective focus of the 
predecessor sections of the Model Code—prohibiting only the know-
ing or obvious making of a claim unwarranted by law121—may have 
actually protected lawyers whose lack of factual investigation made it 
impossible for them to know the claim was unwarranted. 
The shift to an objective test in the 1983 version of Model Rule 
3.1,122 on the other hand, was intended to bring the ethical standard 
 114 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5) (requiring specific information about privi-
leged documents be provided “in a manner that . . . will enable other parties to assess 
the applicability of the privilege or protection”). 
 115 See infra Part III.B.3. 
 116 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2004). 
 117 Id. cmt. 2. 
 118 Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1(as amended 2002), with 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1(2001). 
 119 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1(2001). 
 120 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1), (2) (1969). 
 121 Id. 
 122 See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (5th ed. 2003), supra note 84, 
at 316. 
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in line with the procedural law of frivolous litigation actions.123  Since 
the 1983 version of Rule 11 expressly required a certification that the 
action “is well grounded in fact,”124 it seems likely that the previous 
wording of Model Rule 3.1, requiring a “basis . . . that is not frivo-
lous,”125 implicitly included a reasonable attempt to discern the 
facts.126  The Reporter’s Explanation to the 2002 amendments to 
Model Rule 3.1 confirms this by stating that the 2002 changes were 
not intended to make a change in substance,127 and that the new lan-
guage was added simply “to remind lawyers that they must act rea-
sonably to inform themselves about the facts and law.”128  At the same 
time, Model Rule 3.1 is generally understood to allow little or no fac-
tual investigation if there is no time to do so before an action protect-
ing the client must be taken, such as filing to avoid a statute of limita-
tions deadline.129  It does seem, however, that this excuse is not likely 
to apply to privilege objections to document requests.130
The crucial question under Model Rule 3.1 is whether a lawyer’s 
pre-objection failure to even read documents claimed to be privi-
leged would be an ethical violation if, by chance, the documents were 
subsequently determined to be privileged.  Does Model Rule 3.1 tar-
get the frivolous manner in which the objection was made independ-
ent of the end result?  Prior to the objective turn in Model Rule 3.1, 
frivolousness was understood as having both an objective and subjec-
 123 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 86, at 164 (the objective test of Model Rule 
3.1 was developed to track procedural law). 
 124 FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 125 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2001). 
 126 E.g., In re Kurker, No. BD-2002-0052, 2002 WL 32254626, at *2 (Mass. State Bar 
Disciplinary Bd. Oct. 24, 2002) (suspending from practice, under the original version 
of Model Rule 3.1, an attorney who filed a suit on behalf of himself alleging a con-
spiracy between the judges and opposing counsel in a prior case involving his own 
interest in a family business without interviewing any potential witnesses, investigat-
ing, or having any evidence or reasonable personal knowledge to support the allega-
tions). 
 127 ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, Model Rule 3.1 Reporter’s Explanation 
of Changes, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/e2k-rule31rem.html (last visited Dec. 
12, 2006). 
 128 Id. cmt. 2. 
 129 See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (5th ed. 2003), supra note 84, 
at 319. 
 130 Lawyers finding themselves with insufficient time to review documents for 
privilege and other objections before a deadline to produce has passed should either 
have gotten to work earlier or should apply for an extension of time in which to re-
spond, rather than take a pile of unexamined papers and declare them all privileged 
simply to protect possible client rights in a time crunch.  Even missing a deadline 
without an extension is not going to have the dire consequences of passing a statute 
of limitations deadline without filing a complaint. 
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tive component.  A lawyer who believes there is no factual support for 
a claim has no subjective basis for claiming privilege.  If facts neces-
sary to support a claim of privilege are not in fact present, there is 
also no objective basis for the claim.  If such facts are present, there is 
an objective basis for the claim.  The predecessor to Model Rule 3.1, 
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(2), required that there be neither an ob-
jective basis for the claim nor a subjective basis.131  Thus, a lawyer who 
could show that she did believe facts to be present, even though she 
had done no investigation, and the facts were not in fact present, 
would not violate the ethical rule. 
The turn to an objective standard in Model Rule 3.1 was clearly 
meant to remove the additional requirement that only a lawyer with 
no subjective belief in a claim would violate the rule.132  If the claim is 
objectively frivolous, it is now no defense that the lawyer did not real-
ize it.133  It is possible, however, to eliminate the requirement of sub-
jective knowledge yet still require that an attorney engage in the kind 
of investigatory conduct normally required to produce a subjective 
belief that there is a basis for the claim.  This is precisely what the 
2003 amendments accomplished.  Language added to the comments 
emphasized the conduct requirement that lawyers “inform them-
selves about the facts” as an essential aspect of avoiding making a 
frivolous claim.134  Further, the ABA itself has described Model Rule 
3.1 as including a “duty to investigate.”135  Whether this should be 
understood to impose an independent duty to investigate, such that 
lack of factual investigation of objectively factually grounded claims 
would be an ethical violation, remains unclarified. 
As the same issue has arisen under Rule 11, it may be instructive 
to consult the case law dealing with this very issue.  The 1983 amend-
ments to Rule 11 were adopted one day before the Model Rules were 
first approved to replace the Model Code.136  The amendments to 
Rule 11, for the first time, imposed a “reasonable inquiry”137 require-
ment on litigants.  This reasonable inquiry requirement was designed 
to move the standard away from judgments about a lawyer’s good 
 131 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(2) (1969) (prohibiting the 
lawyer from “[k]nowingly advancing a claim or defense that is unwarranted”). 
 132 Lancelloti v. Fay, 909 F.2d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 133 Id. 
 134 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 2 (2004). 
 135 ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (5th ed. 2003), supra note 84, at 
319. 
 136 See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (3d ed. 1996), supra note 38, 
at 300. 
 137 See VAIRO, supra note 87, at 9 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (amended 1983)). 
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faith in bringing a claim,138 which necessitated a focus on the subjec-
tive state of mind of the attorney.  However, two possible objective 
targets emerged to take the place of the lawyer’s good faith.  The rea-
sonable inquiry standard could be read to require particular pre-
filing conduct by lawyers—which would then immunize the result—
or it could be read to require a final product, which could have re-
sulted from reasonable pre-filing conduct.139
Initially, courts applying the 1983 version of Rule 11 tended to 
focus on the product or filing itself and the issue of whether it was 
substantively frivolous.140  If the product was seen as either not “well 
grounded in fact [or not] warranted by existing law,”141 then courts 
presumed that a reasonable inquiry could not have occurred.142  Us-
ing this approach, however, courts had great difficulty articulating a 
“workable test for frivolousness.”143  Since it is easier to agree on what 
a reasonable inquiry should have been than it is to agree on what re-
sult a reasonable inquiry should have produced, it has been argued 
that courts should shift their focus to the actual pre-filing conduct.144  
Indeed, at least one commentator has suggested that the design of 
the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 was meant “to focus judicial inquiry 
primarily on the reasonable inquiry-conduct aspect of Rule 11, rather 
than the content of paper per se.”145
Additional focus by the courts on the reasonable inquiry ele-
ment of Rule 11 produced two differing approaches.  Most circuits 
have adopted a two-part test, in which sanctions may not be imposed 
unless there has been both a finding that a filing is baseless and a 
finding that this would have been revealed by a reasonable inquiry.146  
 138 Id. at 9 n.57. 
 139 Id. at 244. 
 140 Id. (noting that although the 1983 amendment to Rule 11 did not use the word 
“frivolous,” courts often used this term as a paraphrase of  “reasonable inquiry”). 
 141 Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (as amended through 1983)). 
 142 Id. 
 143 VAIRO, supra note 87, at 244–45. 
 144 Id. at 247. 
 145 Id. (citing William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11: Entering a New Era, 28 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 7 (1994)). 
 146 In re Keegan Mgmt. Co. Sec. Lit., 78 F.3d 431, 434 (9th Cir. 1996) (explicitly 
determining that a pre-filing lack of reasonable inquiry into facts was irrelevant when 
prior to trial, facts emerged which prevented the complaint from being frivolous); 
Jones v. Int’l Riding Helmets, Ltd., 49 F.3d 692, 695 (11th Cir. 1995) (stating the 
Rule 11 test as looking first to see if claims are objectively and substantively frivolous, 
then considering whether a reasonable inquiry would have revealed this at the time 
the claims were made); Calloway v. Marvel Entm’t Group, 854 F.2d 1452, 1470 (2d 
Cir. 1988) (explaining that the Rule 11 test requires no showing of an adequate pre-
filing inquiry if an objectively reasonable evidentiary basis for a claim emerged pre-
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Thus, an actual reasonable inquiry will immunize what turns out to 
be an objectively frivolous filing and vice versa.147  A few circuits have 
taken the position that a pre-filing failure to investigate the facts is 
sufficient to justify Rule 11 sanctions148 even if “the attorney . . . gets 
lucky in discovery.”149  Thus, it remains an open question under Rule 
11 whether subsequent discovery of supporting facts should excuse 
the earlier failure to investigate.150
An important commentator on Rule 11, Georgene Vairo, has ar-
gued that Rule 11 should not be read to impose an independent re-
quirement of an actual reasonable inquiry where facts emerge that 
make a claim not substantively frivolous because the resulting non-
frivolous filing does not create an improper burden to the system.151  
Further, the fact that sanctions loom if the filing is substantively frivo-
lous should provide sufficient motivation for attorneys to investigate 
the facts.152  Vairo also points out that this approach “limits satellite 
litigation,” 153 i.e., litigation about the litigation, which creates its own 
burden on the courts.  Vairo does suggest, however, that the failure 
to engage in factual investigation is unethical even if it should not be 
trial or at trial), rev’d in part sub nom. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Group, 493 
U.S. 120 (1989) (reversing only sanctions against the law firm after holding that sig-
natory lawyer, but not law firm of signatory lawyer, could be sanctioned under Rule 
11). 
 147 Brunt v. Serv. Employees Int’l Union, 284 F.3d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Even 
‘objectively frivolous filings support but do not compel an inference of unreasonable 
investigation.’”) (quoting Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont’l Bank, 880 F.2d 928, 933 (7th 
Cir. 1989)). 
 148 Garr v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 22 F.3d 1274, 1279 (3rd Cir. 1994) (“[A] signer 
making an inadequate inquiry into the sufficiency of the facts and law underlying a 
document will not be saved from a Rule 11 sanction by the stroke of luck that the 
document happened to be justified”); Lichtenstein v. Consol. Serv. Group, 173 F.3d 
17, 23 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating in dictum that “a party who brings a suit without con-
ducting a reasonable inquiry and based on nothing more than a prayer that helpful 
facts will somehow emerge, and who through sheer fortuity is rewarded for his care-
lessness, is nevertheless vulnerable to sanctions”).  But see Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. 
of Am., 861 F.2d 746, 759 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that when a reasonably competent 
attorney would have found non-frivolous legal grounds for a complaint, the fact that 
the filing attorney was not aware of these grounds at the time of filing would not jus-
tify Rule 11 sanctions, and suggesting that the same would apply to a pre-filing lack of 
factual grounds that was remedied later). 
 149 VAIRO, supra note 87, at 251. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
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grounds for sanctions in itself.154  Thus, we may take Rule 11 case law 
as recognizing the impropriety of making a claim without reasonable 
inquiry into the fact even though there is disagreement as to whether 
Rule 11 sanctions are an appropriate way to express this judgment. 
If we may conclude that the ethical duty to avoid frivolous claims 
includes an independent duty not to make claims in a frivolous man-
ner—here, meaning without reasonable inquiry into the facts—it re-
mains only to consider whether such an independent duty is in any 
way problematic in the specific context of claims of attorney-client 
privilege.  Does our duty to preserve the attorney-client privilege re-
quire that we allow attorneys to make unnecessarily fact-blind claims 
of privilege because some of these communications will legitimately 
require the protection of the privilege? 
In fact, the danger of chilling the assertion of objectively non-
frivolous claims of privilege by independently prohibiting fact-blind 
claims of privilege is minimal.  First, the probability of a negative im-
pact on legitimate privilege is quite small.  Unlike improper purpose, 
which may as easily accompany non-frivolous privilege claims as frivo-
lous privilege claims, it would be extremely rare for a truly fact-blind 
claim of privilege to hit the mark.155  Furthermore, while an improper 
purpose probably cannot be “deleted” from the lawyer’s or client’s 
psyche to clear the way to make a substantively non-frivolous claim, it 
is simple to remedy the lack of factual investigation and remove any 
negative impact on privilege.  All that a lawyer needs to do is evaluate 
the communications before making the privilege objection.  Thus, it 
seems consistent with Model Rule 3.1’s emphasis on a primarily ob-
jective standard, as well as the recent elimination of improper pur-
pose as a relevant factor, to view Model Rule 3.1 as containing an in-
dependent duty to reasonably examine the facts surrounding the 
communication sought to be disclosed. 
In addition, it is highly unlikely that an ethical requirement of a 
reasonable pre-filing factual investigation of documents will result in 
lawyers choosing to disclose communications rather than take the 
time to conduct a factual evaluation.  Lawyers are already quite clear 
that allowing a waiver of privilege to occur in this way would be a vio-
 154 Id. (“[I]t would be perverse to reward the losing party with his attorney’s fees 
solely to make sure that the winning attorney complies with his or her ethical obliga-
tions.”). 
 155 See, e.g., Am. Med. Sys. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 98-1788, 1999 
WL 970341, at *10 (E.D. La. Oct. 22, 1999) (imposing sanctions when counsel obvi-
ously failed to review documents such as “blank documents, letters to and from op-
posing counsel, [and] published cases” before objecting to their production as either 
attorney-client privileged or work-product privileged). 
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lation of their ethical duty of confidentiality as well as malpractice.  
The only result of such a duty to investigate would be to increase the 
probability of reasonable pre-filing factual investigation prior to the 
making of privilege claims.  Furthermore, this result will not be pro-
vided at the expense of further burdening the courts with satellite 
litigation.  Perhaps, as Vairo suggests, it might be inappropriate to 
award attorney’s fees to the side losing the motion to compel,156 but it 
does seem necessary to recognize in some arena that the “winning” 
attorney acted in a manner that is unacceptable when an inadequate 
factual inquiry was made. 
Thus, a comment to Model Rule 3.1 designed to focus the atten-
tion of attorneys on the particular ethical concerns raised by claims of 
attorney-client privilege should address the frivolous practice of mak-
ing claims of privilege without reasonable factual investigation of the 
communications in question sufficient to ensure that facts supporting 
the basic legal elements of privilege are present. 
2. Lack of Legal Research of Analysis 
As is the case with a lack of factual investigation, a lawyer’s fail-
ure to do legal research or analysis will usually lead to the filing of le-
gally frivolous claims.  Setting aside for the moment those cases in 
which a claim is also substantively frivolous, we focus here on claims 
that are meritorious, or for which “avant garde”157 legal arguments 
are dreamed up only after a motion for sanctions has been filed. 
The ethical duty of competence as defined by Model Rule 1.1 
requires that “[a] lawyer . . . provide . . . [the] preparation reasonably 
necessary for the representation.”158  Such preparation includes “in-
quiry into . . . [the] legal elements of the problem.”159  Thus, lawyers 
have been disciplined for incompetence under Model Rule 1.1 or its 
predecessor, Disciplinary Rule 6-101(A)(2),160 for: filing a complaint 
without researching whether there was a legal cause of action for the 
 156 See VAIRO, supra note 87, at 251. 
 157 Pathe Computer Sys. Corp. v. Kinmont Indus., 955 F.2d 94, 97 (1st Cir. 1992) 
(describing novel theories of jurisdiction argued for the first time to support a mo-
tion to transfer at the sanctions hearing as “avant garde” and sufficient to avoid being 
sanctioned for failure to make a reasonable inquiry that the filing was warranted by 
law, but suggesting that the timing of the legal research and analysis supported the 
district court’s imposition of sanctions for improper purpose). 
 158 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002). 
 159 Id. cmt. 5. 
 160 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(A)(2) (1983).  “A lawyer shall 
not: . . . handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances.”  
Id. 
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facts alleged;161 failing to do sufficient research to discover possible 
causes of action;162 undertaking a probate matter without any re-
search into the basic law;163 and for failing to read a governing stat-
ute.164   
In addition to undertaking appropriate preparation, Model Rule 
1.1 also requires that lawyers have the “legal knowledge . . . necessary 
for the representation.”165  The interaction between the requirements 
of knowledge and preparation reflects the different paths lawyers may 
take to achieve competence in a particular matter as well as the dif-
fering levels of knowledge required for matters that are complex and 
unique compared to matters that are simple and routine.  A lawyer 
with highly specialized and up-to-date knowledge of the law and a 
great deal of experience with similar cases may already have the legal 
knowledge necessary and need little or no additional preparation in 
the form of legal research.166  A novice lawyer may need remedial 
study and research merely to master the basics of the law in an area, 
with additional focused research as required by the particular legal 
issues raised by the client’s case.167  Alternatively, a novice lawyer or 
an experienced lawyer unfamiliar with an area of the law can consult 
with a more knowledgeable lawyer.168
In cases of alleged incompetence involving relatively basic mat-
ters, courts may therefore focus on a practitioner’s lack of requisite 
knowledge rather than on his lack of research.  In such cases, courts 
 161 Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Henry, 664 S.W.2d 62, 63–64 (Tenn. 1983) 
(suspending under Disciplinary Rule 6-101(A)(2) an attorney who filed civil rights 
and libel complaint based on the receipt of obscene material in the mail). 
 162 In re Disciplinary Proceedings against Zautcke, 508 N.W.2d 387, 388–89 (Wis. 
1993) (attorney “conducted no substantive legal research into any of the potential 
causes of action”). 
 163 Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Hensley, 661 P.2d 527, 530 (Okla. 1983) (finding a lack of 
competence, not merely in attorney’s undertaking a probate matter without any ini-
tial competence in the area, but also in her “failure to ascertain what she knew to be 
basic and statutorily defined points of law readily ascertainable by any member of the 
bar”). 
 164 Neb. State Bar Ass’n v. Holscher, 230 N.W.2d 75, 79 (Neb. 1975) (lawyer failed 
to check amendments to statute, but disciplined on grounds of making a false state-
ment of law); Zautcke, 508 N.W.2d at 388–89 (lawyer failed to “review the statute gov-
erning shareholder derivative suits”); Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Zdravk-
ovich, 762 A.2d 950, 962 (Md. 2000) (lawyer failed to read removal statute). 
 165 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2004). 
 166 Id. cmt. 1 (noting that requisite knowledge can be present from a lawyer’s gen-
eral experience and specialized experience and training). 
 167 Id. cmt. 2 (noting that “a newly admitted lawyer can be as competent as a prac-
titioner with long experience” and that “[a] lawyer can provide adequate representa-
tion in a wholly novel field through necessary study”). 
 168 Id. cmt. 1, 2. 
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require lawyers to be familiar with “fundamental principles essential 
to the practice of law.”169  In other cases, the lawyer may be viewed as 
failing to “discover those additional rules of law which, although not 
commonly known, may be readily found by standard research tech-
niques.”170
Yet a third aspect of competence is legal analysis: “[c]ompetent 
handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of 
the factual and legal elements of the problem.”171  Thus, an attorney 
may know the relevant facts and law yet simply assume the result 
rather than undertake an analysis of the facts under the law.  Alterna-
tively, the attorney may in fact undertake an analysis, but fail to ade-
quately apply the law to the facts.172  In practice, it may be difficult to 
distinguish these two failures. 
The expected competence of lawyers with regard to the law of 
attorney-client privilege has not been a matter regularly or deeply ex-
plored by courts in the context of ethical discipline.  Is the law of at-
torney-client privilege a “fundamental principle[] essential to the 
practice of law”173 such that lawyers would be expected to simply know 
it without doing any research?  Certainly, a case could be made that 
competence in a lawyer must include knowledge of the basic legal 
elements of attorney-client privilege,174 including how privilege may 
be lost.175  In the absence of this knowledge, an attorney will be inca-
pable of fulfilling her ethical duty to protect attorney-client privileged 
communications,176 as that requires the ability to identify what is and 
 169 People ex rel. Goldberg v. Gordon, 607 P.2d 995, 996 (Colo. 1980) (lack of 
knowledge demonstrated by lawyer’s attempted use of probate proceedings to trans-
fer property owned as joint tenants with a right of survivorship); see generally 
ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (5th ed. 2003), supra note 84, at 19 
(citing cases indicating that a lawyer must be “familiar with well-settled principles of 
law applicable to a client’s needs”). 
 170 ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (5th ed. 2003), supra note 84, at 
19 (quoting Baird v. Pace, 752 P.2d 507, 509 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987)). 
 171 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 5 (emphasis added). 
 172 See generally ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (5th ed. 2003), supra 
note 84, at 21 (collecting disciplinary cases involving misapplication of laws such as 
the Internal Revenue Code, child support guidelines, and federal sentencing guide-
lines). 
 173 Goldberg, 607 P.2d at 997 (lawyer attempted to effect a transfer of decedent’s 
assets, owned in joint tenancy with widow, through a probate proceeding). 
 174 See infra note 186. 
 175 Such as by waiver or under the crime-fraud exception. 
 176 See ABA Comm’n on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-385 
(1994) (A “lawyer has a professional responsibility to seek to limit the subpoena, or 
court order, on any legitimate available grounds (such as the attorney-client privi-
lege, work product immunity, relevance or burden), so as to protect documents as to 
which the lawyer’s obligations under Rule 1.6 apply.”). 
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is not privileged.  Furthermore, assessments of privilege may have to 
be made quickly when monitoring the testimony of one’s client in a 
deposition or on the witness stand.  The basic elements should not be 
something that a competent lawyer needs to look up. 
The privilege objections of most concern here—objections to 
written civil discovery requests—are of a type that does not require 
“seat-of-the-pants” knowledge of attorney-client privilege.  Thus, we 
need not be concerned about precisely where we would draw the line 
between an essential basic knowledge of privilege and legal principles 
that can be learned or relearned by some study or research.  It is suf-
ficient to say that prior to filing objections based on attorney-client 
privilege, attorneys need to have this basic knowledge.  A lack of such 
knowledge, combined with the recognition of an ethical duty to pro-
tect attorney-client privilege, will lead lawyers to make substantively 
frivolous claims of privilege. 
In re Ryder,177 one of the few ethics cases to involve an improper 
claim of privilege, is a case that illustrates the consequences of a lack 
of basic knowledge about attorney-client privilege.178  Ryder, an ex-
perienced private practice attorney and former Assistant United 
States Attorney, transferred a bag of money he knew had been stolen 
from a bank and a sawed-off shotgun he knew had been used to 
commit a crime from a client’s safety deposit box to his own safety 
deposit box.179  Ryder kept the existence and location of these items 
secret.180  Within a few weeks, his client had been arrested and a 
search warrant for Ryder’s safety deposit box had been issued.181  
When Ryder revealed to the court that he intended to move to sup-
press the items found in his safety deposit box, the court removed 
him as counsel, suspended him from practice before the court, and 
ordered that charges be brought against him.182
At the time he took possession of the money and shotgun, Ryder 
thought that the transfer would cloak these items with attorney-client 
privilege and that the transfer would work to prevent the client from 
being connected to these instruments and fruits of the crime.  Ryder 
 177 263 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. Va. 1967), aff’d, 381 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1967). 
 178 Ryder was a proceeding to strike an attorney from the roll of attorneys qualified 
to practice before a federal district court.  Ryder, 263 F. Supp. at 361.  It is not a typi-
cal disciplinary case involving state bar supervision and enforcement of ethical viola-
tions, but the federal court did refer to and rely on the ethical rules of the state in 
which it sat, the Virginia Canons of Professional Ethics.  See id. at 367, 369. 
 179 Id. at 363. 
 181 Id. 
 183 Id. at 363–64. 
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is not described as having done any legal research prior to taking this 
action; however, he did consult with a former bar association officer 
prior to taking this action, and he subsequently consulted with a for-
mer judge and law professor, a current state judge, and a state attor-
ney.183  So, rather than doing research to supplement his initial 
knowledge of the attorney-client privilege, Ryder consulted with 
other attorneys. 
If the advice Ryder had received had been good, his consulta-
tions with other attorneys would have been an adequate replacement 
for initial knowledge or a duty to research.184  It is difficult to tell from 
the opinion to what extent, if at all, he asked or was advised regarding 
the application of attorney-client privilege to these objects.  Much of 
the advice he received was simply that he should not retain the 
money if he did receive it.185  The advisors may have been more fo-
cused on Ryder’s possible criminal liability as an accessory rather 
than on the attorney-client privilege rationale.  Based on his own 
misapprehension of the law of attorney-client privilege, which was not 
cleared up by the advice he received—either because the advice did 
not go directly to this point, because the attorneys advising him were 
similarly confused, or because Ryder ignored what they said—Ryder 
took and maintained possession of these items believing that they had 
become privileged. 
Ryder’s misapprehension can be traced to his failure to either 
know or understand one or more of the basic elements of attorney-
client privilege.186  Only communications may be privileged.187  Mere 
physical objects, which do not contain some kind of oral or written 
communication encoded upon them, are not communications.188  No 
non-frivolous argument could have been made in Ryder’s case to 
suggest that either the money or the shotgun were “communica-
tions.”  Furthermore, the transfer of the objects to Ryder was not for 
 184 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 1, 2 (2004). 
 185 Ryder, 263 F. Supp. at 363–64. 
 186 In re Ryder, 381 F.2d 713, 714 (4th Cir. 1967) (“Viewed in any light, the facts 
furnished no basis for the assertion of an attorney-client privilege.”). 
 187 See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (McNaughton Rev. ed. 1961) (“(1) Where le-
gal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as 
such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by 
the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by him-
self or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.”) (emphasis added). 
 188 See Commonwealth v. Stenhach, 514 A.2d 114, 119 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) 
(“[P]hysical evidence of a crime in the possession of a criminal defense attorney is 
not subject to a privilege.”).  Documents, which are physical objects with writing on 
them, are viewed as communications.  See RICE, supra note 26, § 5:2, at 40 (“oral and 
written communications . . .  have . . . been the primary focus of the privilege”). 
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the purpose of legal advice, but for the purpose of concealment.  Fi-
nally, even if the objects had been “communications” “from the client 
to the attorney” for the purpose of “legal advice,” the transfer of pos-
session was for the purpose of concealing evidence from the police 
and assisting the client in the commission of a crime.189  This would 
have triggered the crime-fraud exception to the privilege, had the 
privilege even attached in the first place.190
In the opinion, the court mentions that Ryder improperly relied 
on two cases involving documents held by lawyers.191  It is not possible 
to know whether these were cases that Ryder was aware of and relied 
on at the time he concluded that the attorney-client privilege would 
attach, or whether these cases were discovered afterwards and first 
argued to the court by Ryder or his counsel in an attempt to avoid the 
threatened discipline.  We do know, however, that counsel conceded 
at the hearing that privilege did not attach despite these cases.192
If we assume that Ryder did not know of these cases at the time 
he took and maintained possession of these objects, then Ryder may 
be viewed as a case in which an attorney failed to know or understand 
fundamental principles of the law that a competent attorney is ex-
pected to know.  Even if Ryder consciously had these cases in mind 
when he determined that the transfer of the objects to him would 
make them privileged, his equation of the documents at issue in 
these cases and the non-communication bearing objects he was deal-
ing with reveals how important basic knowledge is.  Without this 
foundation, case law cannot be properly understood and applied to 
new situations. 
It should be pointed out that the court did not frame Ryder’s 
misconduct as a form of incompetence because the standard for re-
moving a licensed attorney from the rolls of those admitted to prac-
tice before a federal court required a showing of misconduct that was 
“fraudulent, intentional, and the result of improper motives.”193  The 
court found that Ryder acted outside of the bounds of the law in 
holding the stolen money and shotgun in violation of Canon 15, and 
rendered a service disloyal to the law in violation of Canon 32.194  For 
the purposes of that proceeding, therefore, Ryder’s intent to hide his 
client’s participation in this crime and his illegal acts in support of 
 189 Ryder, 263 F. Supp. at 366–67. 
 190 See id. at 367. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. at 361. 
 194 Id. at 368. 
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this purpose were of far more concern than his ignorance of the law 
of privilege.  It was Ryder’s ignorance of privilege, however, that 
blinded him to the illegality of his conduct and thereby paved the way 
for his illegal conduct.195
A practical problem that arises in the context of legal knowledge 
and analysis that does not arise in the context of factual investigation 
is that it may not always be possible to establish whether a lawyer was 
aware of a particular legal argument before a legal claim was made, 
especially in an area of the law such as attorney-client privilege.  Most, 
if not all, lawyers have been exposed to some of the law of attorney-
client privilege in law school or during practice.  When a question of 
privilege arises, a lawyer who proceeds without any deliberate re-
search or analysis might be said to be deciding on the basis of an un-
conscious, intuitive application of whatever they had previously 
grasped about privilege law.  The same cannot be said about the par-
ticular facts of a case.  A lawyer who has not received this information 
cannot possibly have learned it before. 
It seems likely that Ryder was proceeding on the basis of some 
knowledge of privilege rather than total ignorance, but in his case, a 
little knowledge was more dangerous than complete ignorance might 
have been.  The fact that he knew something made him confident 
enough to avoid the minimal steps of reviewing the legal elements of 
privilege and analyzing the facts under those elements.  It also may 
have prevented him from checking relevant case law.  In Ryder’s case, 
even the consultation of four other attorneys, whose advice either 
missed the point or was ignored, might not have been enough to pre-
vent him from being viewed as incompetent.196
 195 Compare Ryder, 263 F. Supp. at 370 (merely suspending Ryder rather than dis-
barring him because he intended to return the money to the bank and had at-
tempted to determine whether his actions were ethical by consulting reputable 
members of the bar), with Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Harlton, 669 P.2d 774, 777 (Okla. 1983) 
(disbarring attorney whose concealment of a shotgun used in a crime by another was 
not because of the “misguided zeal of an attorney in defense of his client,” but rather 
“as a personal accommodation to its perpetrator”). 
 196 Ryder did not associate the lawyers he consulted with on the case, which Model 
Rule 1.1 suggests can provide competence where there would otherwise be none.  See 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 2 (2004) (“Competent representation 
can also be provided though the association of a lawyer of established competence in 
the field in question.”).  As a result, the lawyers who provided the advice did not have 
their reputations and licenses on the line and might, therefore, not have given the 
issue the analytic effort they would have exercised had they been guiding their own 
conduct.  Thus, it may well be that reliance on the informal legal advice of others is 
insufficient.  Without associating the advising lawyer, a lawyer seeking advice must 
rely more or less blindly on another because she does not have the competence to 
judge or re-evaluate the advice given. 
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Of course, it is not possible to rely on Ryder to establish that 
claims of privilege made in a frivolous manner are unethical even if 
not substantively frivolous, as the claims of privilege in Ryder were 
substantively frivolous.  Ryder was not a case where in hindsight it was 
possible to see that there was a non-frivolous legal argument that 
might have justified advancing the claim of privilege.  But Ryder does 
help us think about the complex nature of legal knowledge and 
preparation and analysis, as well as how serious the consequences of 
this kind of incompetence can be. 
We can also consider the extent to which the 2003 version of 
Model Rule 3.1 would make merely failing to research the law of 
privilege and to analyze the facts under the law prior to claiming 
privilege ethically impermissible even when non-frivolous legal argu-
ments can be made.  Model Rule 3.1 specifies that “[a] lawyer not 
bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue 
therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact . . . that is not frivo-
lous.”197  The comments add that: 
What is required of lawyers, however, is that they inform them-
selves about . . . the applicable law and determine that they can 
make good faith arguments in support of their client’s position.  
Such action is not frivolous even though a lawyer believes that the 
client’s position ultimately will not prevail.  The action is frivo-
lous, however, if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith 
argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the ac-
tion taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modifica-
tion or reversal of existing law.198
Thus, the rule, together with its comments, identifies two distinct tar-
gets: making a claim for which there is no non-frivolous basis in law 
(objective substantive legal frivolousness) and failure to engage in le-
gal research and analysis prior to filing (frivolous conduct).  Unfor-
tunately, neither the text of Model Rule 3.1 nor its comments clarify 
whether a lucky stab in the dark is an ethical violation. 
As might be expected, the vast majority of disciplinary cases un-
der Model Rule 3.1 involve substantively frivolous cases in which no 
good faith argument is available to be discovered by legal research.199  
In such cases it is obvious that either the lawyer did not do the re-
search, did research but failed to understand what she found,200 or 
 197 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1. 
 198 Id. cmt. 2. 
 199 See generally ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (5th ed. 2003), supra 
note 84, at 317–18 (collecting cases finding no good faith argument). 
 200 In re Richards, 986 P.2d 1117, 1120 (N.M. 1999) (lawyer misunderstood cited 
case). 
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discovered a lack of merit but proceeded anyway.  When a lawyer 
blindly makes a winning claim or even a losing, but non-frivolous 
claim, it is less obvious that they have done so blindly, particularly if 
she corrects her failure to do pre-filing research and analysis prior to 
any ruling on the merits by the trial court.  Thus, the disciplinary ap-
paratus is quite unlikely to ever learn about a lawyer’s improper pre-
filing conduct and consider whether the pre-filing conduct itself vio-
lated Model Rule 3.1. 
At least one court has found a violation of Model Rule 3.1 where 
the lawyer eventually articulated a “unique”201 but good faith argu-
ment on the merits in defending the disciplinary action, but had 
failed to make that argument to the trial court in his response to a 
motion for summary judgment.202  Of course, in this case, the lawyer 
simply failed to cover up his lack of research and analysis as quickly as 
most lawyers would once the merits were challenged.  Had the lawyer 
put the effort into his client’s case that he put into his own discipli-
nary case, we would never have known about the pre-filing lack of ef-
fort.  It is also not clear that the court would have been willing to find 
a violation of Model Rule 3.1 if the good faith argument had been 
developed in time to respond to the motion for summary judgment, 
as this would have made it available in time to try to help the client. 
Most courts facing this issue in the context of Rule 11 have con-
cluded that if an objectively reasonable, i.e., non-frivolous, legal 
ground has eventually appeared, Rule 11 sanctions cannot be im-
posed, even though these legal grounds were neither known nor dis-
covered at the time the litigation action in question was taken.203  This 
approach to the Rule 11 reasonable inquiry requirement has been 
justified by the need to limit satellite litigation204 as well as the fact 
that the possibility of sanctions for substantively frivolous claims al-
 201 In re Boone, 7 P.3d 270, 282 (Kan. 2000). 
 202 Id. (finding a violation of Model Rule 3.1 even though the court also found 
that the lawyer’s continuing argument for retroactive application of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, despite settled case law that the Act is not retroactive, was a 
good faith argument). 
 203 See, e.g., Kale v. Combined Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 746, 759 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding 
that a non-frivolous equitable tolling argument prevented imposition of sanctions 
even if the attorney filing the case was unaware of the equitable tolling doctrine until 
well after filing the complaint); Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng’g, 982 F.2d 
363, 370 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Because the frivolousness prong of Rule 11 is measured by 
objective reasonableness . . . whether Unigard actually relied on these cases is irrele-
vant.”); Jones v. Int’l Riding Helmets, 49 F.3d 692, 695 (11th Cir. 1995) (without an 
initial finding that the claims were objectively frivolous as to the facts or law, no need 
to consider whether a reasonable inquiry was made). 
 204 Kale, 861 F.2d at 759. 
STRASSBERGFINAL 1/15/2007  11:57:13 AM 
458 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:413 
 
ready motivates lawyers to engage in reasonable legal inquiry and 
analysis.205  Yet, at least two circuits206 have taken the position with re-
gard to legal, as well as factual inquiry, that “[a] shot in the dark is a 
sanctionable event, even if it somehow hits the mark.”207  These cir-
cuits argue that this approach both provides better deterrence of 
baseless claims208 and “ensures that each side really does bear the ex-
penses of its own case”209 without creating a chilling effect on aggres-
sive advocacy.210
In the ethical context, we have identified as our primary concern 
the overall litigation impact created by claims of privilege that force 
opposing litigants to make fairly blind choices about what informa-
tion they will pursue through a motion to compel, that divert finan-
cial resources available for the litigation, and that often deprive liti-
gants of information they are entitled to have.  These consequences 
are present in what I will call “losing” cases, when the information is 
not in fact privileged and would have to be disclosed if the issue were 
actually litigated.  Of these losing cases, only some portion would be 
viewed as frivolous from a substantive legal perspective. 
One approach to the ethics of privilege would be to follow the 
majority approach to Rule 11 and require both substantive frivolous-
ness and a lack of legal knowledge, inquiry, or analysis before finding 
an ethical violation—thus viewing the “legally-blind” assertion of non-
frivolous losing claims of privilege as ethical.  Such an approach 
 205 See VAIRO, supra note 87, at 252; see also Garr v. U.S. Healthcare, 22 F.3d 1274, 
1283 (3d Cir. 1994) (Roth, J., dissenting). 
 206 Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont’l Bank, 880 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) 
(the reasonableness of an attorney’s inquiry “focuses on inputs rather than outputs, 
conduct rather than result”); Mays v. Principi, No. 01 C 1418, 2002 WL 15704, at *4 
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2002) (citing Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont’l Bank, 880 F.2d 928 (7th 
Cir.1989) (the focus of Rule 11 analysis is on input rather than output)); Garr, 22 
F.3d at 1279 (“[A] signer making an inadequate inquiry into the sufficiency of the 
facts and law underlying a document will not be saved from a Rule 11 sanction by the 
stroke of luck that the document happened to be justified”); see also Linda Ross 
Meyer, When Reasonable Minds Differ, 71 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1467, 1490 (1996) (arguing 
that the Supreme Court endorsed the Seventh Circuit’s emphasis on attorney con-
duct when, in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 394, 401–02 (1990), the Court 
described determinations of frivolousness as requiring factual determinations about 
the pre-filing inquiry rather than pure questions of law). 
 207 Garr, 22 F.3d at 1279 (quoting Vista Mfg., Inc. v. Trac-4 Inc., 131 F.R.D. 134, 
138 (N.D. Ind. 1990)). 
 208 Id. 
 209 Mars Steel Corp., 880 F.2d at 932 (arguing that it is improper to force the other 
side to do your research for you in order to defend themselves). 
 210 Id. (“Sanctuary as a result of a reasonable investigation ensures that counsel 
may take novel, innovative positions—that Rule 11 does not jeopardize aggressive ad-
vocacy or legal evolution.”). 
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might be justified by the practical reality that we are only likely to be-
come aware that a lawyer has failed to engage in appropriate pre-
filing legal research and analysis when we realize that she has made a 
substantively frivolous claim.  Thus, it might seem that independent 
sanctioning of pre-filing conduct of this kind is of no value. 
It would be a mistake, however, to confuse the reality of en-
forcement with the appropriateness of a threat of enforcement with 
regard to behavior that is deemed problematic.  The ethical rule 
against knowingly suborning client perjury211 is similarly problematic, 
as it is exceedingly difficult to discover when lawyers have violated this 
rule, yet this has not suggested that the rule be abandoned.  The 
most important question is whether the conduct in question is in fact 
unethical, and only secondarily whether the ethical rule creates the 
possibility of deterring the conduct. 
When making “legally-blind” claims of privilege, the lazy lawyer 
is in no position to judge whether the claim is truly frivolous, is a non-
sanctionable loser, or is a winner.  In the absence of a rule that sanc-
tions the conduct of making a “legally blind” privilege claim, the lazy 
lawyer may take a chance either that no one will challenge the privi-
lege claim to discover its possible lack of merit, or that, if challenged, 
the claim will be viewed as substantively non-frivolous.  Given the fact 
that the opposing lawyer is operating in the dark about the possible 
value of the information claimed to be privileged, and the high cost 
of challenging many individual claims of privilege, the lazy lawyer 
might reasonably see the odds tilting away from possible sanction.  
Lawyers should at least be discouraged from strategic behavior that 
has such a significant negative impact on the adversary system. 
The ethical legitimacy of the second calculation—that the claim 
may be non-frivolous—is more difficult to assess.  The risk of sanc-
tions will appear less if lawyers believe that the line between substan-
tively frivolous and legitimate claims of privilege is sufficiently unclear 
that good faith arguments, even if unsuccessful, are likely to be avail-
able if it is necessary to defend an assertion of privilege.  It would not 
be surprising if many lawyers did not in fact have this view of the law 
of attorney-client privilege.  If this were true, then there would be lit-
tle ethical value in forcing attorneys to engage in pre-filing legal re-
search or analysis for attorney-client privilege claims.  The reason-
ableness of this assumption will be considered below, and I will argue 
that while some areas are still unclear, the law of privilege is clear 
enough for a reasonably prepared lawyer to determine whether many 
 211 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2004). 
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claims of privilege are substantively frivolous.  This makes the strate-
gic choice to make a “legally blind” claim of privilege both unneces-
sary and unethical. 
Therefore, lawyers should be ethically required to follow a pro-
cedure that should ensure sufficient legal research and analysis when 
there is time for such a process, e.g., in the context of written inter-
rogatories or document requests rather than objections to testimony.  
Such a procedure might begin with a requirement that lawyers re-
mind themselves of the legal elements of privilege, either by forcing 
the detailed recall of these elements from memory or by reviewing an 
appropriate case law or treatise source.  Additionally, lawyers should 
be required to either be aware of those factual issues that require ad-
ditional reference to case law or statutes rather than the basic for-
mula, such as pre-existing documents, organizational clients, client 
identity information, and information about evidentiary objects the 
lawyer has moved or altered, or be prepared to research beyond the 
basic formula in every case.  Finally, lawyers would be required to 
consciously analyze the facts of each claim of privilege under the 
relevant law before making the claim. 
The steps articulated above are certainly examples of good prac-
tice.  The issue, however, is whether failing to follow one or more of 
these steps should be viewed as an ethical violation.  The issue is most 
clearly raised by asking whether such failures would still be ethical 
violations if the claims of privilege were upheld as substantively meri-
torious.  One problem with such an approach is that it would forbid 
acting on a hunch, or what some might prefer to call an educated 
guess.  An attorney’s intuitive hunch about the possible legal viability 
of a privilege claim may be subtly guided by the thousands of cases 
and arguments read and digested, even though not explicitly re-
membered, during her legal education and career.  Indeed, a compe-
tent lawyer should not be ignorant of the fundamentals of the law of 
privilege.  The question remains, however, whether it is unethical to 
act on a hunch when there is, or should be, time for real legal analy-
sis. 
My inclination is to say that acting on a hunch is an ethical viola-
tion even when the hunch turns out to be correct and the informa-
tion is privileged.212  Although the result in such a case is good for the 
 212 See, e.g., Tuszkiewicz v. Allen-Bradley Co., 173 F.R.D. 239, 240  (E.D. Wisc. 
1997) (requiring payment of attorney fees for an unsuccessful motion to compel 
when explanation of the factual predicates for the claim of privilege at the deposi-
tion, rather than in response to the motion to compel, would have obviated the need 
for a motion to compel). 
STRASSBERGFINAL 1/15/2007  11:57:13 AM 
2007] PRIVILEGE CAN BE ABUSED 461 
 
duty of confidentiality and good for the client, it need not have oc-
curred in such a frivolous manner.  By failing to condemn the con-
duct in this case, we simply reinforce the habit or custom of making 
reflexive privilege objections, which may just as often turn out to be 
frivolous rather than meritorious.  Furthermore, a focus on pre-filing 
conduct rather than post-hoc arguments provides an essential coun-
terweight in an area of law where post-hoc arguments may be per-
ceived as easily available. 
Finally, making such conduct an ethical violation would not chill 
claims of privilege or undermine the duty of confidentiality because 
the ethical and legal consequences of missing such a claim are too 
great.  It seems unlikely that lawyers would choose to simply disclose, 
rather than undertake the necessary research and analysis, as this 
would be easily recognized as a potential violation of the duty of con-
fidentiality, which requires the lawyer to “act competently to safe-
guard information relating to the representation of a client against 
inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer.”213  Since con-
cern for confidentiality motivates the lazy lawyer to blindly claim 
privilege rather than blindly disclose, it seems unlikely that even the 
lazy lawyer would allow privileged material to be improperly dis-
closed, even if it required him to do work he would prefer to avoid.  
All but the most ethically reprehensible lawyer would react to a spe-
cific ethical prohibition on blind claims of privilege with some level 
of factual and legal analysis of the privilege status of requested mate-
rials. 
Thus, a new comment to the Model Rules designed to focus the 
attention of attorneys on the particular ethical concerns raised by 
claims of attorney-client privilege should address the practice of filing 
claims of privilege without the necessary legal knowledge or analysis. 
3. Lack of a Complete Privilege Log 
The third and final way in which a lawyer may make a claim of 
privilege in a frivolous manner is by objecting to discovery requests 
on the grounds of privilege either without providing a privilege log, 
as required by procedural rules such as Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 26(b)(5)214 or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(d)(2),215 or by 
 213 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 15. 
 214 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5) (“When a party withholds information otherwise dis-
coverable under these rules by claiming that it is privileged or subject to protection 
as trial preparation material, the party shall make the claim expressly and shall de-
scribe the nature of the documents, communications, or things not produced or dis-
closed in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, 
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providing a privilege log that fails to fully comply with these rules.216  
Although the precise informational requirements of privilege logs 
vary from district to district,217 all logs require some minimum specific 
factual information.  Thus, the requirement of a privilege log ensures 
that at least some factual investigation of the claimed privileged 
communication has occurred prior to the claim.  Some courts also 
require a statement as to “how each element of the privilege is met as 
to that document,”218 thus forcing legal analysis prior to a claim of 
privilege. 
Making a general claim that one or more documents is privi-
leged without submission of such a privilege log is often a manifesta-
tion of a lack of pre-filing factual investigation and legal analysis.219  
Thus, it is at least partially possible to ground an ethical prohibition 
on asserting privilege without following applicable privilege log rules 
on the prior discussions of the ethical status of pre-filing factual inves-
tigation, legal research, and legal analysis.  Even if these ethical pre-
requisites to a claim of privilege have occurred, however, the absence 
of a privilege log places an impossible burden on the requesting party 
because they have no information upon which they might base a chal-
will enable other parties to assess the applicability of the privilege or protection.”); 
see, e.g., Starlight Int’l Inc. v. Herlihy, 186 F.R.D. 626, 646 (D. Kan. 1999) (finding 
sanctionable misconduct for asserting attorney-client privilege in a deposition with-
out a privilege log or other explanation for refusing to answer questions). 
 215 FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(2) (“When information subject to a subpoena is withheld 
on a claim that it is privileged or subject to protection as trial preparation materials, 
the claim shall be made expressly and shall be supported by a description of the na-
ture of the documents, communications, or things not produced that is sufficient to 
enable the demanding party to contest the claim.”). 
 216 More detailed requirements for such logs are set out in local court rules and 
case law and typically include: “(1) the type of document, (2) the general subject 
matter, (3) the date and (4) such other information sufficient to identify it for a sub-
poena duces tecum, including, where appropriate, the author, the addressee and, 
where not apparent, the relationship of the author and addressee to each other.”  
Michael Silverberg, The Burden of Producing Privilege Log, N.Y. L.J., May 9, 1996, at 3 
(describing Southern District of New York Civil Rule 46(e)(2)(ii)(A) and case law).  
Courts may also require additional information such as the purpose of the document 
and a description of how each legal element of privilege is met.  See Burns v. Imagine 
Films Entm’t, Inc., 164 F.R.D. 589, 594 (W.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 217 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5). 
 218 Id.  See United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1044 n.20 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating 
that the resisting party should have made an “attempt to demonstrate . . . [the] spe-
cific way that . . . particular document[s] fell within the ambit of the privilege”); Wil-
lemijn Houdstermaatschaapij BV v. Apollo Computer Inc., 707 F. Supp. 1429, 1439 
(D. Del. 1989) (requiring “description of the documents within its scope as well as 
precise and certain reasons for preserving their confidentiality”). 
 219 See Eureka Fin. Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 136 F.R.D. 179, 183 
n.9 (E.D. Cal. 1991) (“All too often, the blanket privilege is asserted by counsel who 
have not carefully reviewed the pertinent documents for privilege.”). 
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lenge to the claim of privilege.220  Thus, it is the unfair and impossible 
position in which the requestor of information is placed221 that spe-
cifically requires the attention of the ethical rules. 
Model Rule 3.4, titled “Fairness to Opposing Party and Coun-
sel,”222 provides strong support for the proposition that making a 
claim of privilege with an incomplete or missing privilege log is al-
ready unethical under the current Model Rules.  Model Rule 3.4(c) 
prohibits a lawyer from “knowingly disobey[ing] an obligation under 
the rules of a tribunal except for an open refusal based on an asser-
tion that no valid obligation exists.”223  Thus, attorneys have been dis-
ciplined under Model Rule 3.4(c) for failing to respond to interroga-
tories and requests for production.224  Since filing a privilege log, as 
defined by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5), local rules, and 
case law, is such an obligation, a failure to do so clearly violates Model 
Rule 3.4.  In addition, Model Rule 3.4(d) states that “[a] lawyer shall 
not . . . in pretrial procedure . . . fail to make a reasonably diligent ef-
fort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing 
party.”225  The comments to Model Rule 3.4 state that the rule in-
cludes a prohibition of “obstructive tactics in discovery procedure.”226  
Since making a general privilege objection without filing the privilege 
log that provides the factual and legal basis for the claim may be 
viewed as a failure to diligently comply with a discovery request or as 
an obstructive tactic, Model Rule 3.4(d) provides further support for 
the proposition that privilege log failures are already unethical. 
In the procedural context, many courts encountering violations 
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5) or 45(d)(2) have been 
quite willing to sanction the conduct, even at the expense of legiti-
mate claims of privilege, by summarily denying all such claims of 
privilege and compelling production.227  Some courts, mindful of the 
 220 See Delaney, Migdail & Young, Chartered v. IRS, 826 F.2d 124, 128 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) ( “[A]n index of the withheld material, summarizing, in factual and not con-
clusory terms, the nature of the material withheld and linking each specific claim of 
privilege to specific material . . . helps overcome the . . . natural handicap” arising 
from a lack of access to the documents.). 
 221 See Eureka Fin. Corp., 136 F.R.D. at 183 n.9 (describing blanket privilege objec-
tions as “defeating the full and fair information disclosure that discovery requires”). 
 222 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2004). 
 223 Id. M.R. 3.4(c). 
 224 See In re Gabriel, 837 P.2d 149 (Ariz. 1992); In re Boone, 7 P.3d 270, 283 (Kan. 
2000). 
 225 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(d). 
 226 Id. cmt. 1. 
 227 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563, 575–76 (1st Cir. 2001) (de-
scribing failure to provide a privilege log as a “fatal” error resulting in waiver of the 
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harsh effects of such a consequence, have tried to avoid “hair-trigger 
findings of waiver”228 by providing resisting parties with a second 
chance to produce such a log,229 or by imposing a different kind of 
sanction.230
Although it seems fairly apparent that it is already an ethical vio-
lation to fail to follow court rules and fail to file a sufficiently detailed 
privilege log when making a claim of privilege, it is worth pointing 
out that this specific application of Model Rule 3.4 is entirely consis-
tent with, and does not chill, the duty of confidentiality.  When con-
sidering the ethical prohibition of previous kinds of frivolous claims 
of privilege—improper purpose, insufficient factual or legal investiga-
tion, and lack of legal analysis—there was always a concern that this 
might undermine the duty of confidentiality by chilling claims of 
privilege that ought to be made.  In this situation, however, one of 
the procedural sanctions for not filing the privilege log—waiver of 
privilege—makes a failure to file a privilege log a potential violation 
of the duty to preserve privilege.231  Thus, the duty to preserve privi-
lege and the duty to not claim privilege in a procedurally frivolous 
manner are strategically and ethically linked together. 
Thus, the proposed new comment to the Model Rules can spec-
ify that claims of privilege will be unethical when made in the ab-
privilege); Dorf & Stanton Commc’n v. Molson Breweries, 100 F.3d 919, 923 (Fed. 
Cir. 1996) (applying Second Circuit law to affirm a waiver of privilege for failing to 
file a complete privilege log in violation of Rule 45(d)(2)); Cabot v. United States,  
35 Fed. Cl. 442, 446 (1996) (ordering production of documents when justification 
for claims of privilege ordered under Federal Claims Court rules was not provided); 
Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 653–54 (D. Kan. 2005) (a 
waiver of possibly privileged metadata resulted from unilaterally scrubbing metadata 
from produced electronic spreadsheets without objecting and listing metadata on 
privilege log). 
 228 See, e.g., Hobley v. Burge, No. 03 C 3678, 2003 WL 22682362, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 
Nov. 12, 2003) (quoting 8A WRIGHT &  MILLER § 2213 at 428 (2006)). 
 229 See, e.g., United States v. W. Elec. Co., 132 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1990) (choosing 
not to impose a waiver of privilege as a sanction for failing to file a privilege log, but 
rather to provide a second chance for such log to be prepared and provided). 
 230 See, e.g., Hobley, 2003 WL 22682362, at *5 (refusing to find a waiver of privilege 
for failure to file a privilege log, but granting sanctions in the form of attorney’s fees 
instead). 
 231 See, e.g., Coastal Corp. v. Duncan, 86 F.R.D. 514, 520 (D. Del. 1980) (requiring 
production of all documents claimed to be privileged because “[a]n improperly as-
serted claim of privilege is no claim of privilege at all”); Jones v. Boeing Co., No. 94-
1245-MLB, 1995 WL 827992, at *1 (D. Kan. Aug. 30, 1995) (refusing to conduct an in 
camera  review of documents prior to compelling their production when claimant’s 
“blanket” claim of privilege and failure to show that the elements of privilege had 
been met would result in shifting the burden of analysis and proof to the court). 
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sence of appropriate factual investigation, legal knowledge, research 
and analysis, and a full privilege log. 
C. Substantively Frivolous Claims of Privilege 
Having established that it is unethical to make a claim of attor-
ney-client privilege in a frivolous manner, it is now time to turn to 
those claims that are substantively frivolous from an objective per-
spective.  The vast majority of substantively frivolous claims of privi-
lege will be those made without appropriate factual investigation, le-
gal knowledge, research and analysis, and procedurally required 
disclosure.  Thus, it might seem unnecessary to address the issue of 
substantive frivolousness in an ethical rule.  However, there are sev-
eral reasons why it is worth considering.  A wicked lawyer could claim 
information as privileged after engaging in factual investigation, legal 
knowledge, and legal analysis which reveals that privilege is not avail-
able.  The wicked, as well as the ignorant and lazy, should be ad-
dressed by the ethical rules. 
In addition, although substantively frivolous claims are most 
likely to be the result of frivolous, indeed incompetent, pre-filing 
practices, it might be easier to decide as a matter of law that a particu-
lar claim is substantively frivolous than to engage in a fact-intensive 
inquiry into the details of what the lawyer did and thought.232  Thus, 
targeting substantively frivolous claims of attorney-client privilege 
could provide a simple way to both motivate and regulate the pre-
filing practices of attorneys making privilege claims. 
Furthermore, any determination that there has been incompe-
tent research and analysis cannot avoid reference to the substantive 
frivolousness or merit of the resulting claim.233  Particularly when 
there has been some research and analysis, the competence of such 
research will, in large part, be judged by the product produced.  
Thus, it will sometimes be impossible to decide whether competent 
research and analysis occurred without considering the merit of the 
resulting privilege claim. 
An additional and particularly important reason for evaluating 
substantive frivolousness in the context of attorney-client privilege is 
that ethical obligations of research and analysis only make sense if the 
law of attorney-client privilege is clear and predictable enough that 
 232 But see Meyer, supra note 206, at 1485 (arguing that judges in Rule 11 cases find 
it easier to decide that a lawyer has made a claim in a frivolous manner than to de-
cide that the claim is substantively frivolous). 
 233 Id. at 1494–95 (“[T]he practice-based approach does not eliminate the need 
for courts to determine substantive issues.”). 
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lawyers can distinguish meritorious claims of privilege from frivolous 
claims.  If the law of attorney-client privilege is “radically indetermi-
nate,”234 there will be very few substantively frivolous claims of privi-
lege.  This would make post-hoc factual investigation, legal research, 
and legal analysis much more of a reasonable practice and under-
mine the conclusion reached above that failure to undertake these 
actions prior to making the claim is unethical.  Indeed, many other-
wise competent and ethical lawyers probably do rationalize their fail-
ures to investigate, research, and analyze possible claims of privilege 
on grounds that the law of privilege is sufficiently indeterminate to 
ensure that some non-frivolous argument can be found.  The truth of 
this rationalization must be addressed both to justify the procedural 
ethical obligations outlined above and to educate lawyers about the 
real dangers of making frivolous claims of privilege. 
Whether the law of attorney-client privilege is radically indeter-
minate across the board or only “modestly indeterminate”235 can, as 
practical matter, be studied by looking at when and to what extent 
courts are willing to declare claims of privilege frivolous and award 
sanctions.236  If the law of attorney-client privilege is only modestly in-
determinate, as will be asserted here,237 it should be possible to pro-
vide lawyers with some practical guidance about what does and does 
not make a claim of privilege frivolous.  This guidance can take two 
distinct forms.  The first is general guidance about the kind of legal 
support required to make a claim non-frivolous.  The second kind of 
guidance addresses the specific legal requirements of attorney-client 
privilege and attempts to identify specific kinds of claims of privilege 
or problematic elements that produce frivolous claims. 
 234 Id. at 1468–70 (defining radical indeterminacy in the law as meaning that valid 
legal arguments can be on either side of any legal issue). 
 235 Id. at 1470 (characterizing indeterminacy only in “small pockets” of the law as 
modestly indeterminate). 
 236 Id. at 1480 (stating that deciding whether a legal claim is frivolous is equivalent 
to deciding whether the law relevant to that claim is indeterminate). 
 237 See TASK FORCE REPORT ON ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, supra note 19, at 4 (“At 
the margins, the application of the privilege is not always clear, and indeed, treatises 
can and have been written on the privilege, its exceptions, its intricacies, and its areas 
of ambiguity.”). 
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1. General Characteristics of Substantively Frivolous 
Claims 
As Model Rule 3.1 “parallels and is best analyzed in tandem with 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,”238 we can look to 
both disciplinary cases under Model Rule 3.1 and sanction cases un-
der Rule 11 for more specific guidance as to when a claim is frivolous.  
We can also include Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g)(2) cases 
imposing sanctions for frivolous discovery positions, as language simi-
lar to that found in Rule 11—“warranted by existing law or a good 
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing 
law”239—is found in Rule 26 as well.240
Model Rule 3.1 prohibits “assert[ing] or controvert[ing] an issue 
. . .  unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivo-
lous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modifi-
cation or reversal of existing law.”241  Similar language can be found 
in Rule 11.242  The comments to Model Rule 3.1 add that an “action is 
frivolous, however, if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith 
argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action 
taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or re-
versal of existing law.”243  Good faith requires that there be “some re-
alistic possibility of success if the matter is litigated,”244 but the lawyer 
need not believe that the position supported will ultimately prevail.245  
The Arizona Supreme Court has described the standard of objective 
frivolousness in both the ethical and legal context as requiring that 
 238 ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (5th ed. 2003), supra note 84, at 
321. 
 239 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2)(A) (1983) (also adding the words “or the establish-
ment of new law”); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(2); see Byron C. Keeling, Toward a Balanced 
Approach to “Frivolous” Litigation: A Critical Review of Federal Rule 11 and State Sanctions, 
21 PEPP. L. REV. 1067, 1078 (1994). 
 240 Of course, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 does not cover “disclosures and 
discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions that are subject to the provi-
sions of Rules 26 through 37.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 11(d).  However, the jurisprudence 
with regard to the basic standard of frivolousness is the same.  In re Byrd, Inc., 927 
F.2d 1135, 1137 (10th Cir. 1991) (applying Rule 11 case law to Rule 26(g)(2) deter-
minations and citing multiple circuits that do likewise). 
 241 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2004). 
 242 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2) (where the claim in not “warranted by existing law,” it 
can still avoid being sanctioned under Rule 11 if it is “warranted . . . by a non-
frivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the 
establishment of new law”). 
 243 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 2. 
 244 ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985) (set-
ting out the standard for advising a position on a tax return). 
 245 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 2. 
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there be support by “any reasonable legal theory, or if a colorable le-
gal argument is presented about which reasonable attorneys could 
differ.”246 
It is possible to distinguish two kinds of substantive frivolous-
ness:247 pure factual frivolousness and a combination of legal and fac-
tual inadequacy.  Pure factual frivolousness will only arise when insuf-
ficient factual investigation coupled with a competent grasp of the 
law leads the lawyer to assume facts sufficient under the law, when the 
facts are not actually sufficient.248  This form of substantive frivolous-
ness needs little further explication, but will be specifically fleshed 
out in the context of the attorney-client privilege below.  The combi-
nation of legal and factual inadequacy arises when the lawyer is aware 
of facts inconsistent with the law, yet insists the law applies, or when 
the lawyer is aware of law adverse to the facts, yet insists a different le-
gal result applies.  The difference between these two descriptions of 
frivolousness is more a matter of perspective than substance.  The for-
mer looks more like Cinderella’s sisters insisting that their feet are 
small enough to fit in the glass slipper, when they are clearly too 
large.  We might describe this as obliviousness to inconsistent or miss-
ing facts, while grasping that the law requires such facts.249  The latter 
could be said to be present if Cinderella’s sisters had realistic ideas 
 246 In re Levine, 847 P.2d 1093, 1100 (Ariz. 1993). 
 247 Visoly v. Sec. Pac. Credit Corp., 768 So. 2d 482, 491 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) 
(“[A]n appeal which lacks a factual basis or well-grounded legal argument will be 
considered devoid of merit.”). 
 248 A possible example of this may be found in Bowne of New York City, Inc. v. Am-
Base Corp, 161 F.R.D. 258, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), where the court found no substantial 
justification for privilege claims both when the claimant conceded in response to the 
motion to compel that many documents had been improperly withheld and many 
questions had been improperly not answered, and where plaintiff never established 
the factual predicate for limited waiver as to other communications.  See also Heath v. 
F/V Zolotoi, 221 F.R.D. 545, 550–51 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (frivolous claim that witness 
statements created in ordinary course of business were privileged was result of failure 
to ask client about the circumstances of statement, which showed “not even a scintilla 
of evidence” of attorney involvement and justified default judgment on liability and 
$25,000 personal fine to attorneys). 
 249 See, e.g., Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Ronwin, 557 
N.W.2d 515, 521 (Iowa 1996) (frivolous suit when all evidence showing no causal 
connection to claimed injury, but lawyer included defendant as trial tactic); In re 
Zimmerman, 19 P.3d 160 (Kan. 2001) (disciplining a lawyer under Model Rule 3.1 
for a frivolous appeal of summary judgment after lawyer failed to oppose summary 
judgment because lawyer recognized that his failure to hire an expert to show seat 
belt defect meant no genuine issue of material fact regarding defect and no good 
faith basis for an opposition); In re Selmer, 568 N.W.2d 702, 703–04 (Minn. 1997) 
(racial discrimination defense to collection actions against lawyer were frivolous 
when lawyer could provide no specific evidence of discrimination other than his 
race). 
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about the large size of their feet, but either were convinced that the 
slipper was going to be large enough despite never having seen it, or 
had somehow magnified the size of the slipper when they did see it.  
This happens in a legal context when a lawyer has a realistic view of 
the facts, but misunderstands the law and its application,250 is igno-
rant of the law,251 or refuses to accept that the law relied upon re-
quires different or additional facts.252  This also includes situations 
when lawyers do not even try to address arguments and cases cited by 
the other side,253 when they fail to distinguish controlling adverse au-
thority,254 when they assert irrelevant distinctions,255 or when they take 
 250 See, e.g., In re Capoccia, 709 N.Y.S.2d 640, 643 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (“[Re-
spondent] attempt[s] to shoehorn laws and legal concepts to a set of facts where they 
have no application.” (quoting Providian Nat’l Bank v. McGowan, 687 N.Y.S.2d 858, 
863 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1999))). 
 251 See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Zdravkovich, 762 A.2d 950, 965 
(Md. 2000) (finding an ethically frivolous removal to federal court when plaintiff at-
tempted to remove from Texas state court to federal court in Maryland, but statute 
allowed only defendant to remove and then only to federal court in Texas, and 
speculating that lawyer had not bothered to read statute); Boca Investerings P’ship v. 
United States, No. CIV.A. 97-602PLF/JMF, 1998 WL 647214, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 
1998) (party position not substantially justified under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 37(a)(4) when failed to discover controlling precedent); Vinton v. Adam Air-
craft Indus., Inc., 232 F.R.D. 650, 663 (D. Colo. 2005) (finding no abuse of discretion 
in a magistrate’s imposition of sanctions for claim of privilege found not to be sub-
stantially justified because supported by only a single conclusory sentence claiming 
privilege). 
 252 See, e.g., In re Brough, 709 So. 2d 210, 210 (La. 1998) (per curiam) (finding 
that the filing of a suit against the insured of an insolvent insurance carrier and its 
legal successor was ethically frivolous when statute barred suits unless uninsured mo-
torist policy limits were exhausted); In re Richards, 986 P.2d 1117, 1119 (N.M. 1999) 
(“Respondent would have been aware of the extremely limited parameters of the ex-
ception to the general rule that a property owner cannot have a lien on his own 
property had he further researched . . . .  Indeed, had he done so, he would have 
found cases very similar to the Peterson foreclosure where the exception had been 
found inapplicable.”); Bowne, 161 F.R.D. at 266 (finding no substantial justification 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4) for withholding documents as attor-
ney-client privileged when factual predicate for limited waiver not established). 
 253 See, e.g., Athridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 184 F.R.D. 200, 207 (D.D.C. 1998) 
(“[R]unning from the fight by ignoring what one’s opponent has said is not a sub-
stantially justified position for a litigant to take.”); Bowne, 161 F.R.D. at 265 (no sub-
stantial justification when memorandum “fail[ed] to acknowledge the existence of” 
controlling authority prominently discussed by moving party). 
 254 See, e.g., Bowne, 161 F.R.D. at 266 (finding no substantial justification under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4) for withholding documents as attorney-
client privileged when sanctioned party used “the ostrich-like tactic of pretending 
that potentially dispositive authority against a litigant’s contention does not exist”); 
Athridge, 184 F.R.D. at 206 (awarding expenses for the motion to compel because 
“running from the fight by ignoring what one’s opponent has said is not a substan-
tially justified position for a litigant to take”); Prousi v. Cruisers Div. of KCS Int’l, 
Inc., No. 95-6652, 1997 WL 135692, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 1997) (ordering payment 
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the general position that no argument is frivolous if the Supreme 
Court of the United States has not yet rejected it on the merits.256
At the same time, the prohibition on frivolous litigation is not 
meant to “chill the creativity that is the very lifeblood of the law 
[when] [v]ital changes have been wrought by those members of the 
bar who have dared to challenge the received wisdom . . . .”257  If 
“there is no controlling precedent on the issue, and counsel marshals 
what authority there is in support of her position, the position she ar-
ticulates will be found to be substantially justified even if it does not 
prevail.”258  When potentially dispositive adverse authority exists, how-
ever, it must both be acknowledged259 and a “cogent argument” must 
be made.260  Thus, it is not sufficient to acknowledge the lack of legal 
support but assert simpliciter that the law should be different261 to 
of the other side’s fees and expenses for a motion to compel disclosure of the date of 
a fee agreement when the lack of privilege was easily researched and clearly ad-
dressed by Third Circuit precedent). 
 255 See, e.g., In re Caranchini, 956 S.W.2d 910, 915 (Mo. 1997) (finding that a law-
yer “disregarded well-established Kansas law” and “presented a distinction without a 
difference . . . to distinguish the court’s previous decision on this issue”); Flaherty v. 
Gas Research Inst., 31 F.3d 451, 459 (7th Cir. 1994) (frivolous under Rule 11 to ar-
gue case holding that courts had no jurisdiction to hear age discrimination claims 
until a final administrative order did not apply to a retaliation for opposing age dis-
crimination claim when both claims encompassed by same statute). 
 256 See, e.g., People v. Hartman, 744 P.2d 482, 483–85 (Colo. 1987) (frivolous to 
argue that the Supreme Court of the United States might accept the argument that 
wages are not income when the United States Tax Court has rejected the same ar-
gument for many decades and recently stated that raising such an argument would 
be viewed as frivolous); In re Solerwitz, 848 F.2d 1573, 1577–78 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (re-
jecting expert testimony of law professor that it is not frivolous to remake same ar-
guments to appellate court despite that court’s precedent rejecting such arguments 
as long as the Supreme Court has not decided these issues on the merits). 
 257 Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 258 Boca Investerings P’ship v. United States, No. CIV.A. 97-602PLF/JMF, 1998 WL 
647214, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 1998); see also Maddow v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 107 
F.3d 846, 853 (11th Cir. 1997) (no sanctions because the attorney was “substantially 
justified in relying on Supreme Court dictum regarding the attorney’s fees issue, and 
relying on out-of-circuit district court caselaw, where there was no in-circuit case-
law”). 
 259 See Bowne, 161 F.R.D. at 266 (sanctions justified when litigant used “the ostrich-
like tactic of pretending that potentially dispositive authority against a litigant’s con-
tention does not exist,” even though a valid argument for changing law could have 
been made); Omni Packaging, Inc. v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 930 F. 
Supp. 28, 34 (D.P.R. 1996) (reminding counsel of ethical duty under Model Rule 3.1 
to cite unfavorable binding precedent); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 110 cmt. d (2000) (stating that a good faith argument requires disclosing 
adverse precedent). 
 260 In re Richards, 986 P.2d 1117, 1120 (N.M. 1999). 
 261 FED. R. CIV. P. 11.  The Advisory Committee notes to the 1993 Amendments 
state that the new objective standard is intended to eliminate any “empty-head pure-
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avoid being viewed as frivolous.  Arguments demanding a change 
must first be sought through legal research, and support must be 
found, even if only “in minority opinions, in law review articles, or 
through consultation with other attorneys.”262  In cases where other 
jurisdictions have developed law more supportive than the control-
ling adverse authority, failure to point to this inconsistency will make 
the claim frivolous.263
A new comment to the Model Rules designed to focus the atten-
tion of attorneys on the particular ethical concerns raised by claims of 
attorney-client privilege could usefully point out that claims of privi-
lege are frivolous if they are missing essential facts, are based on ig-
norance or misreading of the law of privilege, fail to acknowledge 
and appropriately distinguish controlling adverse authority, or are 
based on a change or reversal of existing law without providing ar-
gument and support for such a change. 
2. Specific Claims of Privilege that Are Substantively 
Frivolous 
We now turn to considering the extent to which the law of attor-
ney-client privilege may be described as determinate, thereby allow-
ing for claims of privilege to be considered frivolous.  The analysis of 
this issue will be limited to a review of some of the specific factual 
situations in which claims of attorney-client privilege have regularly 
heart’ justification for patently frivolous arguments.”  Id.  Accord Eastway Constr. 
Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 575 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (noting that the first 
challenge to Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1898), was certainly frivolous while later 
challenges became non-frivolous and ultimately prevailed).  Although not expressly 
stated by the Eastway court, we may understand its position on the frivolousness of 
early challenges as founded on a lack of new arguments or reason to believe old ar-
guments would be better received, while half a century later, social change, the use 
of empirical evidence, and the development of the law provided both new arguments 
and new weight to old arguments.  See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING 
LAWYERS § 110 cmt. d (noting that the presence of new authority, new arguments, 
and a new court can be sufficient to ground a good faith argument for change). 
 262 FED. R. CIV. P. 11, Advisory Committee Notes (1993); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 110 cmt. d (describing considerations relevant 
to the presence of a good faith argument for change as including “whether the law-
yer in question or another lawyer established a precedent adverse to the position be-
ing argued (and, if so, whether the lawyer disclosed that precedent), whether new 
legal grounds of plausible weight can be advanced, whether new or additional au-
thority supports the lawyer’s position, or whether for other reasons, such as a change 
in the composition of a multi-member court, arguments can be advanced that have a 
substantially greater chance of success”). 
 263 See Bowne, 161 F.R.D. at 266 (noting that had the party argued when first chal-
lenged that “the law was unsettled,” substantial justification for withholding docu-
ments would have been found). 
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been deemed either frivolous or non-frivolous by the courts.  Such 
findings arise in a variety of contexts, including motions for sanction 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4) (discovery abuse) 
and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (liability for excessive costs due to unreasonable 
and vexatious multiplication of proceeding), as well as contempt 
hearings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(e) (failure to obey 
a subpoena) and the inherent power of the courts.264
The discussion of these cases will be generally organized accord-
ing to the basic elements of privilege at stake.  Although many courts 
cite to the highly articulated Judge Wyzanski definition of attorney-
client privilege265 from United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,266 
the somewhat simpler Wigmore definition will mostly suffice here: 
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought 
(2) from a professional legal advisor in his capacity as such, 
(3) the communications relating to that purpose 
(4) made in confidence 
(5) by the client, 
(6) are at his instance permanently protected 
(7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, 
(8) except the protection be waived.267
a. Frivolous Because No Legal Advice 
The requirement that legal advice be sought will undermine 
privilege claims when no advice whatsoever is sought from an attor-
ney or when the type of advice sought is business, scientific, or liter-
ary, or related to public relations or any other non-legal advice.  In 
 264 See, e.g., NASCO, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television & Radio, Inc., 894 F.2d 696, 702 
(5th Cir. 1990) (“federal courts have inherent power to police themselves by civil 
contempt, imposition of fines, the awarding of costs and the shifting of fees”), aff’d 
sub nom. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991). 
 265 EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 46 (describing the Wyzanski formulation as “much 
quoted”). 
 266 89 F. Supp. 357, 358–89 (D. Mass. 1950): 
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is 
or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communica-
tion was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate 
and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; 
(3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was in-
formed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for 
the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) 
legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) 
for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has 
been (a) claimed [by the client] and (b) not waived by the client. 
Id. 
 267 8 WIGMORE, supra note 187, § 2292, at 554. 
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general, deciding whether legal advice is being sought is first a highly 
fact-dependent evaluation.  In addition, there are particular factual 
settings about which courts do not always agree whether the nature of 
the service is legal or predominantly legal.268  Thus, whether a claim 
that legal advice is involved can be viewed as frivolous may well de-
pend on the particular factual setting and the settled or unsettled na-
ture of the legal analysis governing this setting in this jurisdiction.269  
Nonetheless, courts have been willing to describe some attempts to 
cloak communications to lawyers that do not seek legal advice or that 
involve non-legal concerns as frivolous and deserving of sanctions. 
In FDIC v. Hurwitz,270 sanctions were awarded for, among other 
egregious misconduct by the FDIC, claiming privilege for purely in-
vestigative work by attorneys.271  In Cobell v. Norton,272 sanctions were 
granted for attorney-client privilege objections to questions that 
would have revealed at most the content of lawyer-client conversa-
tions about the client’s schedule and availability for a deposition.273  
As the client’s communications about her schedule were not pro-
vided for the purpose of seeking advice at all, they failed to meet this 
basic element of privilege.274  Sanctions were justified in this case be-
cause, despite a nineteen-page memorandum citing four “supportive” 
cases, the position taken by the Justice Department was deemed not 
supported by case law, and thus legally frivolous.275  The court im-
posed the more extreme sanction of requiring the attorneys to per-
sonally pay the costs of the motion to compel because this attempt to 
“obstruct[] a legitimate inquiry into whether her co-counsel had lied 
to the Court . . .  [was] made more repugnant by the fact that defense 
 268 See RICE, supra note 26, § 7:9, at 65 & n.94 (describing three different positions 
taken by the Eighth Circuit, the Second Circuit, and the Northern District of Illinois 
with regard to the preparation of tax returns by an attorney); see also id. § 7:17, at 79–
80 (describing the en banc reversal of a decision in Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Merid-
ith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977), that legal advice was not sought from attorneys re-
tained by corporations to investigate allegations of illegal practices). 
 269 See generally RICE, supra note 26, §§ 7:10–26, at 69–110 (summarizing legal ad-
vice case law in a variety of factual settings). 
 270 384 F. Supp. 2d 1039 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (awarding over $72 million in attorney’s 
fees and costs arising out of a baseless lawsuit that was abusively pursued over many 
years). 
 271 Id. at 1097 (privilege does not attach when lawyers are acting as executives, in-
vestigators, or regulators). 
 272 213 F.R.D. 16 (D.D.C. 2003) (granting motion to compel and sanctions where 
privilege claimed for conversation about client’s schedule and availability for a depo-
sition). 
 273 Id. at 31. 
 274 Id. at 24. 
 275 Id. at 29–31. 
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counsel [was] not only an officer of the court, but a representative of 
the Department of Justice.”276
Advice was sought from an attorney in Amway Corp. v. Procter & 
Gamble Co.;277 however, since it concerned the negative public rela-
tions consequences of suing nuns, priests, and ministers who had re-
peated allegations of a connection between Satanism and Procter & 
Gamble, it was not legal advice.278  This conclusion was further bol-
stered by the fact that copies of the documents seeking this advice 
were simultaneously circulated to numerous non-legal personnel.279  
The opinion states that, as a general rule: 
Where . . . in-house counsel appears as one of many recipients of 
an otherwise business-related memo, the federal courts place a 
heavy burden on the proponent to make a clear showing that 
counsel is acting in a professional legal capacity and that the 
document reflects legal, as opposed to business, advice.280
As a result of these and other frivolous claims of privilege, as well as 
Procter & Gamble’s failure to provide adequate affidavit support for 
its claims of privilege, the magistrate judge recommended a sanction 
in the form of an order establishing a fact suggested by the non-
privileged, but improperly withheld, documents.281
 Similarly, in American Medical Systems, Inc. v. National Union Fire 
Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa.,282 attorney’s fees were awarded as a 
sanction for frivolous claims of attorney-client privilege283 for trans-
mittal letters 284 and documents sent to both legal and non-legal per-
sonnel.285  Transmittal letters are not viewed as involving legal advice 
because they “merely transmit documents to or from an attorney.”286  
When documents are sent to both legal and non-legal personnel, they 
are not viewed as “made for the primary purpose of seeking legal ad-
vice.”287
 276 Id. at 31. 
 277 No. 1:98-CV-726, 2001 WL 1818698 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 2001). 
 278 Id. at *7–8 
 279 Id. at *5. 
 280 Id. 
 281 Id. at *11. 
 282 No. Civ.A. 98-1788, 1999 WL 816300 (E.D. La. Oct. 7, 1999). 
 283 Id. at *3 (no “good faith effort to produce relevant, non-privileged documents” 
when 236 out of 346 documents were found non-privileged). 
 284 Id.; see also Amway Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., No. 1:98-CV-726, 2001 WL 
1818698, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 1999) (holding that transmittal letters that “con-
tain no facts tending to reveal the client’s confidences” are not privileged). 
 285 Am. Med. Sys. Inc., 1999 WL 816300, at *1. 
 286 Id. at *2. 
 287 Id. at *1. 
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As these cases illustrate, lawyers who assume that the “legal ad-
vice” element of attorney-client privilege is met simply because a law-
yer has sent or received a communication run the risk of making a 
frivolous claim.  This element of privilege is particularly problematic 
when the attorney receiving the communication is in-house counsel, 
because these positions involve non-legal as well as legal duties.  In-
deed, courts place the burden on the in-house counsel claimant of 
privilege to show that legal rather than non-legal advice was sought.288  
The difficulty of proving attorney-client privilege becomes even 
greater if the lawyer is merely one of many recipients of a copy of a 
document.289
Another problematic context for privilege arises when lawyers 
are present at corporate meetings and engaged in non-legal corpo-
rate business, often as a voting member of the committee.290  A care-
ful factual evaluation of the context in which the communication was 
made must take seriously the possibility that non-legal advice may 
have been sought, and recognize the extra burden created by multi-
ple non-lawyer recipients of the communication. 
Given the highly fact-dependent nature of such legal advice 
analyses, especially in the corporate context,291 it is unlikely that the 
assertion of privilege in such situations will be viewed as substantively 
frivolous as long as affirmative factual support is provided and an ar-
gument is made regarding the legal nature of the advice.  Thus, in 
Burton v. R.J. Reynolds,292 while nearly all communications concerning 
 288 RICE, supra note 26, § 7:1, at 21–22, § 7:2, at 24–25 (citing numerous cases 
holding that an affirmative showing that the communication was for legal rather 
than non-legal advice is necessary when the attorney is in-house counsel). 
 289 Courts are wary of the practice of “funneling” sensitive, but non-legal, docu-
ments to or through corporate attorneys, with copies to the non-legal personnel who 
really need the information and then claiming that all the copies of the document 
are privileged.  See generally Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Am. Gas Ass’n, 320 F.2d 314, 324 
(7th Cir. 1963) (stating in dictum that a corporation cannot “funnel its papers and 
documents into the hands of its lawyers for custodial purposes and thereby avoid dis-
closure”); RICE, supra note 26, § 7:2, at 24.  If, however, one copy of a document is 
sent to an attorney for legal advice and other copies are sent to non-lawyers for busi-
ness purposes, or one item in a document requests legal advice while others request 
business advice, courts may protect the copy that went to the attorney or redact the 
parts of the document that seek legal advice.  Id. § 7:2, at 34. 
 290 Marten v. Yellow Freight Sys., No. CIV. A. 96-2013-GTV, 1998 WL 13244, at 
**8–9 (D. Kan. Jan. 6, 1998) (finding that a committee with a voting attorney that 
met to decide whether to terminate an employee had a predominantly business 
rather than legal purpose). 
 291 RICE, supra note 26, § 7:2, at 32. 
 292 200 F.R.D. 661, 680 (D. Kan. 2001) (denying sanctions where “some (though 
not many)” privilege claims were upheld and where “the legal principles governing 
the privilege disputes in this case are somewhat unsettled in this particular context”). 
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scientific evidence on the health effects of smoking cigarettes were 
found to involve public relations or general business advice,293 the 
court refused to sanction the claims of attorney-client privilege.294  In 
part, this refusal was due to a few successful privilege claims.  The 
court, however, seemed to view the novel factual context of this 
case—in which tobacco corporation attorneys had extensive control 
over scientific and public relations matters, at the same time that liti-
gation over the health risks of tobacco was on-going—as making the 
application of the legal principles more complicated.295  Nonetheless, 
the court did describe as “avoidable”296 some of the effort both the 
plaintiff and court were forced to expend to resolve the privilege 
questions, and further described tobacco counsel as not using the 
best professional practice when they failed to acknowledge and argue 
the adverse law of the case on these privilege issues.297
More recently, the Seventh Circuit has described claims of privi-
lege involving “distinguishing in-house counsels’ legal advice from 
their business advice” 298 as “an area of privilege law that is generally 
recognized to be ‘especially difficult.’”299  As a result, the court found 
that such claims of privilege were made in good faith where an ap-
propriate privilege log had been filed, and counsel exhibited good 
faith by reducing the number of documents on the log from 750 to 
465 in response to objections.300  However, making “blanket” privilege 
claims,301 or failing to provide a privilege log or other support302 in 
these contexts is particularly likely to trigger sanctions.  Thus, in an 
 293 Id. at 669–79 (mostly rejecting attorney-client privilege claims on the grounds 
that only public relations or business advice was at issue). 
 294 Id. at 679. 
 295 Id. at 680. 
 296 Id. 
 297 Id. (“[I]t would have been a better exercise in professionalism for defendants’ 
counsel to have acknowledged the court’s prior rulings concerning the scope of the 
attorney-client privilege . . . asserted their position that the court’s prior rulings were 
wrong . . . and then attempted to explain why the court’s prior rulings would not ap-
ply.”). 
 298 Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of the 
U.S., 406 F.3d 867, 878 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing RICE, supra note 26, § 5:7). 
 299 Id. 
 300 Id. (holding that claims of privilege made in privilege logs that had been vol-
untarily amended twice in response to objections were not made in bad faith and 
finding an abuse of discretion in the magistrate’s refusal to review a large number of 
documents in camera and ordering as a sanction release of all documents upon find-
ing a few unprivileged documents in a very limited and arbitrary in camera review). 
 301 RICE, supra note 26, § 7:1, at 21, § 7:5, at 47. 
 302 See Amway Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., No. 1:98-CV-726, 2001 WL 1818698, 
at *10 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 2001). 
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earlier tobacco case in Minnesota,303 sanctions were awarded for 
claims of privilege304 involving the same or similar documents305 de-
spite the fact that a majority of all the withheld documents were 
found privileged.306  Although this case additionally involved applica-
tion of the crime-fraud exception to defeat the privilege, many 
documents were found not to be privileged “in the first instance”307 
because they “contained nothing of a privileged nature.”308  It can be 
surmised from the general description of documents at issue here309 
that many of the documents were not privileged because they in-
volved non-legal advice.  Sanctions were awarded310 because these 
frivolous claims of privilege revealed “a pattern of abuse”311 arising 
from either an attempt to deceive the court or a failure to engage in 
the required level of legal and factual analysis of each document 
claimed to be privileged.312
 303 Minn. v. Philip Morris Inc., No. C1-94-8565, 1998 WL 257214 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 
Mar. 7, 1998) (magistrate opinion affirming order of special master appointed to re-
solve discovery disputes in suit by the State of Minnesota against a number of tobacco 
companies). 
 304 Id. at *7 (ordering the disclosure of more than 30,000 documents in certain 
categories without document-by-document evaluation when a spot check revealed 
abuse of the categorization process by the inclusion of obviously unprivileged mate-
rial). 
 305 Three categories of documents ordered disclosed in Minnesota v. Philip Morris 
were described as relating to or referencing scientific research, “Special Projects,” 
and public statements about smoking and health.  Id. at *5–6 (requiring disclosure of 
Category 3, 4(b), and 5 documents).  Documents found not privileged in Burton v. 
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 200 F.R.D. 661 (D. Kan. 2001), included position papers, 
prepared congressional testimony, and position resources for public statements, Bur-
ton, 200 F.R.D. at 669 (documents 58, 86, 88, 93, 94, and 98), purely scientific docu-
ments, id. at 670–71 (documents 52, 51, 62, 68, 70,75, 85), and “Special Products” 
documents, id. at 674 (document 107). 
 306 Philip Morris, 1998 WL 257214, at *5–6 (upholding privilege claims for as many 
as 200,000 of the remaining documents). 
 307 Id. at *6. 
 308 Id. at *7. 
 309 Id. at *5–6 (spot checks of documents in the categories of “Science,” “Special 
Projects,” and “Public Statements” revealed unprivileged documents). 
 310 Id. at *7. 
 311 Id. 
 312 See Philip Morris, 1998 WL 257214, at *7 (noting that despite the fact that the 
court had put counsel on notice that documents listed on the privilege log had to 
have been personally reviewed by counsel or those under counsel’s supervision, a 
spot check of listed documents revealed many documents “clearly and unarguably 
not entitled to protections of privilege”). 
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b. Frivolous Because No Lawyer Qua Lawyer 
The next element of attorney-client privilege requires that the 
legal advice be sought from a lawyer in their capacity as a lawyer.  A 
claim of privilege for a communication to a person who is clearly not 
an attorney, or an agent of an attorney, will be viewed as frivolous.  
Thus, in Amway Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Corp.,313 the court described 
as frivolous a claim of privilege for a document in which neither the 
author nor any of the recipients was an attorney.314  In Chinnici v. Cen-
tral Dupage Hospital Assoc.,315 the court described counsel as having 
“ignored the law of privilege,”316 which requires both an attorney and 
a client, when the lawyer redacted a section of a memo from a non-
lawyer condominium association president to other association 
members.317  In Heath v. F/V Zolotoi,318 sanctions in the form of a 
$25,000 personal fine against the lawyers and a finding of liability 
against the client were imposed when the lawyers failed to reveal the 
existence of routine witness statements made without any attorney in-
volvement and then subsequently made frivolous arguments that they 
were privileged.319
Claims of privilege involving communications to both a lawyer 
and non-lawyer are less likely to be viewed as frivolous when the pos-
sibility exists that the non-lawyer to whom the communication was 
made was an agent of the attorney.  The so-called agent must be 
needed by the attorney in order to render legal advice320 and must in 
fact be under the direction and supervision of the attorney at the 
time of the communications.321 These are primarily factual matters, 
and will require lawyers to engage in the necessary level of factual in-
vestigation to ensure that the appropriate foundational facts are pre-
sent and asserted in a privilege log or supporting affidavits. 
However, the issue of whether particular kinds of assistance are 
really required to obtain legal advice can become a matter of law.  
 313 No. 1:98-CV-726, 2001 WL 1818698 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 2001) (granting sanc-
tions for many different kinds of frivolous claims of privilege and failure to provide 
proper affidavit support for its privilege claims in general). 
 314 Id. at *8. 
 315 136 F.R.D. 464 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 
 316 Id. at 466. 
 317 Id. (sanctions were not granted because the moving party failed to request a 
discovery conference to resolve this very simple matter). 
 318 221 F.R.D. 545 (W.D. Wash. 2004). 
 319 Id. at 550–51, 553 (statement was given to persons not represented by attorney, 
no attorney was present, and no attorney had requested the statements). 
 320 RICE, supra note 26, § 3:4, at 26–27. 
 321 Id. § 3:5, at 30–32. 
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One issue that frequently arises in this context is whether communi-
cations with an accountant employed by the client’s lawyer are privi-
leged when they were made for the purpose of having the accountant 
prepare the client’s tax return.  As many courts do not view the 
preparation of a tax return by an attorney as involving legal advice, 
the same work performed by the accountant is viewed as lacking a re-
lationship to legal advice.322  The status of psychiatric experts hired by 
the defense in criminal cases is also an issue that will be resolved as a 
matter of controlling law, which varies from jurisdiction to jurisdic-
tion.323  Another vexing issue concerns whether communications to 
patent agents are privileged either as communications to attorneys324 
or as communications to agents of attorneys.325
While the lack of national consensus in these matters might sug-
gest the law is indeterminate, there is settled law within some jurisdic-
tions.  Lawyers wishing to avoid substantively frivolous claims of privi-
lege for communications to agents of attorneys must do the legal 
research required to determine whether their jurisdiction has ad-
dressed the privilege issue with regard to the kind of agent at issue in 
their case.  Further, if the lawyer wants to challenge settled law, she 
must acknowledge any negative controlling precedents and make a 
colorable argument as to why a different approach should be 
adopted. 
c. Frivolous Because Not Communications Relating to the 
Purpose of Seeking Legal Advice 
There are two distinctly different types of privilege claims that 
are substantively frivolous due to failure to meet this element.  The 
 322 Id. § 3:6, at 36; § 7.24 at 104–05. 
 323 See, e.g., Granviel v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 673, 682–83 (5th Cir. 1981) (finding that 
Texas law, along with New York law, would not find communications to the psychia-
trist privileged, while Michigan, California, New Jersey, and the Third Circuit would 
extend the privilege to these communications); see also RICE, supra note 26, § 3:3, at 
19–20 & n.33 (collecting cases applying and denying attorney-client privilege to 
communications to psychiatrists assisting defense counsel). 
 324 See generally Jonathon G. Musch, Note, Attorney-Client Privilege and the Patent 
Prosecution Process in the Post-Spalding World, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 175, 190 (2003) (dis-
cussing the continuing “lack of uniformity” in the treatment of patent prosecution 
documents among the federal circuits). 
 325 Compare Gorman v. Polar Electro, Inc., 137 F. Supp. 2d 223, 227 (E.D.N.Y. 
2001) (holding that the Second Circuit generally allows privilege to cover communi-
cations with patent agents when the agents are “‘acting under the authority and con-
trol of counsel,’” but noting that federal courts are not in agreement on this issue 
(quoting Cuno, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 121 F.R.D. 198, 204 (E.D.N.Y. 1988))), with Agfa 
Corp. v. Creo Prods., No. Civ.A. 00-10836-GAO, 2002 WL 1787534, at *2 (D. Mass. 
Aug. 1, 2002). 
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first involves exchanges that are not viewed as communications at all, 
such as objects, observations, underlying information, and pre-
existing documents.  The second group concerns specified kinds of 
information that are not viewed as being communicated for the pur-
pose of seeking legal advice as a matter of law, even though the in-
formation is communicated to lawyers from whom legal advice has 
otherwise been sought. 
i. Non-Communications 
As we have already seen in the discussion of In re Ryder, physical 
objects that do not contain a message to the attorney inscribed upon 
them are not communications.326  The consequences to lawyers who 
risk their licenses and freedom by making frivolous claims of privilege 
for such items can be dire.327  A claim of privilege regarding an object 
is most likely to be deemed frivolous when the object is evidence of a 
crime and the claim is made to defend a lawyer’s possession and fail-
ure to turn over the object to police,328 as was the case in In re Ryder.  
Attorneys who take and keep possession of such objects, believing 
that they are acting within the law, are in fact courting criminal 
prosecution.329
 326 See supra text accompanying note 186; see also In re January 1976 Grand Jury, 
534 F.2d 719, 728 (7th Cir. 1976) (stating that money itself is not privileged); State v. 
Dillon, 471 P.2d 553, 565 (Idaho 1970) (attorney-client privilege applies “only to 
communicative and not real evidence”); People v. Investigation Into a Certain 
Weapon, 448 N.Y.S.2d 950, 954 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982) (ordering attorney to produce 
ammunition and ammunition clip, but distinguishing the tangible objects from at-
torney testimony about how possession of objects was obtained); Commonwealth v. 
Stenhach, 514 A.2d 114, 119 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (“We join the overwhelming ma-
jority of states which hold that physical evidence of crime in the possession of a 
criminal defense attorney is not subject to a privilege but must be delivered to the 
prosecution.”). 
 327 See In re January 1976 Grand Jury, 534 F.2d at 730 (affirming the confinement 
for contempt of an attorney who refused on grounds of privilege to turn over stolen 
money paid to the lawyer by a client hours after robbing a bank). 
 328 See id. at 727–29. 
 329 See United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 1001 (1st Cir. 1987) (affirming at-
torney’s conviction for obstruction of justice based in part on attorney’s suggestion 
that incriminatory documents be placed in his briefcase to protect them from a 
search warrant); Quinones v. State, 766 So. 2d 1165, 1171 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) 
(suggesting, but not deciding, that a defense attorney who kept a knife possibly used 
in client’s stabbing attack for eighteen months violated the evidence tampering stat-
ute).  But see Commonwealth v. Stenhach, 514 A.2d 114, 125–26 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) 
(vacating criminal sentences for attorneys who failed to turn over rifle stock on 
grounds that statutes prohibiting hindering prosecution and tampering with evi-
dence were constitutionally overbroad as applied to lawyers because they failed to 
distinguish between privileged evidence such as written communications to lawyers 
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A more complicated legal issue arises when an attorney is served 
with a subpoena duces tecum, which requires the attorney to produce 
an object, often identified as relating to, or received from, a specified 
client.  While the object itself cannot be claimed to be privileged, the 
production of the object by the attorney in response to the detailed 
subpoena request might or might not be viewed as implicitly disclos-
ing an intentional communication to the lawyer of the fact that the 
client had possession of the object prior to transferring it to the law-
yer.330  If the production is viewed as testimonial, one solution is to 
require the attorney to simply produce the item to the district attor-
ney, thereby avoiding the more testimonial production to the grand 
jury.331  If not, the lawyer may suffer contempt sanctions.332  The best 
way to avoid this risk is to understand both that the object is not privi-
leged and that it cannot be kept for any length of time by the law-
yer.333
These complications, while worth being aware of because they 
threaten lawyers who fail to understand them with criminal prosecu-
tion or contempt, are not particularly relevant to the issue of frivo-
lous claims of privilege in the civil litigation context.  To begin with, 
an entirely different standard of frivolousness is applied to criminal 
defense.334  More importantly, information about a client’s original 
possession of an object is less likely to have the kind of evidentiary 
and non-privileged evidence, and because there was no settled law clarifying what 
defense conduct was legal and what was not). 
 330 Compare State ex. rel. Sowers v. Olwell, 394 P.2d 681, 883–85 (Wash. 1964) (pre-
serving any privilege relating to knife by requiring it to be to turned over to the Dis-
trict Attorney rather than produced to the grand jury in response to the subpoena, 
and precluding any attempt to reveal the source of the knife to the jury) and Investi-
gation into a Certain Weapon, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 953 (ordering lawyer to deliver ammuni-
tion clip and ammunition to district attorney rather than produce items in response 
to grand jury subpoena because delivery of items by client to attorney involves a privi-
leged communication), with In re January 1976 Grand Jury, 534 F.2d at 731 (Tone, J., 
concurring) (affirming order of confinement for contempt for lawyer’s failure to 
produce items as required by grand jury subpoena because neither object nor act of 
transferring money to lawyer is a communication). 
 331 State ex. rel. Sowers, 394 P.2d at 684–85. 
 332 Id. 
 333 Keeping the items can be a violation of the criminal law prohibiting conceal-
ment of evidence and the ethical rule also prohibiting unlawful concealment of “ma-
terial having potential evidentiary value.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a) 
(2004); see also ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE §§ 4–4.6 
(1991) (setting out the circumstances under which defense counsel should and 
should not deliver an object received from a client to law enforcement authorities). 
 334 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (“A lawyer for the defendant in a 
criminal proceeding . . . [which] could result in incarceration, may nevertheless so 
defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be established.”). 
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value it often has when the object is a gun or stolen money in a 
criminal case.  This means that possession of information is less likely 
to be viewed as an intentional communication arising out of the 
transfer.  Finally, such information can be easily discovered from cli-
ents due to the lack of a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination leading merely to civil liability and the availability of 
liberal civil discovery.  Thus, it is usually quite unnecessary to seek this 
kind of information from attorneys. 
Two other kinds of non-communications are attorney observa-
tions of clients and the underlying information conveyed in the 
communication.  Attorney observations of client appearance, coher-
ence, etc., are not viewed as communications335 unless the observation 
was made as the result of a communicative act by the client.336  Simi-
larly, although the fact that certain information or facts has been 
communicated to an attorney is protected from disclosure by the at-
torney or client, the underlying information, minus the fact of com-
munication to the attorney, can be compelled from the client.337
Finally, documents created independent of the attorney-client 
relationship for purposes other than communicating information to 
the attorney are not themselves communications from the client to 
the attorney and are not attorney-client privileged.338  Even though 
such “pre-existing documents” can subsequently be used by clients to 
communicate the information contained therein to lawyers, it is the 
showing of the document to the lawyer that is the communication 
rather than the document itself.339  Careful attention to the facts sur-
rounding the creation of a document is essential, especially in a busi-
ness context, to determine whether the client can meet the burden of 
 335 See e.g., People v. Williams, 454 N.E.2d 220, 240 (Ill. 1983) (finding lawyer ob-
servation of client’s appearance and demeanor during courtroom conference un-
privileged). 
 336 PAUL F. ROTHSTEIN & SUSAN W. CRUMP, FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 2:11, 
at 81 (2d ed. 2006); see also Rubin v. Maryland, 602 A.2d 677, 685 n.4 (Md. 1992) 
(equating demonstrative communication with verbal communication for purposes of 
attorney-client privilege). 
 337 See RICE, supra note 26, § 5:1, at 9–11; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 896 F.2d 
1267, 1270 (11th Cir. 1990) (distinguishing non-privileged underlying facts from the 
privileged communication of those facts). 
 338 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 404 (1976) (pre-existing documents 
obtainable from client are also obtainable from attorney); In re Original Grand Jury 
Investigation, 733 N.E.2d 1135, 1139–40 (Ohio 2000) (holding that a client’s letter to 
his brother was not attorney-client privileged, but vacating contempt and monetary 
sanctions for the attorney who refused to turn it over to a grand jury on the ground 
that there was a good faith argument that ethical obligations prohibited the disclo-
sure). 
 339 In re Search Warrant B-21778, 521 A.2d 422, 428 (Pa. 1987). 
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proof by showing that the document was initially created for the pur-
pose of later transmittal to the lawyer rather than for another busi-
ness purpose.340
There is one exception to this rule: pre-existing documents pro-
tected by the Fifth Amendment while in the possession of the client, 
but unprotected by the Fifth Amendment in the possession of the cli-
ent’s lawyer, are considered privileged.341  However, this is precisely 
the kind of narrow exception that requires careful attention to both 
the facts of the case and the legal doctrine in order for a good faith 
argument to be made regarding the privileged status of pre-existing 
documents. 342
ii. Communications Not for the Purpose of Legal Advice 
The fact that there is an attorney-client relationship formed for 
the purpose of seeking legal advice does not mean that all communi-
cations made in the context of this relationship are privileged.  Each 
individual communication must be shown to be for the purpose of 
seeking legal advice.  There are three kinds of information routinely 
communicated to attorneys by clients that are not commonly viewed 
as communicated for the purpose of seeking legal advice: identity of 
client, location of client, and fee or billing information. 
w. Identity of Client 
The identity of the client, while certainly communicated by the 
client to the attorney in the course of seeking legal advice, is in most 
cases not viewed as protected by the attorney-client privilege.343  This 
result has been justified on the following grounds: no legal advice is 
sought concerning the client’s identity;344 the identity of the client is 
usually not intended to remain confidential and is often intended to 
 340 See Robertson v. Commonwealth, 25 S.E.2d 352, 360 (Va. 1943) (affirming con-
tempt against an attorney, including a fine and striking the defenses of the client, 
where the attorney had refused to produce an accident report which the court found 
had not been shown to have been made for the exclusive purpose of showing the 
lawyer). 
 341 Fisher, 425 U.S. at 404–05. 
 342 SEC v. Kimmes, No. M18-304, 1996 WL 734892, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 1996) 
(refusing to award sanctions for possibly frivolous claims of privilege regarding pre-
existing documents that had no Fifth Amendment protection in the client’s hands 
because the requesting party had also engaged in frivolous and meritless arguments). 
 343 ROTHSTEIN & CRUMP, supra note 336, § 2:11, at 87. 
 344 See, e.g., People ex rel. Vogelstein v. Warden of County Jail, 270 N.Y.S. 362, 367–
68 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1934) (“‘The client does not consult the solicitor with a view to ob-
taining his professional advice as to whether he shall be his solicitor or not.’” (quot-
ing Bursill v. Tanner, (1885) 16 Q.B.D. 1, 4 )). 
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be revealed in the course of providing representation of the client in 
dealings with non-clients;345 or the lawyer was hired by the client for 
the purpose of furthering criminal activity.346
Yet the analyses of these situations is complicated by the fact that 
client identity will be viewed as privileged if “disclosure would reveal a 
privileged confidential attorney-client communication, or where dis-
closure would incriminate the client, but perhaps only if it provides 
the last link in a chain of evidence against him, and perhaps only if it 
does so in the very criminal activity for which legal advice was 
sought.”347  In addition, there is considerable variation from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction as to the validity or applicability of this “last link” 
or “legal advice” exception.348  Finally, the actual application of the 
exception is highly fact-dependent and cogent arguments can often 
be made on both sides.349  As a result, it is difficult to provide much 
general guidance as to when a claim of privilege for client identity 
might be viewed as frivolous. 
However, as the exception continues to be the subject of consid-
erable litigation,350 it seems likely that the application of the excep-
tion within any single jurisdiction will become regularized.  This then 
creates the possibility of determining that a particular claim that falls 
within the exception fails to make even a colorable case.351  The legal 
 345 See, e.g., United States v. Flores, 628 F.2d 521, 526 (9th Cir. 1980) (attorney 
hired to file administrative claim by named client to recover guns seized in search 
cannot claim privilege for name of source of information for claim). 
 346 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 680 F.2d 1026, 1028–29 (5th Cir. 1982) (refusing 
to find the identity of a client privileged when client paid fees for persons involved in 
drug smuggling who had been induced to smuggle in part by a promise that they 
would be “taken care of” if arrested). 
 347 ROTHSTEIN & CRUMP, supra note 336, § 2:11, at 90–94 (collecting a large num-
ber of cases showing the different ways this exception has been formulated, and the 
considerable differences in results reached from case to case and circuit to circuit); 
see also Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663, 664–66 (7th Cir. 1965) (reversing con-
tempt for an attorney refusing to disclose the identity of a client who had independ-
ently determined that he had a tax liability and retained the attorney in question to 
deliver a cashier’s check for the amount to the IRS). 
 348 See RICE, supra note 26, § 6:15, at 89 (describing the Tenth Circuit as question-
ing this exception and the Second Circuit as first reformulating the exception and 
then consistently refusing to find it applicable). 
 349 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 680 F.2d at 1026 (district court and court of 
appeals found identity of fee-payer privileged, reversed en banc with three out of 
seven judges dissenting). 
 350 See ROTHSTEIN & CRUMP, supra note 336, § 2:11, at 87–99 (summarizing cases 
on client identity). 
 351 See, e.g., Liew v. Breen, 640 F.2d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding attorney’s 
fee sanction arising from privilege claim for client identity was not abuse of discre-
tion because legal issue was not sufficiently doubtful to show good faith dispute). 
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consequence of making such a frivolous claim is likely to be contempt 
for the attorney raising this objection, as attempts to get testimony 
from attorneys about undisclosed clients are most often made in the 
context of grand jury investigations352 and criminal trials of third par-
ties.353  
x. Location or Address of Client 
In ordinary cases, clients’ communication of their address is 
clearly neither made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice nor 
meant to be confidential.354  In cases where clients do not want to be 
found, however, address information communicated to an attorney is 
meant to be confidential.  In these cases, the factual context of the 
communication becomes paramount in determining whether privi-
lege will attach to the location information.  Attempts to compel law-
yers to disclose the confidentially communicated location or address 
of clients most often arise in the context of custody cases in which 
one parent has disappeared with minor children,355 criminal cases in 
which the defendant cannot be found or has skipped bail,356 and civil 
cases in which the location of a client is needed to enforce a mone-
tary judgment.357
In the custody cases, the location of the client who has disap-
peared with minor children has often been found to fall outside of 
 352 E.g., Ex parte Enzor, 117 So. 2d 361, 362, 365–66 (Ala. 1960) (reversing an or-
der of confinement for an attorney who refused to disclose a client’s identity to a 
grand jury because disclosure would reveal the client’s guilt on the very matter for 
which the lawyer had been employed to advise). 
 353 E.g., United States v. Flores, 628 F.2d 521, 527 (9th Cir. 1980) (affirming order 
of confinement for civil contempt until attorney testified, matter expired, or eight-
een months had been served); Hughes v. Meade, 453 S.W.2d 538, 542 (Ky. 1970) 
(civil contempt order for refusing to reveal name of client justified because attorney 
hired to help return stolen property to police was not providing legal advice at all). 
 354 ROTHSTEIN & CRUMP, supra note 336, 85–87 (describing client address informa-
tion as non-privileged because it related to general features of attorney-client rela-
tionship rather than communications for specific advice); accord Viveros v. Nation-
wide Janitorial Ass’n, 200 F.R.D. 681, 683–84 (N.D. Ga. 2000) (imposing sanctions of 
$50 and attorney’s fees where addresses and phone numbers were withheld on 
ground of privilege and there was no attempt to show that confidential legal advice 
was sought regarding the address). 
 355 See, e.g., Bersani v. Bersani, 565 A.2d 1368 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1989) (wife disap-
peared with children); Dike v. Dike, 448 P.2d 490 (Wash. 1968) (wife disappeared 
with child). 
 356 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Maguigan, 511 A.2d 1327 (Pa. 1986) (attorney re-
fused to reveal location of client who skipped bail in a rape case). 
 357 See Sullivan v. Carrigan, 10 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 431 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (holding attor-
ney in contempt for refusing to reveal the telephone number of client with an out-
standing default judgment). 
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attorney-client privilege, with some important exceptions.  When the 
failure to disclose location assists the client in contemptuous violation 
of a court order not to leave the jurisdiction and frustrates court rul-
ings based on the best interests of the child, any legal purpose for the 
communication is trumped by the use of the attorney to assist in the 
criminal or fraudulent conduct of the client, thus bringing the crime-
fraud exception to attorney-client privilege into effect.358  At the same 
time, however, courts have upheld claims that client location infor-
mation was privileged where harm to the parent or child was feared if 
the location was revealed,359 or when it was not clear that the disap-
pearing parent had actually violated a valid court order.360
Several decades ago, when this was a novel issue of law, judg-
ments of contempt against lawyers refusing to disclose such informa-
tion were vacated even as courts clearly held that the information had 
to be disclosed.361  In jurisdictions where these issues have been set-
tled for some time, courts may now be willing to find lawyers in con-
tempt for refusing to disclose the location of disappearing parents in 
custody cases involving clear violation of court orders and not involv-
ing fear of harm because such claims will be viewed as substantively 
frivolous. 
y. Fee or Billing Information 
The attorney-client privilege only protects communications 
made for the purpose of getting legal advice—it does not protect “all 
occurrences and conversations which have any bearing, direct or in-
direct, upon the relationship of the attorney with his client.”362  These 
occurrences and conversations either do not involve communications 
 358 See Bersani, 565 A.2d at 1371–72 (holding wife in contempt of order not to 
leave country); Jacqueline F. v. Segal, 391 N.E.2d 967, 972 (N.Y. 1979) (guardian 
moved to Puerto Rico during appeal of custody order); Jafarian-Kerman v. Jafarian-
Kerman, 424 S.W.2d 333, 339–40 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967) (finding no privilege when 
husband left country with child in violation of temporary custody order because the 
obstruction of justice triggered the crime-fraud exception). 
 359 See, e.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 359 N.E.2d 820, 824 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (wife re-
quested confidentiality of address due to fear for her safety and that of her child); 
Waldman v. Waldman, 358 N.E.2d 521, 522 (Ohio 1976) (suggesting that confidenti-
ality of client addresses may be generally necessary in domestic relations matters to 
protect client safety). 
 360 See, e.g., Brennan v. Brennan, 422 A.2d 510, 517 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (finding 
no crime or fraud because father had not been served with notice of custody hearing 
or custody order). 
 361 See, e.g., Dike v. Dike, 448 P.2d 490, 499 (Wash. 1968) (relieving the attorney of 
the contempt citation because the “application of the privilege [was] rather ob-
scure”). 
 362 United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280, 281–82 (6th Cir.). 
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from clients, or if they do, are not viewed as confidential communica-
tions for the purpose of seeking legal advice.363  Thus, information 
ordinarily found in bills, such as time expended,364 the fact of meet-
ings or calls,365 the general nature of work done,366 fee arrange-
ments,367 including the fact of payment and who paid,368 and ex-
penses,369 is not viewed as privileged.  If revealing this information has 
the effect of revealing a privileged attorney-client communication, 
however, such fee or billing information will be viewed as privileged 
as well.370  Thus, where a client’s motive for seeking legal services, the 
litigation strategy, or the specifics of the legal services sought could 
be deduced from particularly detailed bills, they have been treated as 
privileged.371  Some courts have viewed billing information as privi-
leged where the information would incriminate the client,372 but 
more recently, this has been limited to cases where disclosure of an 
actual confidential communication would result.373
These special circumstances are not likely to be present in cases 
not involving either unusually detailed bills,374 criminal wrongdo-
 363 In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 494 (7th Cir. 1980). 
 364 Id. 
 365 Id. 
 366 ROTHSTEIN & CRUMP, supra note 336, at 85. 
 367 In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591, 592 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[G]enerally ‘fee ar-
rangements with . . . clients are not confidential communications protected by attor-
ney-client privilege.’” (quoting United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 
(9th Cir. 1977))). 
 368 In re Walsh, 623 F.2d at 494. 
 369 ROTHSTEIN & CRUMP, supra note 336, at 89. 
 370 Id. at 92.  
 371 See Clarke v. Am. Commerce Nat’l Bank, 974 F.2d 127, 129–30 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(noting exception, but finding no privilege in this case where “statements contain 
information on the identity of the client, the case name for which payment was 
made, the amount of the fee, and the general nature of the services performed”). 
 372 ROTHSTEIN & CRUMP, supra note 336, at 92–94 (although this has been limited 
by some courts to situations where the information “provides the last link in a chain 
of evidence” against the client). 
 373 Id. at 97–99; see, e.g., Seventh Elect Church in Israel. v. Rogers, 688 P.2d 506, 
510 (Wash. 1984) (holding that a potentially incriminating disclosure regarding fees 
was not privileged if it did not “convey the substance of the confidential communica-
tions”); In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591, 592–94 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting that the idea 
that mere incrimination would make the fee information privileged, rather than the 
privileged nature of the information revealed, was based on a misreading of case 
law); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 896 F.2d 1267, 1274–75 (11th Cir. 1990) (ex-
plaining that the implicit communication of the fact of having sufficient money to 
pay the fee which accompanies payment or a promise to pay a fee is not confidential 
and need not be protected to encourage effective legal representation). 
 374 See, e.g., Real v. Cont’l Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 211, 214 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (not-
ing the unusually detailed nature of the billing statements sought to be discovered); 
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ing,375 or the payment of a fee by the client or a third party in a cir-
cumstance suggestive of wrongdoing by the client.376  Furthermore, 
the presence of these special circumstances only suggests the possibil-
ity that a confidential communication may be revealed with fee in-
formation—it does not guarantee it.377  Careful attention to the pres-
ence of special circumstances, legal research, and an analysis of the 
basic elements of privilege sufficient to provide a good faith argu-
ment that fee or billing records fall within these possible exceptions 
will be necessary to prevent claims of attorney-client privilege for such 
information from being found sanctionable.378
d. Frivolous Because Not Made in Confidence 
A communication from a client to an attorney must be both in-
tended to be confidential and made in a manner that reasonably 
could achieve confidentiality in order to satisfy the confidentiality 
element .379  Information is not intended to be confidential if it is in-
tended to be transmitted by the attorney to a third party. 380  Thus, in-
Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394, 403 (4th Cir. 1999) (finding privilege where 
the bills showed the federal statutes researched); Lane v. Sharp Packaging Sys., Inc., 
640 N.W.2d 788, 804–05 (Wis. 2002) (finding billing records that contained detailed 
descriptions of the legal service privileged). 
 375 See generally ROTHSTEIN & CRUMP, supra note 336, at 90–97 & nn.22–24 (collect-
ing and discussing the mostly criminal cases in which claims of privilege were upheld 
for information of this kind); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 925 F. Supp. 849, 857 (D. 
Mass. 1995) (noting that the payment information, determined to be non-privileged, 
was sought regarding the wrongdoing of others rather than the client). 
 376 See generally ROTHSTEIN & CRUMP, supra note 336, at 92–97 & n.24 (discussing 
numerous cases and circumstances in which client incrimination did or did not make 
fee information privileged). 
 377 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 925 F. Supp. at 855 (noting that fee information is 
privileged only in “rare situations”). 
 378 See, e.g., R.A. Hanson Co. v. Magnuson, 903 P.2d 496, 499–500 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1995) (affirming a contempt order against an attorney who refused, on grounds of 
privilege, to disclose information about the attorney’s payment on behalf of the cli-
ent of legal fees for a third party in another case); Moudy v. Superior Court, 964 P.2d 
469, 472 (Alaska Ct. App. 1998) (affirming a finding of contempt for an attorney who 
refused, on grounds of attorney-client privilege, to reveal whether a client had been 
told of a trial date and whether the client had had contact with other public de-
fender staff); State v. Keenan, 771 P.2d 244, 248  (Or. 1989) (upholding a contempt 
finding for refusal to disclose dates of attorney-client contacts where the substance of 
the communications would not thereby be revealed).  But see Seventh Elect Church, 
688 P.2d at 512 (vacating a finding of contempt against lawyers who refused “in good 
faith” to disclose unprivileged legal fee information in a case that appeared to make 
new law in Washington, as no Washington precedents were cited in the court’s attor-
ney-client privilege analysis). 
 379 RICE, supra note 26, § 6:1, at 7–9 (confidentiality requires both subjective and 
objective intent). 
 380 EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 178. 
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formation provided to an attorney for the purpose of preparing a tax 
return, for incorporation in a letter to a third party, a prospectus or 
other filing, or for any other form of disclosure will not be viewed as a 
confidential communication.381  Communications made in public 
places with no attempt to avoid being overheard382 or deliberately 
made in the presence of third parties who cannot be shown to be a 
client-spouse,383 the agent of the client or the attorney,384 or otherwise 
necessary to provision of legal services, 385 will not be viewed as made 
in confidence.  Of course, determinations as to what the client in-
tended to have transmitted to others, who is an agent of a client or 
attorney, who is necessary to the provision of legal services, or what 
constitutes reasonable attempts to ensure or maintain confidentiality 
of communications will be highly fact dependent.  As long as suffi-
cient facts are present to allow a good faith argument on these points, 
a claim of privilege will not be frivolous or unethical. 
Although clients with a common interest, such as joint clients, 
who communicate with their attorney in each other’s presence, tech-
nically do so in the presence of a third party, such communications 
are nonetheless viewed as made in confidence as to real third par-
ties.386  The presence of a common interest is crucial to the finding of 
privilege in these cases, and can arise in a number of factual situa-
tions, including patent cases, joint ventures, and common criminal or 
civil defense.387  A claim of privilege under the common interest doc-
trine will not be frivolous as long as a good faith basis in fact and law 
exists for claiming a common interest.  Such communications, how-
ever, are not viewed as made in confidence vis-à-vis the joint clients 
 381 Id. at 172–76, 178–82 (summarizing cases where no intention of confidentiality 
was found due to expectation of transmittal to third parties).  But see RICE, supra note 
26, § 6:8, at 54 (suggesting that the conclusion of no intent for confidentiality should 
not be inferred from intent to have the lawyer transmit the information subse-
quently, as legal services may counsel against the transmission). 
 382 ROTHSTEIN & CRUMP, supra note 336, §2:16, at 107–08 (reasonable attempts to 
avoid ordinary eavesdropping or observation must be made). 
 383 EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 168 (noting that the presence of other relatives or 
non-marital partners will destroy confidentiality).  But see Schreiber v. Kellogg, No. 
90-5806, 1992 WL 309632, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 1992) (presence of the father of 
the client at meeting between the client and his attorney does not the defeat attor-
ney-client privilege). 
 384 ROTHSTEIN & CRUMP, supra note 336, § 2:16, at 111. 
 385 Id. at 115–16; see also Tausz v. Clarion-Goldfield Cmty. Sch. Dist., 569 N.W.2d 
125, (Iowa 1997) (holding that the presence of an accountant was essential to ren-
dering a legal opinion). 
 386 EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 196. 
 387 Id. at 196–213; see also ROTHSTEIN & CRUMP, supra note 336, § 2:17, at 117–21. 
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themselves.388  As a result, the attorney-client privilege cannot be as-
serted by one joint client to prevent a disclosure of communications 
to the joint attorney desired by the other client.389
e. Frivolous Because Not Made by the Client 
Attorney-client privilege will only attach to communications 
made by the client or an agent of the client.390  It is the claimant’s 
burden to show that there is an attorney-client relationship.391  Vari-
ous legal tests are used to assess whether communications by an agent 
are involved, depending on whether the client is an individual or an 
entity with many internal corporate agents,392 and whether the agent 
is an independent contractor, assistant or consultant.393  These tests 
are highly fact dependent, thus it may be that many claims of agency 
are at least colorable and therefore non-frivolous.  However, the ab-
sence of facts making the agency relationship colorable will make a 
claim of privilege arising from a third party communication frivolous 
and unethical.394
f. Frivolous Because Privilege Has Been Waived 
The party claiming privilege also bears the burden of showing 
that the privilege has not been waived.395  Thus, a claim of privilege 
 388 EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 213. 
 389 See Athridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 184 F.R.D. 200, 204 (D.D.C. 1998) (find-
ing a communication from insurance company to insured’s lawyer not privileged 
against insured where lawyer was viewed as representing the common interest of the 
insured and the insurance company). 
 390 RICE, supra note 26, § 4:1, at 9–10. 
 391 Id. at 8–9 (noting that prospective clients are clients for this purpose and that 
the burden is on the claimant to show the relationship). 
 392 E.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 390 (1981) (setting out the 
federal test of privilege for communications from corporate employees to corporate 
attorneys). 
 393 RICE, supra note 26, § 4:2, at 12–21 (discussing the “necessity” test used to de-
termine the agent status of non-employees). 
 394 Waldman v. Waldman, 358 N.E.2d 521, 523 (upholding contempt charge 
against an attorney claiming privilege for address of the son of a client because the 
attorney failed to provide any evidence showing that he learned the address from his 
client); Ost-West-Handel Bruno Bischoff GmbH, v. M/V Pride of Donegal, No. M8-
85, 1997 WL 231126, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 1997) (granting sanctions where numer-
ous documents that were “not communications with any client” were withheld and 
no privilege log was provided). 
 395 See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dean, 813 F. Supp. 1426, 1428 (D. Ariz. 1993) 
(testimony concerning the precautions taken to maintain the confidentiality of a 
memo quoted in a newspaper article was sufficient to meet the burden of showing 
non-waiver); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 863 (D.C. Cir. 
1980) (claimant of privilege bears the burden of showing that confidentiality, a “fun-
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may be substantively frivolous if made for communications that would 
be privileged but for a clearly present subsequent waiver.  However, 
while some waivers involve fairly simple legal rules and factual deter-
minations,396 other waivers are either controversial,397 rest on unset-
tled law,398 or are highly fact dependent.399  Indeed, even where a 
damental prerequisite to assertion of the privilege,” was maintained after the com-
munication was made). 
 396 See ROTHSTEIN & CRUMP, supra note 336, at 159–60 (describing “express waiver, 
failure to assert the privilege, or voluntary disclosure” as “relatively unproblematic 
concepts”); see also In re Omeprazole Patent Litigation, 227 F.R.D. 227, 231–32 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (disclosing information to an expert witness constitutes a voluntary 
waiver of privilege and the “specious and frivolous” motion to protect the disclosed 
information justified an award of attorney’s fees from counsel and client jointly and 
severally); EEOC v. Exel, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1181 (E.D. Mo. 2002) (granting 
fees and costs sanctions where client voluntarily answered early deposition questions 
about communications with his attorney, then claimed privilege as to later ques-
tions). 
 397 The issue of whether voluntary disclosure of privileged information to a gov-
ernment agency results in waiver of privilege in all future settings, sometimes de-
scribed as selective waiver, has produced three different approaches in the federal 
courts.  See EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE & THE WORK-
PRODUCT DOCTRINE 76–85 (4th ed. Supp. 2004) (collecting cases in which courts in 
the Federal, First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth circuits held that selec-
tive waiver is a total waiver; in which courts in the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and 
Tenth Circuits held that selective waiver was not a waiver in other settings; and in 
which courts in the First, Second, and Seventh Circuits have held or suggested that 
selective waiver would not waive privilege if an agreement or protective order to that 
effect was put in place at the time of the selective waiver).  The encroachment on at-
torney-client privilege created by the combination of the no-selective-waiver ap-
proach and the expanding coercive practice of government agencies to demand 
privileged information in exchange for “cooperation credit” in criminal and regula-
tory investigations recently triggered the formation of an American Bar Association 
Task Force on Attorney-Client Privilege.  See TASK FORCE REPORT ON ATTORNEY-CLIENT 
PRIVILEGE, supra note 19, at 1, 12–21. 
 398 EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 309–16 (collecting cases illustrating the three differ-
ent approaches to inadvertent disclosure waiver: usually waived; usually not waived; 
and waiver dependant on five-factor analysis of the circumstances of the disclosure).  
It should be noted that within particular jurisdictions, the approach taken to inadver-
tent disclosures may have reached the status of settled law; however, a frivolous claim 
would only appear possible in jurisdictions following the most harsh approach, as the 
possibility of maintaining privilege despite an inadvertent disclosure is either quite 
likely in the “usually-not-waived” jurisdictions or is arguable on the facts in the “five-
factor-analysis” jurisdictions). 
 399 See ROTHSTEIN & CRUMP, supra note 336, 147–50 & nn.2, 4–8 (collecting cases 
finding authorization of non-officer corporate employee waivers even though this 
authority “is normally exercised by its officers and directors;” cases finding a lack of 
authorization of corporate officer waivers; cases finding attorney waivers both author-
ized and unauthorized by clients; and cases finding trustee waivers for individual 
bankrupts always authorized, never authorized, and sometimes authorized).  Waivers 
made by corporate officers, employees, and client representatives, such as attorneys, 
are dependent on a determination that the waiving actor had authority to make the 
waiver, which is a very fact-dependent determination.  Id. 
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waiver as to a specific communication is unarguable, the extent to 
which the implied waiver extends to other privileged communica-
tions on the same subject is a determination subject to both varying 
legal tests and the specific facts of the case.400  In these more prob-
lematic areas of waiver, assertions of non-waiver are likely to be 
viewed as colorable and non-frivolous.  The existence of a waiver, 
however, has been viewed as sufficiently non-controversial to justify 
sanctions in cases where counsel expressly stated that privilege was 
waived as to a particular subject401 or where advice of counsel was 
made an issue in this402 or previous litigation.403
The preceding consideration of the case law involving unsuc-
cessful claims of privilege reveals that specific guidance can be pro-
vided concerning the danger of substantively frivolous claims in cer-
tain areas of attorney-client privilege in which the law is relatively 
straightforward and settled.  Other kinds of claims remain either con-
troversial or too fact dependent to allow for useful generalizations.  
We also saw that while courts have imposed sanctions on attorneys 
who made such substantively frivolous claims, they have also been 
sympathetic to lawyers who they have seen as genuinely struggling 
with the intersection between ethical duties of confidentiality and le-
gal duties of disclosure, and have vacated sanctions imposed by lower 
courts.404  However, as these issues are increasingly brought to, and 
clearly resolved by, state supreme courts and federal appellate courts, 
it will become more difficult for attorneys to be seen as making claims 
of privilege in good faith unless they both acknowledge the existence 
 400 See id. at 159, 183–85 (noting that the extent of an implied waiver as to the 
same subject matter as the communication expressly, voluntarily, or involuntarily 
waived is interpreted more broadly by some courts and less broadly by others). 
 401 McCormick-Morgan, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 134 F.R.D. 275, 284–85 
(N.D. Cal. 1991) (imposing monetary sanctions upon attorneys who instructed wit-
nesses not to answer deposition questions on matters squarely within an express 
waiver provided by them). 
 402 See, e.g., Gov’t Guar. Fund of Finland v. Hyatt Corp., 177 F.R.D. 336, 343 (D.V.I. 
1997) (imposing sanctions where an attorney in a litigation waived privilege previ-
ously established by providing information regarding his advice in opposition to mo-
tion for summary judgment). 
 403 See, e.g., Amway Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., No. 1:98-CV-726, 2001 WL 
1818698 at *3, 12 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 3, 2001) (magistrate recommended establish-
ment of a negative fact as a sanction for meritless claims of privilege that included, 
among other claims, documents for which privilege had previously been found 
waived because they were “at issue” in a prior case). 
 404 See, e.g., In re Original Grand Jury Investigation, 733 N.E.2d 1135, 1139–40 
(Ohio 2000) (vacating contempt and monetary sanctions for an attorney who refused 
to turn a letter over to a grand jury on the ground that there was a good faith argu-
ment that ethical obligations prohibited the disclosure). 
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of the contrary controlling case law and make non-frivolous argu-
ments for distinction or reversal.  Increasingly, the comments to the 
Model Rules have offered concrete examples of problematic fact pat-
terns to illustrate rules and identify especially common areas of viola-
tion.405  Including concrete examples of claims of privilege that are 
generally agreed to be legally unsupportable in a comment to Model 
Rule 3.1 would be a particularly effective way to help lawyers avoid 
these most obviously frivolous claims of attorney-client privilege.  
However, this aspect of the proposed comment is likely to be the 
most controversial, as it raises concerns that lawyers will be chilled 
from carefully considering the possibility that communications de-
scribed as “frivolous” privilege claims might have merit in unusual 
fact settings or legal contexts, or they might be misled by concise, but 
overbroad characterizations of frivolous claims. 406
CONCLUSION AND PROPOSED COMMENT 
In a society with a complex legal system and laws unintelligible 
to non-experts, the attorney-client privilege is essential to the possibil-
ity of vindicating rights and maintaining liberties.  It is not the inten-
tion of this Article to suggest that the law of attorney-client privilege is 
too expansive or that the ethical duty to assert the attorney-client 
privilege should be reined in.  Rather, this Article seeks to strengthen 
the privilege against attacks by the executive, the legislature, or even 
the judiciary, by ensuring that claims of privilege are seen as a legiti-
mate part of legal representation and not as a mere tool for abuse of 
the system.  This requires lawyers to exercise the same judgment and 
minimal self-restraint as required by other areas of the law to avoid 
making frivolous claims.  With privilege comes responsibility.  The 
following proposed comment to Model Rule 3.1 attempts to articu-
late the attorney’s responsibility.  It has four sections that move from 
a general explanation of the ethical problem (Part A), to general 
rules for avoiding claims that are made in a frivolous manner or are 
substantively frivolous (Parts B and C), and finally to more specific 
examples of substantively frivolous claims of attorney-client privilege 
(Part D).  It could be adopted either in whole or in part.  Even if all 
 405 See, e.g., MODEL RULE PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 6–11, 16, 23, 27, 28, 31, 35 
(2004) (alerting lawyers to particular fact patterns which often produce conflicts of 
interest). 
 406 Professor Gregory Sisk has expressed to me the concern that while a carefully 
nuanced discussion of substantively frivolous claims can do a good job of setting red 
or yellow flags for certain kinds of communications without chilling potentially viable 
claims of privilege, nuance is lost in a summary comment.  Unthinking reliance on 
such a comment could then deter non-frivolous claims of privilege. 
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four sections were to be adopted, however, it is insufficient on its 
own.  Legal education and continuing legal education must also take 
seriously the importance of developing competence and judgment in 
the law of attorney-client privilege. 
PROPOSED COMMENT TO MODEL RULE 3.1 
A.     The ethical duty of confidentiality requires lawyers to assert 
all non-frivolous claims of attorney-client privilege.  At the same 
time, frivolous claims of attorney-client privilege undermine the 
proper function of the adversary system.  Lawyers must be aware 
that it is also unethical to make a frivolous claim of attorney-client 
privilege.  The evidentiary burden is on the claiming party to 
show the evidence sought falls within the attorney-client privilege.  
Ethics requires that lawyers avoid claims of attorney-client privi-
lege that are substantively frivolous or are made in a frivolous 
manner. 
 
B.     A claim is made in a frivolous manner if it is made: 
(1) without factual investigation, as appropriate under the 
circumstances, sufficient to show that facts supporting the 
basic legal elements of privilege are present; 
(2) made without taking all necessary steps, including legal 
research, to ensure that the lawyer has the foundational and 
specialized legal knowledge of the law of attorney-client 
privilege relevant to this specific claim of  privilege; 
(3) without engaging in a competent legal analysis applying 
the law of privilege relevant to this claim to the facts discov-
ered by the required factual investigation; and 
(4) made in violation of a court rule or order requiring the 
provision of specific facts relevant to privilege or a demon-
stration that the legal elements of privilege are met by these 
facts. 
C.     A claim of privilege will be substantively frivolous if it is 
made: 
(1) with essential facts missing; 
(2) based on ignorance or misreading of the law of privilege; 
(3) while failing to acknowledge and appropriately distin-
guish controlling adverse authority; and 
(4) based on a change or reversal of existing law without 
providing argument and support for such a change. 
D.     It is especially important for lawyers to engage in the appro-
priate fact investigation and legal research described above when 
considering the privilege status of communications for which a 
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colorable claim of privilege can be particularly difficult to estab-
lish, such as: 
(1) communications that seek non-legal advice or seek no 
legal advice, as is the case with scheduling communications, 
transmittal letters, and some documents sent by clients both 
to lawyers and non-lawyer employees of the client; 
(2) non-communications, such as objects, ordinary observa-
tions, and underlying information; 
(3) specific communications viewed as not ordinarily made 
by the client for the purpose of getting legal advice, such as 
ordinary client identity or location information; 
(4) communications not made in confidence, such as com-
munications made to a lawyer and third parties, made  in the 
presence of third parties, or intended to be disclosed to 
third parties; 
(5) communications to the lawyer not made by the client; or 
(6) where privilege as to these communications has been 
expressly waived by counsel or where advice of counsel has 
been put at issue. 
 
